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Abstract 
This' study compares the characteristics of A.I.D.'s rural finance projects in Latin 
America and the Caribbean with new policy guidelines issued in 1988. Information from 
A.I.D./Wa~hington files, and three case studies in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras make 
up the bulk of the report. Recent rural finance activities of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank 1and the World Bank are also surveyed. Recommendations are that A.I.D. do: 
larger rural finance projects, do more systematic financial sector studies, do less loan 
targeting, piace more emphasis on deposit mobilization, engage in long-term policy dialogue 
on finance :policies, and add a person to the LA/DR staff who might focus on rural finance. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
I 
The ~ses of this study are the following: (1) to review the inventory of documents 
in Washinglon on recent rural finance projects funded by A.I.D. (2) To compare the design 
of these pr@jects with AI.D.'s policy guidelines on financial market development issued in 
1988. (3) Tp do case studies on A.I.D. funded rural finance activities in Bolivia, Guatemala, 
and Hondujras. ( 4) To analyze factors that affect the access of the rural poor to formal 
financial s~rvices. (5) To interview present and former A.I.D. employees about their 
experience ~th rural finance projects in Latin America. And ( 6) to propose a strategy for 
LAC\RD\KD to use during the 1990s in addressing rural financial market problems. 
I 
I 
Rur~ finance programs have been an important part of U.S. bilateral assistance 
efforts in Latin America for many decades. Since the early 1970s Al.D. has funded more 
than 180 ~evelopment programs there--worth about $1.7 billion--with rural finance 
component~. The World Bank and the Inter-American Bank have also directed large 
amounts of money to agricultural credit efforts in the region. A number of the donors' 
credit pro~ams, however, have yielded less than anticipated results. Excessive loan defaults, 
few deposi~s mobilized, high transaction costs, political intrusions into lending, concentration 
of financial services, dependence on donor funding, insolvent financial institutions, capital 
erosion duf to inflation, and transitory financial services have often tarnished the results of 
these programs. 
While a number of AI.D. assisted countries in Latin America have expanded 
substainabllity their financial infrastructure in rural areas since World War II, most of the 
institutioru1 involved are fragile and many poor rural people still lack access to formal 
financial services. Both of these problems are closely related to policies that repress 
financial n}arkets and to the high costs of providing formal financial services in rural areas. 
Reforms hJt policies and innovations that reduce transaction costs in financial markets are 
two major 1ways to resolve these problems. 
I 
A.IID.'s Policy Statement on Financial Market Development issued in 1988 evolved 
out of ext~nsive research and policy discussions sponsored by the Agency since the mid-
1960s. 'fllis statement summarized the "new thinking" about financial markets and also 
prescribes I substantial changes in the design of AI.D.'s rural finance projects. The seven 
most important changes mentioned are the following: (1) Use financial markets to allocated 
resources fiore efficiently, instead of handling targeted loans or income transfers. (2) 
Governm~nts should be encouraged to liberalize their financial market policies. This 
includes a~opting market rates of interest and removing taxes and regulations that repress 
financial Jjlarkets. (3) Deposit mobilization should be promoted. (4) A.I.D. should assist 
financial ihstitutions to become more efficient and sustainable. ( 5) The development of 
equity m4rkets should be encouraged. ( 6) Governments should be encouraged to 
implement macro economic policies--especially those affecting rural areas--to provide a 
favorable /economic environment for financial markets. And, (7) A.I.D. missions should 
i 
prepare financial market assessments before starting projects that have a major impact on 
financial n¥trkets. (The Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank are 
discussing similar policy changes.) 
I 
It is not surprising that A.I.D.'s current activities in rural finance are not in full 
I 
compliance with this new policy directive. Adjustments in financial market policies are 
difficult and time consuming to effect. 
I 
I 
I 
Acc9mplishments: AI.D. has done best in encouraging liberalization of financial 
market pol,cies. While some interest rates are still too low and inflexible in Latin America, 
a number qf countries have adopted relatively flexible interest rate policies that are related 
to market forces. The Agency has also largely backed away from using financial markets 
to handle income transfers, has placed more emphasis on viable financial institutions, and 
has sponso11ed a sizeable amount of research in a handful of countries that is useful in policy 
dialogue aµd in financial market assessments. To its credit, the Agency has also been 
innovative ~n applying the new thinking about rural finance in pilot projects, especially in 
the Dominican Republic. 
I 
Shortcomings: A.I.D has made less progress in stimulating deposit mobilization, in 
developing1 equity markets, in encouraging macro economic policies more conducive to 
vigorous financial markets, and in moving away from targeted lending. The extremely large 
number of 1 AI.D. projects in Latin America with targeted credit components are trouble-
some to manage, yield results that are suspect, and cause substantial wear and tear on 
financial markets. 
1. 
A RECOMMENDED STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S 
A.ID. MIGHT ADD A PERSON TO ITS WASHINGTON STAFF AS 
SOhN AS POSSIBLE TO COORDINATE AND BACKSTOP MISSION 
PRPGRAMS IN RURAL FINANCE 
In part, AI.D. has difficulty implementing in Latin America the new policy directives 
on financi~l markets due to the lack of Washington back stopping. A person might be 
added to 1he LAC staff who is a specialist in rural financial markets and who can help 
missions 'dopt the new strategy outlined in A.I.D.'s 1988 policy statement. The job 
descriptio:µ for this position might include the following activities: 
I 
I. Assist missions in doing financial sector assessments. 
I 
11. As$iSt missions in developing rural financial sector projects that stem from the above-
mentioned assessments. 
11 
iii. 
iv. 
v. 
vi. 
vii. 
viii. 
2. 
Be a liaison with other development agencies in Washington to assure that donors 
are Jot at cross purposes in rural financial markets activities in Latin America. 
Be clearing house for new publications and research on rural finance that might 
be of interest to missions. 
I Con~uct regional and country seminars to expand knowledge of mission staff and 
policy makers about new views on rural finance. 
I 
Tak~ the lead in arranging short-course training programs for A.I.D. staff, local 
offic~als, and potential consultants on the most difficult aspects of the new views 
about rural finance. 
I 
Assi~t missions in doing more useful evaluations of rural finance projects and helping 
them to contact qualified consultants 
Be~I resource person who can explain to Congress how the new approaches to using 
rura financial markets in Latin America will better achieve A.l.D.'s Congressional 
M dates. 
I 
AI.J?. MIGHT DO LESS TARGETED LENDING 
ThrJe case studies show that AI.D. continues to do mostly loan targeting in its rural 
finance actMties, largely in attempts to achieve Congressional Mandates. Research the past 
several dec~des has shown, however, that loan targeting is usually ineffective in providing 
targeted gr~ups with sustainable financial services and often damages the performance of 
rural finanf al markets by raising transaction costs. 
3. A.I.b. MIGHT PREP ARE SECTOR STUDIES OF RURAL FINANCIAL 
~KETS, INCLUDING ANALYSES OF INFORMAL FINANCE, 
BE~ORE FUNDING RURAL FINANCE PROJECTS 
AI.b. might give rural financial markets physical examinations--understand how they 
operate antl why--before developing related projects. These financial sector assessments 
might have I four components. First, they could include in-depth analyses of informal finance 
to detel the types of services provided therein, the financial technologies used in these 
informal kets, and the contact points between formal and informal finance. Second, the 
structure d performance of the formal financial system should be documented. This 
includes sembling aggregate and institution-specific information on number of clients 
served thr4ugh both loans and deposits and whether this number is static, increasing, or 
declining. ' Detailed information on loan recovery performance, deposit mobilization performan~e, and financial status of formal institutions should also be collected. Third, the 
reasons foJ faulty performance should be diagnosed. Fourth, prescriptions for ameliorating 
problems ctnd suggestions on the role AI.D might play in this could be included. 
iii 
4. A.I.D. MIGHT FORM SECTOR PROJECTS DIRECTED AT IMPROVING 
~OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Ma~ of the problems in rural finance result from incorrect policies, not the lack of 
loanable fttjids, technical knowledge, or formal financial institutions. Policy problems occur 
in interest :rates, reserve requirements, the way financial markets are used, charges on 
rediscount : lines, information requirements, supervision and regulation of financial 
institutions~1 sources of loanable funds, and macro economic decisions. AI.D. might have 
more influ nee on policies if its assistance were bundled in financial sector loans. These 
loans migh focus on improving the overall performance of rural financial markets. 
I 
I 
Regf1rding Congressional mandates, A.I.D. might argue that an efficient, expanding, 
and sustaiqable rural financial market will reach more of the rural poor than has occurred 
through a vpiety of targeted credit programs in the past. If the new views are fully applied, 
large num[ers of the rural poor will have access to attractive deposit services for the first 
time, some of them will also have access to more formal loans, and many of the rural poor 
will receiv enhanced services through informal finance, that, in turn, has improved access 
to sustaina le formal finance. 
5. 
I 
AI.b. MIGHT EMPHASIZE DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION IN ITS RURAL 
FINANCE PROGRAMS 
I 
I 
I 
Mo't rural financial systems that operate efficiently and equitably aggressively 
mobilize d~posits. Recent research on the Agricultural Bank in the Dominican Republic, 
and on cre~it unions in Honduras and in the Dominican Republic show these organizations 
operate mpre efficiently and equitably when deposit mobilization is stressed. A.I.D. has 
been crea~ve in funding several small technical assistance projects in Latin America that 
demonstrf.d the feasibility of mobilizing substantial amounts of voluntary deposits in rural 
areas. It · ght extend these programs into other countries as a way of demonstrating the 
opportuni ies to mobilize more deposits. 
6. AIID. MIGHT ENGAGE IN SYSTEMATIC, LONG-TERM DIALOGUE 
WllfH LOCAL POLICY AND OPINION MAKERS OVER 
c9NTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN RURAL FINANCE 
Ma/ny of the problems in financial markets in Latin America are caused by incorrect 
policies 31_d these policies have been difficult to influence through the project approaches 
tradition3fly used by A.I.D. Virtually all of these policies are linked to other critical 
economic rconsiderations. Lack of clear understanding about the adverse effects of these 
policies inbreases the difficulty of encouraging policy changes. Most of the policy issues that 
ought to be front and center in AI.D.'s policy dialogues are outlined in its 1988 policy 
statement/ on financial markets. Incorrect policies are more likely to be changed if A.I.D. 
designs ru~al finance projects so they include sustained, long-term policy dialogue buttressed 
by some ~olicy oriented research. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
iv 
U.S. FUNDED RURAL FINANCE ACTIVITIES IN 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1942-1990: 
A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S 
by 
Dale W Adarns1 
INTRODUCTION 
The. following discussion reviews the rural finance activities of the Agency for 
Intemationial Development's (AI.D.) in Latin America since the early 1940s, with particular 
emphasis oln the period since the early 1970s.2 This includes doing an inventory of AI.D.'s 
rural finan~e projects, reviewing evaluations of these projects, and briefly summarizing the 
efforts of tJie World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in this area (objective 
number on~ in the scope of work). Another objective of the study is to chronicle the extent 
to which ~I.D.'s projects conform to the new thinking on rural finance as summarized in 
a recent ~I.D. Policy Paper (objectives 3, 6 and 7 in the scope of work). This includes 
identifying /and analyzing cross-country issues affecting clientele groups of particular interest 
to A.I.D. (objective number 2 in the scope of work). 
I 
In Jddition to reviewing A.I.D. documents in Washington, case studies are also 
presented that describe rural finance activities in three countries (objective number 4 in the 
scope of ~rk). Additional background information was provided by informal interviews 
with a number of current and retired AI.D. employees who have had experience in rural 
finance ( o~jective number 5 in the scope of work). The final objective of the study is to 
recommentl a strategy for the 1990s--a first draft of a scope of work--for LAC/DR/RD that 
would lea4 to practices in accord with AI.D.'s 1988 policy statement (objective number 8 
in the scope of work).3 
I 
I 
1Thmtjas Dickey, Jerry Ladman, Michael Saperstein, and Robert Vogel helped collect 
the informjation presented in this report. Rafael Rosario and Mark Bidus also helped with 
data collecttion and analysis. 
I 
2In th~ remainder of the discussion I use the term 'Latin America' to mean all of the 
countries ~n the Americas south of the U.S. 
3 Agenb for International Development, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, 
"A.I.D. Pplicy Paper: Financial Markets Development," Agency for International 
Developlllient, Washington D. C., August, 1988. 
! 
1 
2 
To $eet the objectives outlined in the scope of work for this study, the report is 
organized into seven sections plus a Bibliography and two Appendices, one containing three 
country casF studies and the other presenting brief descriptions of World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) activities in rural finance. As background for the study, 
the first sdction provides historical background on U.S. involvement in rural finance 
activities in Latin America. The second section presents details on the magnitude of 
A.l.D.'s in~olvement in rural finance since the early 1970s and also outlines the new views 
on rural firtance summarized in A.I.D.'s recent policy paper. This section draws heavily on 
project information and evaluations available in Washington, on interviews with A.I.D. 
employees,1 and on three country case studies (Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras). The 
third section critiques evaluations done on A.I.D.'s rural finance projects and also makes 
suggestion$ on how to strengthen evaluations of rural finance projects. The fourth section 
present a Summary of information from the three country case studies. The fifth section 
outlines th¢ major lessons learned. The sixth section compares A.l.D.'s rural finance efforts 
across varipus countries in Latin America with recent A.I.D. policy guidelines for financial 
market activities. The seventh and final section provides suggestions on a new strategy that 
A.l.D. might use during the 1990s in Latin America to address problems of rural finance. 
This strategy is consistent with A.l.D.'s 1988 policy statement on financial market projects 
and is alsq consistent with new policies that are emerging in the World Bank and in the 
Inter-American Development Bank. 
I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
TuJ involvement of U.S. Agencies in rural finance in Latin America goes back to the 
early 1940~. I divide these activities into four periods: the 1940s, the 1950s and 1960s, the 
1970s, ancl the 1980s. 
I 
The 1940s1 
I 
The earliest rural credit program receiving U.S. support in Latin America was in 
Paraguay in 1942.4 Rice reports a jointly funded U.S./Paraguay program administered by 
the Cooperative Service for Agriculture (STICA) that included a major rural credit 
component (p.75). Walter Crawford, previously an employee of the Farm Security 
I 
I 
4The y.s. Department of Agriculture and the Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) 
promoted rural development in 11 Latin American countries during World War II. Many 
of these efforts were aimed at stimulating the production of a commodity, such as rubber, 
that was ~tal in the war effort. In other cases the programs were aimed at producing more 
food. After the War, some of these programs evolved into various Servicios that were 
supported by U.S. agencies (Rice, 1971. p. 53-55). Aside from Paraguay, agricultural credit 
initially p~ayed a minor role in these efforts, but funding for agricultural loans became more 
importan~ as the Servicios developed. Many of these program evolved, with substantial U.S. 
assistance, into relatively large supervised credit programs during the 1950s and 1960s. 
I 
3 
Administrahon, has the distinction of being the first U.S. technician to work on rural finance 
in Latin Anterica. A few years later Crawford was employed by the American International 
Associatio11i for Economic and Social Development (AIA) to initiate several agricultural 
credit programs in Brazil and Venezuela [Wharton, 1950 and 1969].5 These programs 
linked extension efforts with supervised credit, and the technicians participating in AIA's 
programs a$sisted farmers in obtaining loans along with giving them technical assistance. 
The opti.Il$m that surrounded these efforts is shown in a 1952 statement by an AIA 
employee: I 
I 
Pro~rams in the U.S. in 1930s strongly influenced AIA and AI.D. credit efforts. 
After Word War II, numerous policy makers and administrators from Latin America 
studied the U.S. farm credit system. Many of the U.S. credit experts in Latin America were 
former em~loyees of either the Farmers' Home Administration (FmHA) or the cooperative 
farm credit system. Because many of the credit programs initiated in Latin America 
received ~S. support, the U.S. experience in agricultural credit had a strong influence on 
these effo1 ~s. 
Poli ·es: Aside from the emphasis on institution building, policy makers and donors 
attempted o use supervised loans with low interest rates to substitute for informal lending, 
to stimula e use of new farm technologies, and to encourage production. The limited 
presence f formal lenders in rural areas meant that the impact of these efforts was 
generally s all and several of the credit projects ended up being pilot efforts. In some cases 
supervised I credit programs were later folded into specialized agricultural banks. 
I 
5The +was a private non-profit corporation funded largely by Nelson Rockefeller and 
his broth~~s. A It was organized in July, 1946 and initially focused its efforts in Brazil and 
Venezuela An important objectives of AIA was improvement of agricultural credit systems 
in particip ting countries by combining farm planning, education assistance to farmers 
through e tension, and sound bank loans. No AIA funds were lent and all lending 
programs e James G. Maddox, "Credit Experience in South America," in Bauer, Volume 
1, pp. 214- 21. 
I 
4 
Res$arch: Because the scope of formal rural financial activities was limited and the 
capacity for undertaking social science research was even less well developed, there was 
little reseatch done on rural finance in Latin America prior to the 1950s. Most of the 
discussion <?f agricultural credit that made its way into the literature came from Asia. Far 
East views about agricultural credit dominated the thinking about rural finance for several 
decades af~er World War II, mostly because it was the only research available. 
The 1950s knd 1960s 
I 
Begfnning in the early 1950s predecessor agencies of A.I.D. funded several waves of 
rural credit programs.6 Continuing earlier emphasis, supervised credit was stressed in a 
number of countries with most of these programs being attached to the agricultural Servicios 
sponsored ~y A.l.D. Reservations about informal lenders, emphasis on low rates of interest, 
using loans to help the poor or to promote targeted activities, advocacy of credit 
cooperatives, and replication of the U.S. farm credit system were the conceptual foundations 
for these aFtivities. These views dominated the International Conference on Agricultural 
and Cooperative Credit held in Berkeley, California in 1952, sponsored by the U.S. bilateral 
aid agency! as well as a United Nations seminar on agricultural credit held at about the 
same time1in Guatemala (Bauer, Davis, United Nations). Periodic regional seminars in 
Latin America largely funded by A.I.D. in 1957 through 1966, continued to focus on these 
concerns. As a result, donor agencies, especially, the Inter-American Development Bank 
and A.I.D.
1 
began to place heavy emphasis on developing and enlarging agricultural credit 
programs. 
I 
A.I.p. was particularly aggressive in promoting new credit institutions. From 1950 
to the early 1970s, it spent over $700 million--much of this in Latin America--in various 
types of agricultural credit programs (Rice, 1973, p.2). This included placing a large number 
of credit aqvisors, largely for institution building purposes, in virtually all of the 17 countries 
in Latin Ahierica where AI.D. was working. Most of these advisors attempted to implant 
supervisedlcredit programs. Later, various forms of cooperative credit institutions were also 
supported~ a few countries. Still later additional emphasis was placed on developing credit 
unions. Irl the mid-1960s AI.D. also provided funding through the regional credit union 
office, CUNA--a private cooperative organization--to encourage credit unions to offer 
directed credit programs in various countries aimed at small farmers, Ecuador being a 
notable example. 
I 
Th~ IDB began the bulk of its agricultural credit programs in the 1960s and their 
efforts corlcentrated on development banks. While a few of these efforts were targeted at 
a particul~r economic activity, most of IDB's funds augmented the amounts available for 
lending to 1 farmers in general. Only later did the World Bank become heavily involved in 
6In the remainder of the discussion, I use the term 'A.I.D.' to include A.I.D. and 
predecess?r agencies. 
5 
agricultural] credit programs. This included making funds available for intermediate- and 
long-term l~ans for farm investments, mainly through government owned banks, especially 
in Brazil a.Dfd Mexico. Operators of medium- and large-sized farms received most of these 
loans. Thq Bank also included major credit components in other agricultural projects. 
During this
1 
time it became popular among donors to speak of credit as being part of a 
package of jinputs needed to stimulate agricultural production. 
I 
Dutjng the 1950s and 1960s the assumptions behind donor's rural finance effort were: 
(1) most fajrmers in Latin America needed loans and supervision in order to adopt new 
technologitjs; (2) informal sources of loans were inadequate and too expensive; (3) most 
farmers were too poor to invest their own funds in new technologies, let alone to make 
deposits; (4) there were major shortages of reasonably priced loans for farmers in most 
countries; ~5) imperfections in rural financial markets resulted in few medium- and long-
term loans being available for farmers; ( 6) the financial infrastructure serving rural areas 
was incom lete, inadequate, exploitative, or incompetent; and (7) commercial bankers were 
too consentative to make loans to farmers. 
I 
Poli ie : Common government and donor policies during this period included: (1) 
Creating n w institutions to provide loans in rural areas; (2) replacing informal borrowing 
with formal loans; (3) setting concessionary interest rates on agricultural loans and on rural 
deposits; ( 4) increasing the supply of formal agricultural lending through grants or loans 
directly to ~evelopment banks, cooperatives, or rural private banks, or indirectly through 
rediscount lines in central banks; and, (5) tying loans to regional, commodity, target group, 
or input prbmotion efforts. 
I 
Res ar h: Initially, policy makers were confident that most of the answers to 
agricultur credit problems could be found in the high income countries and transferred to 
low incom countries. Prominent authorities on agricultural credit in Latin America during 
this period such as Belshaw, Fernandez y Fernandez, and Rochac rarely reported empirical 
results in tfeir publications. Despite the increasing interest in the problems of agricultural 
credit, rela~vely little research was done on this topic until the mid-1960s. A.I.D. lead in 
stimulatin~ this research through a centrally funded research contract in 1964. Most 
subseque~~ analysis of rural finance and related region-wide policy dialogue has been 
sponsoredjby AI.D.7 Much of the research done during the latter part of the 1960s on 
agriculturar- credit was descriptive, focused on alleged credit impact among borrowers, 
7 AI. . funded most of the major seminars and conferences during the 1950s on 
agricultur credit problems in Latin America. The Agency also provided virtually all of the 
funding fo research done on rural finance in Latin America while other donors have 
allocated ery few funds to research on this topic. A.l.D also provided most of the funds to 
conduct t; major policy dialogues on rural finance: the 1972-73 Spring Review of Small 
Farmer C dit, the 1981 Colloquium on Rural Finance in Washington D.C., and the 1989 
Seminar o Informal Finance held in Washington D. C. 
I 
I 
I 
6 
described t4e sources and terms of rural loans, and attempted to document monopoly profits 
among informal lenders. This research was mostly descriptive, used farm surveys to 
determine the sources and terms of rural loans, included some analysis of lender procedures, 
attempted tb document credit impact, and touched on informal lending. Most importantly, 
however, t~ research began to uncover common problems in many rural finance programs 
in Latin America. 
I 
The 1970s I 
I 
By the early 1970s it became increasingly apparent that the design of many 
agricultural credit programs was flawed, even though donors and governments continued to 
spend large amounts of money on them. The most obvious problems were poor loan 
recovery, w~ak lending institutions--some were insolvent--and heavy dependency on outside 
funding. There was also criticism that too few formal loans were reaching the rural poor. 
Even with 1hese major problems, most donors and a number of governments continued to 
rapidly incttease the supply of agricultural loans during the 1970s, making credit the main 
rural devel<;>pment instrument in countries such as Brazil and Mexico. Emphasis on building 
new finandal institutions generally declined. 
I 
The continued use of concessionary rediscount lines to fund agricultural credit 
projects discouraged financial institutions from mobilizing deposits. Sticky interest rate 
policies often resulted in negative real rates of interest on both loans and deposits leading 
to loan confentration in the hands of relatively few borrowers, few deposits being mobilized, 
and financial institutions that could not sustain the purchasing power of their loan portfolios. 
Extensive loan targeting and the associated reporting requirements also increased 
transaction! costs in financial markets and limited willingness to expand. Also, because many 
of A.I.D.'s Eral credit efforts emerged in small projects, A.I.D. had relatively little influence 
on major financial and economic policies that strongly influenced the performance of rural 
financial Itj.arkets. 
I 
In ppt, the fragmentation of A.I.D's rural credit efforts was caused by a reorientation 
in its activities in the early 1970s to focus on the poorest of the poor. This resulted in 
emphasis ~n poverty, small farmers, women, and small enterprises. Later, additional 
emphasis was given to promoting the private sector. This resulted in a change in 
terminology that substantially broadened the focus of analysis from 'agricultural credit' to 
'rural finance.' This included increased concern about deposit mobilization and about the 
overall peI[f ormance of rural financial markets. 
Parhy because of this reorientation, A.I.D. became increasingly concerned about the 
results of its previous efforts to provide loans to small farmers. In response to this concern, 
A.I.D.'s "Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit" in 1972-73 assembled a large amount of 
information on agricultural credit programs and also clarified the extent of problems in rural 
financial markets (see AI.D. volumes in the Bibliography and Donald's book). The Review 
showed th~t most problems, practices, and policies associated with agricultural credit in 
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Latin Ame~ica were found in other regions of the world. The most obvious problems were 
that relatively few poor people received cheap credit, that many of the institutions handling 
I 
these programs were not sustainable, and that few deposits were being mobilized in rural 
areas. 
Polities: Despite mounting criticism, many policy makers promoted concessionary 
loans to hef p agriculture and the rural poor through the 1970s. Rigid interest rate policies, 
combined with substantial inflation pressures, resulted in negative real rates of interest on 
most formal agricultural loans in many Latin American countries. Increased use was also 
made of cdncessionary rediscount lines in central banks to target funds at priority groups, 
commoditi¢s, inputs, or regions. Extensive use was also made of concessionary loans in 
attempts td offset the adverse effects of other policies on farmers' decisions, particularly in 
Brazil's massive credit program. Because of increasingly severe balance-of-payments and 
foreign de~t problems, many governments were eager to acquire more foreign exchange 
through 1041.ns for credit projects. 
I 
Ge:qeral economic policies that affected the profitability of farming also left their 
mark on ftnancial markets. Import substitution strategies often resulted in overvalued 
exchange tates that effectively taxed agricultural exports and reduced farm incomes, 
creditwortlliiness, and savings capacity. It became increasingly apparent that the well being 
of rural financial markets was inexorably linked to agricultural pricing policies, exchange 
rate polides, the efficiency of the marketing system and public investments in rural 
transportation, research, and education. 
I 
Research: With the substantial increase in agricultural credit projects, there was also 
a major increase in associated research and analysis, often tied to these projects. Dozens 
of studies puring the 1970s, for example, attempted to justify credit projects by estimating 
credit denpnd, or alleged credit impact among borrowers, and many of these studies were 
evaluations of AI.D. funded projects. 
i 
Re~earch in Costa Rica and in Brazil was particularly helpful in clarifying the 
regressive way in which repressed financial markets allocate subsidies (e.g., Adams and 
Tommy, ahd Vogel and Gonzalez-Vega). 
Be~ause of the pervasiveness of negative real rates of interest for both formal loans 
and on rutal deposits, much of the policy dialogue among researchers, donors, and policy 
makers cetntered on interest rate policies. The increasing concern with policies also began 
to nudge rbsearch away from looking at what happens to borrowers, to more concerns about 
what was happening to financial intermediaries and to the performance of rural financial 
markets owerall. 
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The 1980s I 
Prob~ems in rural finance escalated into major crises in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Economic stress in many countries made it more difficult for borrowers to repay 
their loans 1 and for lenders to find creditworthy borrowers. Burdensome foreign debt 
reduced thel ability of many governments to continue attracting donor funds for agricultural 
credit projJcts, and mounting budget deficits also forced governments to reduce their 
funding for rural finance. The real value of loan portfolios in a number of countries 
declined dur to high transaction costs of lending, negative real rates of interest, government 
borrowing hat squeezed the private sector out of loan markets, and declining loan 
recoveries. 
Many rural credit unions in Latin America were decapitalized during the 1980s (e.g. 
in Bolivia, t~e Dominican Republic, and Peru). In other cases large programs, such as the 
Jamaican D~velopment Bank, collapsed and new banks or programs were formed to replace 
them. In several countries, including Brazil, sharp declines in the real value of formal 
agricultural loans--contrary to conventional expectations--caused little or no decrease in 
agriculturajl output. In still other cases, such as Bolivia, specialized agricultural banks 
experience major contractions in the real value of their loan portfolios and this forced 
them to re uce farm lending. 
Individuals in development circles became disillusioned during the 1980s with the 
results of p~st agricultural credit programs. While some donors and governments continued 
to fund agrifu.ltural credit, they did so with waning enthusiasm. This stimulated interest rate 
reforms and also encouraged several A.I.D. missions to experiment with deposit mobiliza-
tion. 
A.l.~.'s concern with deposit mobilization was prompted by the results of the 1972-73 
Spring ReJew. AI.D.'s interest was first visibly expressed in a pilot savings mobilization 
project in Peru in the late 1970s. The results of this project showed that a weak bank and 
a few flounrering credit unions could mobilize substantial amounts of voluntary deposits in 
rural areas, even when economic conditions in the country were unfriendly. These results 
encouraged A.I.D. to experiment with rural deposit mobilization in additional countries: 
Honduras and the Dominican Republic. 
Poli ies: It became more difficult to generalize about the policies and assumptions 
applied to ral finance during the 1980s. In some countries, interest rate reforms--or lower 
inflation--raised real rates of interest in rural finance: e.g., Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile. Still 
other governments continued traditional attempts to use rural finance as income transfer 
mechanis,--Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru--while other countries sharply reduced their 
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efforts to qontinue these transfers or to target agricultural credit:8 e.g. the Dominican 
Republic. Policy makers in several countries became resigned to credit programs that 
mainly served relatively large producers, while others were making concerted efforts to reach 
small borrdwers through rural finance. In part, this reflects diversity in policy makers' 
perceptions~ both in low income countries, and differences in local economic conditions. 
Some governments were forced to wean rural financial markets from external assistance due 
to foreign debt and budget problems, while others were not. 
I 
A "first draft" of new thinking about rural finance and its contribution to development 
emerged from the Colloquium on Rural Finance held in Washington D. C. in 1981 (Adams, 
Graham~ Von Pischke). It was sponsored by A.I.D. and the World Bank. Most of the 
donor employees interested in rural finance, who were located in Washington at the time, 
attended thlese meetings. The major policy issues discussed were the case for interest rate 
reforms aqd the appropriateness of using rural finance to transfer subsidies through 
concessionary interest rates and loan defaults. Also discussed were the effectiveness of 
aiming loans at specific target groups or activities, the impact of non-financial policies on 
rural finanJe, and deposit mobilization. Also covered were the merits of viewing informal 
finance more positively, the provision of financial services to non-farm rural enterprises, and 
the importance of understanding how various credit projects and policies affect the 
performanqe of rural finance. 
i 
Thejpolicy recommendations that emerged from the Colloquium emphasized major 
changes in the way rural financial markets were used to support development. This included 
doing much less loan targeting, placing more emphasis on developing sustainable financial 
institutions, adopting flexible interest rate policies that resulted in positive real rates of 
interest ori both loans and deposits, less use of concessionary rediscount lines, more 
emphasis oµ reducing transaction costs in rural financial markets, and much more emphasis 
on mobilizing deposits. It was also recommended that much less emphasis be placed on 
justifying credit projects on the basis of the impact of loans on ultimate borrowers. Instead, 
it was recohimended that more attention be placed on evaluating how credit projects affect 
the perfonµance of financial intermediaries and the overall performance of rural financial 
markets. This later recommendation was incorporated into A.l.D.'s 1988 policy paper on 
financial markets. 
I 
Th~ acceptance of the Colloquium's policy recommendations by governments and 
donors was uneven. AI.D. attempted to adjust its rural finance efforts so they were more 
in line with the recommendations of the Colloquium, and went so far as to sponsor pilot 
8Finant:ial markets transfer subsidies in two ways: through allowing loan defaults or 
through c9ncessionary interest rates. Concessionary interest rates effectively "tax" the 
providers pf funds (governments, donors, or depositors) and "subsidize" borrowers. The 
subsidies conveyed by concessionary interest rates become larger as negative real rates of 
increase. I 
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projects on deposit mobilization. In 1988 A.1.D. also issued its policy guidelines for financial 
market projects that were consistent with the recommendations made in the Colloquium. 
The Inter-American Development Bank made a few adjustments in its agricultural credit 
activities in lthe early 1980s and then made major adjustments in the late 1980s. The World 
Bank responded ambiguously: The general recommendations were accepted as being 
consistent ~th the Bank's long standing policy of encouraging higher rates of interest in 
rural finanqial markets, but, ultimately, few changes were made in the Bank's agricultural 
credit projects during the early 1980s. It was obviously difficult for donors with large 
amounts of money to lend to adopt new approaches in rural finance that required less, 
rather than I more, donor funds. 
In October 1989, AI.D and The World Bank sponsored a seminar in Washington 
D.C. that f~cused on informal finance in low income countries. Participants challenged 
much of the conventional wisdom about informal finance and reinforced the notion that 
informal fil).ance generally provides valuable service to many poor people. Some of the 
participant~ argued that informal finance was more successful in serving poor rural people 
than was fotmal finance, and that careful analysis of the practices in informal finance might 
lead to insights that would be helpful in making formal finance programs more sustainable. 
Res~arch: In the 1980s research on rural finance began to anticipate policy changes 
and was closely tied to these changes. This work was more diagnostic and prescriptive, and 
less descriptive than was the case in earlier analysis. Consistent with the conclusions of the 
1981 Colloquium, the research focus gradually shifted from borrowers and savers to financial 
intermediaries. This resulted in less farm-level interviewing and more analysis of the 
operations of intermediaries and how their performance was affected by government 
policies. Riegarding deposit mobilization, research increasingly focused on measuring the 
effectivends of deposit mobilization efforts, instead of trying to measure savings capacities. 
Particularly in Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras applied research 
was used as an educational tool to facilitate policy dialogue. 
I 
Recent research has also stressed documenting transaction costs in rural finance and 
their alloca~ion among participants. It has identified reasons for excessive transaction costs, 
and suggesied how to reduce these costs through financial innovations (e.g., Cuevas and 
Graham). These investigations show that attempts to use rural financial markets to transfer 
subsidies to borrowers or for loan targeting raises transaction costs and thus weaken the 
primary, rdsource-reallocating role of rural financial markets. Researchers also began to 
argue that the best way to encourage the financial system to extend its services in rural areas 
to the poor is to reduce the costs of financial intermediation for intermediaries and for their 
clients. ~ese policy suggestions have been labelled the "New Views" in rural finance and 
most of them are included in A.I.D.'s 1988 policy statement on financial market develop-
ment. 
11 
Summaty of the New Views 
A.I.D.'s policy statement stresses seven main points, the sum of which amounts to a 
major change in the way the Agency deals with financial markets: 
I 
1. Financial markets should be used primarily to mobilize and reallocate claims 
on resources; their role should not be to handle income transfers or 
directed/targeted loans. 
2. Financial market policies should be liberalized. This includes allowing market 
forces to largely determine interest rates on loans and deposits, increasing 
interest rates on rediscount lines in central banks so they do not discourage 
deposit mobilization, enhancing competition among financial intermediaries, 
and eliminating other policies that distort the operation of financial markets. 
3. Financial markets should be encouraged to mobilize more voluntary deposits 
and to rely less on government and donor funding. 
4. · AI.D. projects should develop sustainable financial institutions. This includes 
helping to reduce their transaction costs, enhancing supervision of financial 
intermediaries, and streamlining regulation and information requirements 
5. A.I.D. should help in the development of equity markets that would allow 
share capital to replace some long-term debt. Many firms would be better 
able to manage risk if equity, rather than debt, formed the base of their 
operations. 
6. A.l.D. should also encourage governments to pursue macro economic policies 
that provide hospitable economic environments for rural financial markets. 
7. Finally, AI.D. should prepare financial market strategy papers before 
initiating projects that affect financial markets. 
Whlle the formal statement of A.I.D.'s policy on financial market development was 
not issued until the latter part of the 1980s, many of the policy prescriptions in it were 
understood by a number of A.I.D. employees after the 1973 Spring Review. This 
understanding was further broadened by subsequent research and the 1981 Colloquium. 
Thus, it ntjght be expected that A.l.D.'s rural finance efforts should have been influenced 
somewhat by the new views before the official policy statement was issued. 
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I A.I.D. PROJECTS IN RURAL FINANCE SINCE 1973 
It is 
1
more difficult now to summarize A.I.D.'s efforts in rural finance than it was 
when E.B. Rice did it for the period up to 1973. The scope of A.l.D.'s efforts has expanded 
substantiallt beyond the agricultural credit programs he surveyed. Credit components can 
be found en/1-bedded in rural projects that have relatively little to do with agricultural credit: 
e.g., export 
1
promotion, women development, environment projects, deposit mobilization, 
microenterprises, rural housing, disaster relief, and industries that serve agriculture. Also, 
there are a surprisingly large number of projects with credit components. As can be noted 
in column~ of Table 1, there were 181 AI.D. projects in Latin America with significant 
rural financp components during the 1973-90 period--far more than we had anticipated when 
we were making plans for the study. Only a handful of them were strictly for agricultural 
credit or rdral finance. The total value of these projects amounted to about $1.7 billion 
(Table 1, c~lumn 4 ), four times the nominal amount allocated to agricultural credit in the 
period prior to 1973. 
I 
It was difficult to document the volume of funds involved in projects directed at rural 
finance actfities. As a result, the values in Column 4 of Table 1 should be interpreted as 
approximat•ons rather than exact figures. This is due to several reasons: (1) Documentation 
on a few projects was simply not readily available in Washington. In other cases, the project 
information available in A.I.D.'s Center for Information and Evaluation was incomplete. 
(2) More ifiiportantly, funds for rural finance are usually only one component of larger 
A.I.D. proj~cts. In some cases the absolute size of this component is not clearly stated in 
project doduments. In other cases, the original amounts committed to rural finance were 
augmented! or reduced as the project evolved. Since our analysis is largely based on original 
project pro~osals, we may have missed later changes. (3) Many of the projects analyzed 
were augmented by additional local currencies (counterpart or P.L. 480 funds) that were 
partly conttolled by AI.D. The documentation on these funds is spotty and it is impossible 
to know the extent to which these local funds resulted in additionality or financial 
substitutiort.9 (4) In some countries local currencies may be channelled by AI.D. to rural 
finance act~vities that are not seen in Washington as being part of formal A.l.D. projects. 
9For ~ample, AI.D. may require a government to commit ten million pesos of 
counterpar!t funds to augment the supply of agricultural credit involved in an A.l.D. project. 
The gove~ent, however, may decide to comply with this request through reducing by ten 
million pe,os the amount it would have otherwise put into the agricultural credit system, 
thus resulting in no additionality. 
I 
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TABLE 1. U.S. Funded Rural Finance Activities in Latin America 
! and the Caribbean, 1942-1990 
Country or 
Region 
LA Regional 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Caribbean 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Totals 
1942 - 1972* 
Technician US$ 
Years Million 
51 
38 
6 
27 
18 
53 
22 
16 
61 
5 
5 
10 
7 
10 
29 
20 
15 
11 
404 
19 
82 
18 
39 
23 
21 
11 
10 
23 
1 
7 
40 
11 
3 
10 
23 
10 
351 
1973 - 1990** 
No. of US$ 
Projects Million 
9 
2 
17 
11 
5 
6 
13 
11 
9 
12 
9 
0 
6 
24 
7 
0 
9 
8 
9 
13 
1 
0 
181 
77 
6 
261 
79 
37 
43 
95 
81 
63 
215 
79 
35 
298 
62 
30 
43 
25 
199 
*** 
1,728 
* E.B. Rice, "History of Agricultural Credit", Evaluation paper No. 8, Program and Policy Coordination Bureau, Agency for International 
Development, Washington, D.C., June 1973, pp. 33-91. 
** 
*** 
Information was drawn from project files maintained by the Development 
Information Division, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, A.I.D., Washington, D.C. 
One hundred thousand dollars. 
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(5) fnflation is still another serious problem. The effects of inflation on the real 
value of th~ US dollar and, even more importantly, on the real value of local currencies 
have been 
1
substantial over the time span of this study and also vary substantially across 
countries. 
1 
Since we could see no systematic way of deflating both the dollar and local 
currency vajlues--because of money flow problems--we decided to leave all values in nominal 
terms. ( 6) 1 Finally, there is some overlap between the figures in columns two and four in 
Table 1. With the information that is available in Washington, we were unable to tell 
exactly wh+n funds were spent in projects that started before 1973 but did not end until 
later. Th~ figures in Column 4 of Table 1 are likely on the high side of the amounts 
I 
actually sp~nt on rural finance during the 1973-1990 period. 
I 
I A CRITIQUE OF EVALUATIONS DONE ON AI.D. FUNDED 
I RURAL FINANCED PROJECTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Out original plans were to use some of the information reported in evaluations of 
AI.D.'s ru~al finance projects to drawn conclusions about the performance of these projects. 
A.l.D. propedures require evaluations on most projects funded by the Agency. These 
evaluatio~ are part of the project documentation assembled and maintained by A.I.D.'s 
Center fot Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE). Unfortunately, these 
evaluation$ turned out to be less accessible and less useful for meeting the objectives laid 
out in our iscope of work than we had originally anticipated. 
Accessibilik 
Evafuation documents on some rural finance projects, for example, were not in 
CDIE's li~rary or in its machine readable data base, especially on the oldest projects.10 
In other cases, only abstracts of evaluation documents were readily available in machine 
readable form. It would have been possible to obtain some hard copies of the original 
evaluationl documents from microfiche or microfilm, but this would have cost several 
thousand 4ollars in reproduction costs that were not anticipated in our contract budget. A 
few compl,te evaluation documents--about two dozen--were available in CDIE's Library and 
in a university library. We reviewed these documents along with abstracts of evaluation 
documents that were available on about half of the other 157 rural finance projects covered 
by our stu4y. We drew the following conclusions about evaluations of Al.D. rural financed 
projects ~e,ed on reviewing these documents and abstracts--assuming they were fairly 
represent~tive of other evaluations that were unavailable: 
1. Re~atively few of the evaluations provided information that was useful in meeting the 
objectives [of this study. 
I 
I 
I 
10We were surprised by how few of these evaluation documents were available in mission 
files on prbjects that had been completed in the three countries where we did case studies. 
I 
15 
2. Mant of the evaluations of projects with rural credit as only a component of a larger 
program provided little information about the credit activities. 
3. Most, of the evaluations that did analyze finance activities attempted to measure the 
impact of loan use on borrowers' activities in terms of changes in employment, income, 
output, capital formation, input use, or adoption of new technology. 
I 
4. Few of the evaluations measured the impact of the project on financial institutions 
handling th¢ credit aspects of the program. Almost none of the evaluations documented 
transaction costs of either borrowers or lenders. Few of the evaluations provided detailed 
information1 on loan recovery performance or on deposit mobilization. None of the studies 
reported onl the extent to which the credit project contributed to additionality in terms of 
numbers of borrowers or funds lend. Few of the studies provided insights on the extent to 
which the leinding agency covered its cost of handling project lending out of interest receipts. 
None of the evaluations provided a clear picture of the extent to which the project 
strengthened or weakened the financial intermediary and whether the loan activities were 
sustainable !without donor assistance. 
Usefulness I 
Evaluations generally attempted to justify the credit program in terms of the targeting 
objectives set up for the project and these seldom included concern for the well being of the 
financial system. In many cases loans were viewed as a productive input rather than as 
increases in1 the borrower's purchasing power. In addition to providing little information on 
the financi~l institutions handling the credit projects, a number of the studies reviewed had 
methodological weaknesses that led to systematic overestimation of project benefits and 
underestimation of associated costs. 
On tpe issue of overestimating benefits, for example, measuring accurately the impact 
of loans at the borrower level requires data that are difficult to assemble. Three methods 
were used ~n most of these impact evaluations: The first method assembled economic 
information about borrowers before, and after they used loans. Changes in borrowers' key 
economic ipdicators were then often attributed to borrowing. The second method used 
compared ~conomic performance of a group of borrowers with a control group of non-
borrowers. ·Differences in performance between the two groups were then attributed to the 
project loa~s. The third method relied on simple tabulation of the loan purposes stated by 
borrowers on loan applications. If, in the aggregate, a group of borrowers said they used 
their loans to buy ten tons of chemical fertilizer, for example, this was taken to be a partial 
measure of
1 
the impact of the loan--an increase by ten tons in the use of chemical fertilizer. 
Eveµ if evaluators have little interest in the well being of the financial system, all 
three of these methods have a tendency to overestimate the benefits realized by individuals 
from loan use. The before-and-after-loan method, for example, usually attributes all of the 
increases ilJl output, input use, increases in employment, augmentation in investments, and 
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increases inlincome to loan use. Too often the contributions of other development efforts 
that accompany loan use cannot be isolated or are ignored. Farm income, for example, may 
have increased because of favorable weather or higher prices that happened to accompany 
the lending program. Since before-loan information is seldom assembled in anticipation of 
a credit program, this type of information usually must be collected on a recall basis and 
borrowers nltay feel obligated to gild the lily when reporting how much progress they have 
made unde~ the credit program, especially if they feel a favorable evaluation will enhance 
the chances of its continuation. 
I 
The with-and-without studies are vulnerable to another type of weakness. Unless 
loans are ralndomly distributed among a population it is virtually impossible to assemble a 
control grotip (firms or individuals without loans) who are identical--except for the fact they 
do not receive a loan--to the group of borrowers. If the lending program is efficient, it 
should seledt individuals who are creditworthy, who have excellent investment opportunities, 
who are good managers of their resources, and who are also above average entrepreneurs. 
With or without loans this group of selected individuals should achieve more over a given 
period than individuals in the control group. It is impossible to know what economic 
advances this selected group of borrowers would have realized without borrowing and, thus, 
it is easy tol assign too much change to the use of loans. 
The ~hird method, as well as the second, is unable to measure the degree of financial 
substitution! that occurs with the borrowing of project loans. For example, at least some 
farmer borrowers who use loans to buy chemical fertilizer may have been willing to use at 
least some bf this modern input if project loans had not been available. They may have 
relied on irlformal finance, other sources of formal finance, self finance, sale of assets, or 
deferred cqnsumption to fund investments they viewed as being highly profitable in the 
absence of project lending. Clearly, some measure of financial substitution and fungibility 
is involved 1in virtually every borrowing and it is difficult and costly to assemble data that 
yields clea~ insights into additionality in input use caused by a loan. Ignoring fina.ncial 
substitution results in estimates of the benefits of using loans that are exaggerated. 
Occkionally anecdotal stories are presented in evaluation studies to suggest that the 
benefits of ~oan use are substantial, even if the overall benefits of the program are difficult 
to docume~t. For example, a rural development project may make several small loans to 
a women in a village who is able to substantially increase her income by producing enough 
candles to rpeet the needs of her entire village. Because of borrowing, her income increases 
and she repays her loans with interest--the loans were successful in elevating the economic 
position of the borrower. At least partially, however, her gain may be another person's loss. 
A candle 1111aker in a neighboring village may be able to sell fewer candles because of the 
competition and thereby suffer a decrease in her income, for example. The net social 
benefits ofl this increase in candle production are unclear, especially if project loans are 
subsidized. 
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Thei;e types of subtle issues that diminish the real benefits of credit projects are 
seldom de~t with in evaluations of A.I.D. rural finance projects. 
Lik4wise, if value is placed on sustaining a viable, efficient, and equitable financial 
system attention must also be given to the wear and tear (costs) imposed on that system by 
an A.I.D. rural finance project. Virtually none of the evaluations we reviewed mentioned 
this issue. • Over the past several decades AI.D. has used a number of credit unions, 
cooperatives, development banks, and non-governmental organizations as channels for 
handling rtjral finance projects. Some of these organizations have now disappeared or are 
bankrupt. While A.I.D. should not be blamed for all the difficulties encountered by the 
financial institutions with which it has worked, it does bear culpability in some of these 
problems. AI.D. and other donors, for example, were largely responsible for the large 
number of FOncessionary targeted rediscount lines in central banks that have dampened the 
interest in tfeposit mobilization among participating financial institutions, thus making them 
highly dependent on politically tainted funds. This, in turn, made it more difficult for 
lenders to recover loans, made them more vulnerable to political intrusions into the loan-
making process, and also increased transaction costs associated with processing targeted 
loans. Th~ social costs of the deposits not mobilized--because of the disincentives to save 
that often accompanied donor rural finance program--are substantial, even though they are 
difficult to 1 document. 
It would also seem appropriate to more carefully document the direct costs on 
financial intermediaries of A.I.D.'s rural finance projects. This includes answering most of 
the followihg questions. Was the intermediary able to protect the purchasing power of its 
loan portf,lio from the ravages of inflation using A.I.D.'s interest rate guidelines? In 
addition, was the intermediary able to cover its costs of lending and default risks with the 
spreads allowed on interest rates? Were the costs of technical assistance, project evaluation, 
equipment1 depreciation, and training properly accounted for in costing the program? 
Finally, wa.S the intermediary given a menu of activities that were sustainable after the extra 
support supplied by the donor was withdrawn, or would the program likely disappear with 
the exit ofthe donor? 
U~ortunately, the A.I.D. evaluation documents we reviewed provided little 
information that would allow assessment of these costs or answers to these important 
questions. I In large measure, the lack of this type of information suggests that financial 
market development was not an important objective in many of the projects evaluated. 
Because of these shortcomings, we were unable to use summaries of information 
from thes~ evaluations to measure the success or failure of AI.D.'s projects in developing 
sustainabl4 rural financial markets. Instead, we chose to compare the results of these 
projects with the policy guidelines for financial market development issued by the Agency 
in 1988. 
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THREE CASE STUDIES 
The countries selected for case analysis were Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
These countries were selected because they had relatively large programs in rural finance, 
because A.~.D. had been concerned about rural finance problems there for a number of 
years, and also because some research had been done on rural finance in each country. The 
case studies are presented in Appendix A to this report. Only a brief synopsis of each case 
is presented here. 
Bolivia 
I 
i 
The !Bolivian Agricultural Bank (BAB) was founded in 1942 and has played a pivotal 
role in proYiding rural financial services since then. Various commercial banks, a few 
agricultural cooperatives, credit unions, several supervised credit programs, several non-
governmental organizations, and various discount lines in the Central Bank have also 
provided rural financial services at various times since World War II. 
A.I.D.'s first efforts in rural finance began in 1955 through a contract with 
Internationµ.l Development Services to assist in creating a supervised credit program within 
a bilateral agricultural Servicio that A.I.D. had helped to set up in 1948 (Rice, 1973). This 
credit program was later transferred to BAB in 1963. During the late 1950s and early 1960s 
AI.D. made several additional loans or grants to BAB and also funded a directed credit 
program a9ministered by the Federation of Credit Union Cooperatives (FENACRE). A 
variety of rural credit efforts were also funded by A.I.D. through a Special Fund for 
Economic Development established in the Central Bank. In the early 1970s A.I.D. provided 
additional :financing for rural credit through an Agricultural Rediscount Fund in the Central 
Bank that :funded the BAB, as well as private banks, credit unions, and other public credit 
• I 
agencies. 
Since the early 1970s A.I.D. has directly funded 17 projects with major rural credit 
components amounting to more than a quarter of a billion dollars, a substantial part of 
which was ttirected at targeted activities in rural areas. In addition, a number of other rural 
finance prqjects were funded out of A.I.D. controlled P.L. 480 funds. Few of these programs 
focused ex~lusively on expanding or strengthening rural finance and the activities for which 
loans were targeted included: small businesses, basic food producers, colonization, 
agricultura!I cooperative members, rural investments, a loan guarantee program, market town 
developm9nt, credit union members, disaster relief loans, and coca substitution. 
! 
At various times the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank have 
also provided substantial assistance to rural finance in Bolivia. 
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Guatemala I 
In 1929 the Credito Hipotecario Nacional de Guatemala was formed to supply 
agricultural loans. An additional agricultural lending agency, the Instituto de Fomento de 
la Produccipn was founded in 1948 and in 1953 the Banco Nacional Agrario (BNA) was 
established Ito provide still another source of loans in rural areas. A.l.D.'s first efforts in 
rural financr in Guatemala began in 1955 in support of a colonization effort. Later, U.S. 
funds and technicians were used to develop a supervised credit program in BNA (Rice, 
1973). Until 1962 most of AI.D.'s rural finance efforts were attached to BNA. Subsequent-
ly, the supemsed credit program was absorbed by a new bilateral Servicio, SCICAS, that 
reported to_i the Ministry of Agriculture.11 In 1963, the Inter-American Development Bank 
took over the primary funding of the supervised credit program. 
Apart from supervised credit, A.I.D. also provided substantial funding for loans to 
rubber farmers in 1959. In the 1960s A.I.D. began supporting two lines of cooperative 
development that involved on-lending to farmers. In 1964 A.I.D. support was given to credit 
unions and later A.I.D. also supported multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives that all on-
lent to fanl}ers. In the early 1970s A.l.D. provided substantial support to BANDESA, the 
successor td SCICAS. This again brought A.I.D. into the business of promoting supervised 
credit. From the early 1970s until now, A.I.D. has provided funding for rural finance 
through nine projects amounting to a total of about $80 million. 
HonUuras. Prior to 1950 only a small amount of farm lending was done in Honduras 
by a couple of commercial banks. In 1950 the Government formed the Banco Nacional de 
Fomento (BANAFOM) with its primary purpose being to provide agricultural loans. Very 
early the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) helped the Bank develop a supervised 
credit program that encountered substantial problems. In the mid-1960s AI.D. began 
supporting two tracks in rural finance, one aimed at small farmers through BANAFOM, and 
the other at strengthening lending by credit unions and cooperatives. Later A.I.D. made 
additional loans or grants to fund loans for food production, livestock, grain storage 
facilities, atricultural cooperatives, and agro-industries. 
Since the early 1970s A.l.D. has funded 24 projects with substantial rural finance 
components worth, in total, about $300 million. In addition to general funding for 
expanding fhe amount of rural lending, assistance was given to credit unions, to assist in 
strengthening rural organizations, in loans for small farmers, to supervised credit, to export 
110ne ~f the reasons A.l.D. encouraged the shifting of the supervised credit program 
away from BANAFOM to the Ministry of Agriculture's control was because BANAFOM 
resisted ap~lying concessionary interest rates on supervised loans for small farmers! (Rice, 
1973, p.36). The widespread amnesia about previous A.I.D. efforts in rural finance in Latin 
America m~y be a blessing in disguise, since A.I.D. might be otherwise subject to consistency 
complaints 'by local policy makers. 
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promotion, ror disaster relief, for improvement of coffee production, to facilitate land sales, 
to enhance rural technologies, for forestry development, to promote deposit mobilization, 
for microenterprises, and for irrigation facilities. 
In addition to AI.D., the Inter-American Development Bank has also provided 
substantial funding to BANAFOM. There are also four commercial banks in Honduras that 
do significant amounts of agricultural lending, largely out of their own funds. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
A mi1mber of useful lessons can be drawn from the three case studies, the review of 
A.l.D. proj~cts and associated evaluations, informal discussions with A.I.D. employees 
knowledgeable about rural finance, the large volume of literature available on rural finance, 
and cross country comparisons.12 
1. The! first lesson is that developing a strong and sustainable rural financial system in 
Latin America is much more difficult to do than experts initially anticipated 
immediately after World War II. At the same time the financial infrastructure in 
most Latin American countries has been substantially expanded the past 50 years. 
A.I.D. can take pride in the numerous financial institutions it has assisted in Latin 
America, but it is discouraging how many of these organizations, have disappeared, 
are ~nsolvent, or unable to survive without outside assistance. 
2. While all of AI.D.'s efforts to reach the rural poor through various types of credit 
programs have been well intentioned, many of these efforts ended up being high cost 
and transitory. Many of these programs essentially disappeared, or substantially 
shntnk, soon after AI.D.'s support was withdrawn. AI.D. and other donors have had 
a difficult time designing rural financial institutions that were efficient, equitable, and 
sustainable. 
3. It appear that few of the borrowers from A.I.D.'s rural credit programs "graduated" 
to cpmmercial forms of borrowing or that programs were able to "graduate" to non-
concessionary sources of funding. 
4. Witlh 20/20 hindsight, it is clear that cheap credit was an inequitable instrument for 
helping the rural poor. Since the benefits from using concessionary loans are always 
proportional to loan access, borrowers who receive large loans always receive more 
benefits than small borrowers or non-borrowers. Subsidies tied to loans, therefore, 
often help the rich more than the poor. The low interest rates, in turn, make it more 
12Readers wishing additional documentation on these lessons may wish to refer to some 
of the puqlications listed in the Bibliography. 
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diffiblt to mobilize deposits, distort lending decisions, and undermine the vitality of 
the tender. 
5. It also appears that loans are a relatively weak policy instrument for influencing 
producers' behavior. Product prices, new technology, and input prices factor into the 
deci~ions of most small producers more strongly that do loans and interest rates. A 
loan, regardless of the terms placed on it, does not alter the relative profitability of 
investments faced by producers, nor make an unprofitable investment profitable. 
This calls into question the efficacy of doing extensive loan targeting. 
I 
6. AI.D. deserves special recognition for helping to prove that many of the rural poor 
in several countries in Latin America are willing to deposit significant amounts of 
funds under appropriate conditions. 
I 
7. AI.D. is also largely responsible for helping to clarify the substantial transaction costs 
that lenders incur when participating in targeted lending and how these costs affect 
lending behavior. Closely associated with this, A.I.D. has also helped to clarify the 
important role transaction costs incurred by borrowers and depositors play in their 
beh~vior. In many cases, high transaction costs for lenders, deposit mobilizers, 
boqowers, and savers have limited the access of poor people who live in rural to 
formal financial services. 
8. While A.I.D. has often been instrumental in encouraging policy reforms in rural 
financial markets, it has been difficult for the Agency to do this systematically in 
conjunction with the kinds of targeted credit projects that made up most of its 
portfolio in Latin America. The Agency has been most successful in encouraging 
interest rate reforms and in consolidating rediscount lines in central banks. 
9. Ovclrall, it has been difficult to design projects that focus on enhancing the 
performance of rural financial markets within Congressional mandates that are more 
easily accommodated through loan targeting. 
10. Finklly, a review of A.I.D.'s evaluation documents on recent rural finance projects 
revealed some limitations in their design that were discussed earlier. 
POLICIES COMPARED TO PRACTICE 
It is easier to prepare a policy paper in Washington than it is to encourage new 
policies inJ AI.D. assisted countries. As a result, there is substantial difference between 
A.l.D. pohcy and practice in the area of rural finance in Latin America. 
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Objectives rnd Accomplishments and Shortfalls 
As was mentioned earlier, AI.D.'s policy paper on Financial Markets identifies seven 
major objectives that Missions ought to pursue. 
Accqmplishments: AI.D., and other donors, have done best in encouraging the 
liberalizatiqn of interest rate policies, a vital ingredient in the new views. The Agency has 
also been ~uccessful in reducing transaction costs by consolidating credit lines in several 
countries, for example, in the Dominican Republic and in El Salvador. A.I.D. has also been 
ahead of the pack in sponsoring research on rural finance--a precursor to financial sector 
assessment~--in a number of Latin American countries. The Agency has also sharply 
lessened it$ attempts to use financial markets as vehicles for handling income transfers or 
subsidies f9r borrowers which, in turn, enhances the ability of these markets to allocate 
resources more efficiently. A.I.D., and other donors, have also become more sensitive to 
the costs imposed on financial intermediaries by donor credit programs. A.I.D. deserves 
especially liigh marks for its leadership in developing the new thinking on rural finance, the 
associated research it has sponsored, and the extensive policy dialogue--especially among 
donors--it pas stimulated on this topic. Also, AI.D.'s pilot efforts in rural deposit 
mobilization, especially in Peru and the Dominican Republic, have broken new ground. 
I 
A.I.b.'s innovative efforts in the Dominican Republic merit special mention. 
Through s¢veral projects, the Mission has promoted deposit mobilization in rural areas, 
lowered trtnsaction costs in the Agricultural Bank and some credit unions, funded applied 
research that supports sustained policy dialogue, and carried out a number of seminars that 
exposed a ~arge number of policy makers in the country to new thinking about rural finance. 
These efforts spanned most of the 1980s, were heavy on technical assistance and light on 
funding, and had strong back stopping from Mission staff. The efforts in the Dominican 
Republic 11rovide a valuable model for systematically addressing major policy issues that 
might be more widely applied in Latin America. 
Sho~falls: A.I.D. has made less progress in promoting equity markets, in encouraging 
large segments of financial markets to mobilize deposits, and in inducing policy changes that 
would proyide economic environments more conducive to vigorous rural financial markets. 
As the three case studies show--in attempts to meet Congressional mandates--A.I.D. also 
continues ro use rural financial markets extensively for handling targeted loans with suspect 
results and with adverse effects on the ability of these markets to allocate resources 
efficiently.I As a result, many of A.I.D.'s rural finance projects end up providing transitory 
financial services that terminate with the project and which often weaken the agency 
handling the loans. A.I.D. has also found it difficult to address the problem of improving 
the overal' efficiency of rural financial markets. Loan recovery problems continue to persist, 
high transaction costs for lenders, borrowers, and depositors are common, and far too many 
of the fina!ncial institutions assisted by AI.D. remain dependent on outside funding. A.I.D. 
missions have also been slow to include improvement of financial intermediation as a 
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primary objective in their rural finance projects. This shows up most clearly in evaluations 
done on thrse projects. 
It is 1 not plausible to expect the busy staff of disparate A.l.D. missions to evolve the 
dramatically new and difficult-to-implement strategy for rural financial markets outlined in 
the 1988 pblicy statement without strong leadership from Washington and without more 
formal traiping to upgrade staff understanding of the subtle and difficult issues embodied 
in the new views on rural finance. There is also little sharing of successes and failures in 
current ru~al finance projects among missions--a function that ought to be provided by 
Washington staff. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
LAC\DR\RD and associated missions might consider implementing the following 
strategy in 1the 1990s to bring A.I.D. funded rural finance programs in Latin America more 
in line wit9 the policy guidelines proposed in the 1988 policy statement on financial markets. 
The recommendations that follow are ordered by time priority. 
1. A.Lb. MIGHT ADD AT LEAST ONE PERSON TO ITS WASHINGTON 
STAFF TO COORDINATE AND BACKSTOP MISSION PROGRAMS IN 
RURAL FINANCE 
! 
In part, A.l.D. has difficulty implementing in Latin America the new policy directives 
on financifl markets due to the lack of Washington back stopping. A person might be 
added to f.e LAC staff who is a specialist in rural financial markets and who can help 
missions adopt the new strategy outlined in A.I.D.'s 1988 policy statement. The job 
description for this position might include the following activities: 
i 
i. Assist missions in doing financial sector assessments. This should include identifying 
qualified consultants to do the assessments, developing a standard format for these 
assessments, and helping the missions to interpret results. 
ii. Assist missions in developing rural financial sector projects that stem from the above-
mentioned assessments. This might include helping to initiate sustained policy dialogue. 
Some of tfuis might be done on a regional basis through workshops and seminars. 
111. Be la liaison with other development agencies in Washington to assure that donors 
are not at 1cross purposes in rural financial markets activities in Latin American countries. 
iv. Be 
1
a clearing house for new publications and research on rural finance that might 
be of intetest to missions. 
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v. cotjduct regional and country seminars to expand knowledge of mission staff and 
policy makers about new views on rural finance. This should include providing opportunities 
to share s~ccess stories among missions. 
vi. Take the lead in arranging short-course training programs for AI.D. staff, local 
officials, and consultants on the most difficult aspects of the new views about rural finance. 
vii. Assist missions in doing more useful evaluations of rural finance projects and helping 
them to contact qualified consultants 
viii. Be f resource person who can explain to Congress how the new approaches to using 
rural financial markets in Latin America will better achieve A.l.D.'s Congressional 
Mandates.13 · 
! 
2. A.I.b. MIGHT DO LESS TARGETED LENDING 
The three case studies show that A.I.D. continues to do mostly loan targeting in its 
rural finan~e activities, largely in attempts to achieve Congressional Mandates. Research 
the past several decades has shown, however, that loan targeting is usually ineffective in 
providing ~argeted groups with sustainable financial services and often damages the 
performanfe of rural financial markets (e.g., Vogel and Larson; and Cuevas and Graham's 
chapters iri Adams-Graham-Von Pischke). Targeting is ineffective and gives a false sense 
of control because of fungibility.14 A loan, regardless of the terms placed on it, does not 
alter the relative profitability of a targeted activity. 
Loan targeting is damaging because it undermines incentives to mobilize deposits 
(because of cheap rediscount lines), adds to the transaction costs of borrowers and lenders, 
13Congress will likely continue to insist on targeting foreign assistance. It is A.I.D.'s 
responsibil~ty, however, to help Congresspersons and their staffs to understand the 
limitations I and problems of using loans for this purpose. A rural finance specialist in LAC 
ought to be aggressive in sharing publications and information with people on the Hill who 
need a better understanding of these problems. There is nothing wrong with targeting 
foreign asslstance, but it is wrong to continue using credit programs to echo those targeting 
priorities when they may be ineffective in achieving the desired results. 
14The ~ssential characteristic of money is its interchangeability, or fungibility. One unit 
of a currency is indistinguishable from another unit. A targeted loan, therefore, simply adds 
to the liquidity a borrower has for spending. How the borrower decides to allocate the 
additional liquidity will largely depend on the marginal rates of return or the additional 
satisfaction that might be realized from various alternatives available to the borrower, not 
on the purposes stated in obtaining the loan. See article by Von Pischke and Adams for a 
more ample discussion of this issue. 
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and clogs ilnformation channels with data that are not useful for managmg financial 
institutions. 1 
Sector lending might largely substitute for smaller targeted programs. If targeting is 
a political iJ!nperative, limit its adverse effects on deposit mobilization and transaction costs 
by taking care not to set preferential interest rates on loans and also keep the reporting 
requiremenits to a minimum. 
I 
3. AI.I>. MIGHT PREPARE SECTOR STUDIES OF RURAL FINANCIAL 
~KETS, INCLUDING ANALYSES OF INFORMAL FINANCE, 
BEFORE FUNDING RURAL FINANCE PROJECTS 
I 
I 
Skil~d physicians seldom give prescriptions to individuals without first doing physical 
examinatio:µs to isolate the causes of disease. A.I.D. might do likewise in its rural finance 
activities; it might give rural financial markets physical examinations--understand how they 
operate and why--before developing related projects. For example, is the fact that most 
commercial bankers refuse to lend to small farmers, but informal lenders eagerly do so, 
largely a q'r1estion of transaction costs or traditional attitudes? Likewise, various forms of 
informal finance may be highly successful in mobilizing deposits from poor people, while 
banks and cooperatives are much less successful. Is this largely due to policies that dampen 
incentives to save or to mobilize deposits, or is it due to low propensities to save? 
To fts credit, A.I.D. has sponsored a substantial amount of research of rural finance 
in Bolivia, 1Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Jamaica that provides a substantial amount of the information needed in these financial 
1. 
sector studies. 
These financial sector studies might have four components. First, they could include 
in-depth analyses of informal finance to determine the types of services provided therein, 
the financful technologies used in these informal markets, and the contact points between 
formal and informal finance. This would yield a clearer idea about the types of financial 
services that rural people currently find useful and the techniques they have invented to 
satisfy the$e demands. It would also show the extend to which A.I.D. target groups are 
serviced bf informal finance. 
Secbnd, the structure and performance of the formal financial system should be 
document¢d. This includes assembling aggregate and institution-specific information on 
number of clients served through both loans and deposits and whether this number is static, 
increasing~ or declining. Detailed information on loan recovery performance, deposit 
mobilization performance, and financial status of formal institutions should also be collected. 
Comparative costs of effecting similar financial transactions and information about changes 
in these transaction costs is also useful in evaluating performance. It is also important to 
document 1 the types of loans being made by the system and major sources of funds for 
lending. 1 
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Third, the reasons for faulty performance should be diagnosed. For example, is the 
financial system finding it difficult to mobilize deposits because of concessionary rediscount 
lines, legislation that prohibits development banks from accepting deposits, or because of 
high rese~e requirements? Is the financial system hesitant to lend to the rural poor 
because oflthe transaction costs involved, the lack of acceptable loan collateral, or because 
of interest rate restrictions? Do donor procedures increase or decrease the transaction costs 
associated with a credit program? Does the insertion of external funds into rural financial 
markets introduce political pressures to make loans on some basis other than credit-
worthiness and does this lead to loan default problems? 
Fourth, prescriptions for ameliorating problems and the role A.I.D might play in this 
could be ~eluded. For example, if formal lenders resist lending to more of the rural poor 
because of high transaction costs, the analysis should identify ways to reduce these costs. 
If agricultu al banks are discouraged from mobilizing deposits by concessionary rediscount 
lines, policy changes should be identified for eliminating these disincentives. If a large 
number of policy makers in the country do not accept the new views about rural finance, 
mechanisms should be proposed for helping them better understand these new ideas. 
4. A.l.D. MIGHT FORM PROJECTS DIRECTED AT IMPROVING THE 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
MaJy of the problems in rural finance result from incorrect policies, not the lack of 
loanable fuinds, technical knowledge, or formal financial institutions. Policy problems occur 
in interest I rates, reserve requirements, the way financial markets are used, charges on 
rediscount lines, information requirements, supervision and regulation of financial 
institutions, sources of loanable funds, and macro economic decisions. A.I.D. and other 
donors have slight if any influence on these policies via small and short-term projects that 
focus on segments of the financial system. 
I 
A.I.p. might have more influence on policies if its assistance were bundled in 
financial sdctor loans.15 These loans might focus on improving the overall performance of 
rural finan~ial markets in terms of loan recovery, transaction costs, deposit mobilization, 
geographic! coverage, range and quality of financial services provided, the number of people 
served, and the viability and sustainability of financial institutions. 
Re~ding Congressional mandates, A.I.D. might argue that an efficient, expanding, 
and sustainable rural financial market will reach more of the rural poor than has occurred 
through a 1ariety of targeted credit programs in the past. If the new views are fully applied, 
large num ers of the rural poor will have access to attractive deposit services for the first 
time, some of them will also have access to more formal loans, and many of the rural poor 
15The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have both moved in the 
direction of doing more rural financial sector lending the last several years. 
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will receive I enhanced services through informal finance, that, in turn, has improved access 
to sustainable formal finance. 
I 
5. A.I.D. MIGHT EMPHASIZE DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION IN ITS RURAL 
FINANCE PROGRAMS 
Most rural financial systems that operate efficiently and equitably aggressively 
mobilize deposits. The farmers associations in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan are widely 
recognized as efficient and equitable organizations that help a large number of rural clients 
both with deposit and loan services. The more recent and highly successful KUPEDIS/ 
SIMPEDES programs in Indonesia also stress deposit mobilization. Recent research on the 
Agricultural Bank in the Dominican Republic, and on credit unions in Honduras and in the 
Dominican Republic show these organizations operate more efficiently and equitably when 
deposit mobilization is stressed (see two studies by Poyo ). Deposit mobilization enhances 
performance by reducing political intrusions (compared to targeting), results in more 
discipline among financial intermediaries and savers, provides deposit services to the poor 
who would otherwise not have these services, and improves the efficiency of resource 
allocation in rural areas. Financial systems that mobilize substantial deposits also make 
fewer calls on tight government budgets. 
Donor agencies have found it difficult to directly assist deposit mobilization because 
it does not require much foreign exchange. AI.D. has been creative, however, in funding 
several small technical assistance projects in Latin America that demonstrated the feasibility 
of mobilizing substantial amounts of voluntary deposits in rural areas. It might extend these 
programs into other countries as a way of demonstrating the opportunities to mobilize more 
deposits. Even more importantly, AI.D. and other donors might coordinate their efforts so 
as not to inadvertently discourage deposit mobilization and to, in fact, encourage same. This 
includes assuring that attractive incentives are offered on deposits, reducing the disincentives 
financial intermediaries have to seek deposits, and not helping lenders to become highly 
dependent on external funds when deposits could provide a substantial portion of the 
loanable fu;nds. A.I.D. has learned a great deal about how to mobilize deposits in rural 
areas through several pilot programs in the Dominican Republic during the 1980s. This 
experience and approach might be extend to most of the other countries in Latin America. 
6. AI.D. MIGHT ENGAGE IN SYSTEMATIC, LONG-TERM DIALOGUE 
WITH LOCAL POLICY AND OPINION MAKERS OVER 
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN RURAL FINANCE 
Many of the problems in financial markets in Latin America are caused by incorrect 
policies and these policies have been difficult to influence through the project approaches 
traditionally used by AI.D. Virtually all of these policies are linked to other critical 
economic considerations and are often sustained by powerful political and economic forces 
that benefit from these policies. Lack of clear understanding about the adverse effects of 
these poli9es increase the difficulty of encouraging policy changes. By-and-large, A.I.D. 
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(and other donors) has had only limited success in using numerous, relatively small and 
targeted loan projects to precipitate major changes in policies. These projects are often 
negotiated I with individuals or agencies who play little or no role in setting policies that 
damage fitjancial markets most. Often, the negotiations surrounding the project take place 
relatively quickly and do not allow for the time and patience that is often required to realize 
a major policy changes. 
In lkrge part the policy issues that ought to be front and center in A.l.D.'s policy 
dialogues ~re outlined in its 1988 policy statement on financial markets. They include 
interest rate policies, reserve requirements, charges on rediscount lines, use of rediscount 
lines, taxes on financial institutions, reporting requirements, the way financial markets are 
used to support development, defaults, use of financial markets to transfer subsidies, loan 
targeting, 'nd the criteria used to evaluate financial market projects. 
Doing systematic financial sector assessments that carefully document the 
shortcomi1tgs of existing system, focusing on larger projects that more directly address the 
financial s~stem, and including a systematic and relatively long-run policy dialogue with the 
project may give AI.D. a better chance of encouraging important policy changes. The 
combination of pilot projects, applied research, policy seminars, and ongoing policy dialogue 
along the 'ines done in the Dominican Republic the past few years provides a promising 
model for ~ow to stimulate appropriate policy changes elsewhere. 
I FINAL COMMENTS 
Ru~al development in general, and development of sustainable formal financial 
markets t~ support this development in particular, are difficult tasks. It is even more 
difficult when the focus is the poorest of the poor. Providing sustained financial services to 
the rural poor is the most difficult and costly thing that can be asked of formal financial 
systems. !~should not be surprising, therefore, that many of A.I.D.'s efforts in this regard 
encounter roblems. U.S. foreign assistance agencies, nevertheless, have been instrumental 
in helping ost countries in Latin America to expand their formal financial systems servicing 
rural areas since World War II. Possibly even more importantly, A.I.D. has also been 
aggressive in studying its successes and failures and learning how to do a better job of 
providing ~he rural poor with formal financial services. AI.D.'s 1988 policy statement on 
financial I1farket development is a distillation, in large part, of that learning. 
A.I.D studies have also substantially clarified why many credit programs aimed at 
rural clients in Latin America encounter problems. These studies shown that part of these 
difficulties 1 are caused by disadvantaged rural economies--one should not expect financial 
systems to be vigorous and healthy if the enterprises they service are economically stressed. 
It is obvious that formal rural financial markets in Latin America perform poorly partly 
because o~ slow and erratic agricultural growth. Serious bouts of inflation also limit the 
ability of rr1.any formal rural financial markets to function as efficiently and equitable as they 
might. I 
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Not all of the maladies in rural financial systems can be attributed to adverse 
economic epvironments, however.16 It is becoming increasingly apparent that at least part 
of the problems in these systems is due to attempts to use formal financial markets for 
I purposes beyond their capacities--essentially design problems in traditional rural finance 
project. The numerous attempts to use cheap credit to help the poor in Latin America--as 
well as elsewhere--have largely failed with most benefits going to the non-poor. Likewise, 
the numeroµs attempts to use targeted loans and augmentations in the supply of credit funds 
to boost rural production have yielded disappointing results. All too often, targeted credit 
programs result in transitory financial services, elevated transaction costs, political intrusions 
into loan mlaking decisions, discouragement of deposit mobilization, and financial systems 
that are dependent on outside funds. 
In la;rge part, donors have used financial markets in Latin America as a "commons" 
the past 30 ! years; hundreds of donor funded credit projects have been imposed on these 
markets with little regard for how they affect the sustainability of the overall financial 
system. Despite numerous attempts to form new formal financial intermediaries or to 
strengthen existing institutions, there have been few donor funded programs that were aimed 
directly at Jnhancing the overall performance of these markets. All too often attempts to 
strengthen segments of these markets, without changing the economic and policy 
environme11t in which they operate, led to failure. Because of the way they were designed 
few of thesf credit projects had a substantial impact on financial market policies. 
I 
In large part, A.l.D. has had limited influence on critical policies affecting financial 
markets be¢ause its efforts are fragmented into many small and relatively short-run projects. 
The three crse studies show that A.l.D.'s projects in rural finance are largely transacted with 
agencies that have little to do with the most important policies affecting rural financial 
markets, namely the central banks and the ministries of finance. This problem is 
exacerbated as Al.D. increasingly shifts it efforts to the private sector. Furthermore, the 
burdens of µianaging these project make it difficult for mission employees to do subtle and 
difficult po1icy massaging. 
If intplemented by LAC\ DR \RD, the recommendations presented in this study will 
result in a major change in the way A.l.D. addresses and uses formal rural financial markets 
in Latin America.17 The challenge at hand is to improve the performance of rural financial 
16The fact that informal finance often flourishes in many situations where economic 
environme:ilits are harsh, suggests that the health of financial intermediation is not entirely 
dependent on economic growth and stability. 
' 
17Since the recommendation in this report are closely related to A.l.D.'s own policy 
statement, implementation of these recommendations will essentially mean that LAC\DR-
\RD lives up to directives it received in 1988. 
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markets.18 Sharply reducing the transaction costs of lenders, savers, and intermediaries will 
be a critical part of this process. New financial technologies that allow intermediaries to 
reduce trahsaction costs, and new policies that encourage the development of these 
innovations must be a central part of these efforts. Formal financial intermediaries will only 
extend their services further down the economic ladder to the rural poor on a sustained 
basis when the costs of financial intermediation are reduced. 
18 As an aside, AI.D.'s current emphasis on private sector development is resulting in a 
relatively large number of microenterprise projects in Latin America that have major credit 
components. Many of these projects are managed by private sector offices in A.I.D. 
missions rather by rural or agricultural offices. These projects are very similar to the spate 
of small farmer credit projects that A.I.D. promoted in Latin America up until about 10 
years ago and these microenterprise projects may be repeating many of the errors 
experienced in those programs. It may be advisable, therefore, for the entire LAC Bureau 
to consider applying Al.D.'s policy 1988 guidelines on financial market activities, rather than 
limiting th4se changes to only those emanating out of the LAC\DR\RD office. 
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A.I.D. SPONSORED RURAL FINANCE PROJECTS 
IN BOLIVIA 
by 
Jerry R. Ladman • 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of A.I.D.'s rural finance 
programs in Bolivia over the 1970 the 1990 period and to assess the extent to which these 
programs fit within A.I.D.'s new policy framework for finanical market. The influence 
A.I.D. has lhad on policies associated with financial markets is also examined. 
I 
Bol~via is an interesting country to study because A.I.D. has sponsored a large 
number of agricultural credit programs there the past two decades and for most of the time 
the governpient had a fixed interest rate structure, with concessionary rates for agricultural 
credit. Mdreover, the political turmoil, the hyperinflation that occurred in the first half of 
the 1980s, and the successful stabilization program in the last half of that decade make that 
country somewhat unique. Each of these factors furnished a special environment that 
influenced financial market development and created unusual circumstances for A.l.D.'s 
programs. 
This study is organized in three parts: (1) a historical overview of USAID/Bolivia's 
activities; ~2) a brief description of other international donor projects in agricultural credit 
in Bolivia; and (3) a critique of AI.D.'s rural financial market activities in Bolivia based on 
the criteri4 in the 1988 Policy Paper. 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Over the two decades under study there are five identifiable periods that represent 
different programming, project and policy activities by AID/Bolivia: (a) 1970-1974, a time 
when projects to promote production of basic foodstuffs and import substitutes were 
stressed; (b) 1975-1978, a period when projects targeted to benefit small farmers were 
emphasized; ( c) 1979-1982, a time when A.l.D. funding and programming was cut back due 
to politica~ problems; ( d) 1983-1985, a period of natural disasters and hyperinflation and 
when ad h~c PL-480 domestic currency programs were developed; and ( e) 1986-1990, a time 
when the PL-480 programs were expanded and financial markets were restructured in the 
aftermath pf economic stabilization. 
• Pro~essor of Economics, Arizona State University. 
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1970-1974j1 
Pri r to the late 1960s, the Bolivian Agricultural Development Bank (BAB), which 
was estab shed in 1942, was virtually the only financial institution to provide loans to 
farmers. !J 1967, this began to change when the Bolivian Government (GOB), with urging 
from A.I.D, established regulations that 70 percent of each commercial bank's loan portfolio 
should be n productive activities, including agriculture. Simultaneously, AI.D. provided 
funding £ r the Bolivian Central Bank (BCB) to establish a development-oriented 
refinancin line, the 511-L-014 Project, the Special Fund for Economic Development (D.S. 
07911), w "ch was to be used to refinance loans extended for productive purposes. The 
$6.49 milli n funding for this project was in local currency that was provided by the GOB 
to repay in erest and principle on a previous AI.D. loan that had been made for the mining 
sector. Of the total funding, $3.5 million was earmarked for agriculture. 
Thi was a period when A.I.D. was stressing credit projects to increase agricultural 
output, es ecially of basic foodstuffs and substitutes for food imports. To this end, in 1971 
A.l.D. fina ced another BCB rediscount line, the 511-L-042 Project, the First Agricultural 
Refinanc· Fund (FRA-1), with a loan of $7.25 million. The fund was available to both 
the comm rcial banks and the BAB, and was to be used mostly for financing small- and 
medium-si ed farmers. 
In 972 the Industrial Refinancing Fund (FRI) was established as another BCB 
discount l" e with a $8 million loan from AI.D. and $1 million in counterpart funds. The 
purpose w to help stimulate industry, including agribusiness, in exports and import 
substitutes. 
An I sis: These three projects were the Mission's first efforts to finance agriculture 
in the 197 s. They reflect AI.D.'s prevailing policies of the time, e.g., financing overall 
productio especially basic foodstuffs and food imports, using Central Bank rediscount lines 
to make er dit available to the entire banking system, and not just to a development bank, 
targeting o directing the credit to specific objectives, and employing concessionary interest 
rates for t final borrowers. The projects were successful as measured by disbursement of 
funds. Th y were important contributions to rural finance as attested by the fact that total 
agricultur credit extended by the banking system increased almost five times in real terms 
between 1 67 and 1974 and that the commercial bank's relative participation rose from 10 
to 34 perc nt. It should be noted, however, in this same period, there was a rapid but 
temporary expansion of bank lending for capital-intensive cotton production in the Santa 
Cruz regio . 
The use of BCB rediscount lines was an innovation in that it made the funds 
available t the entire banking system. Nevertheless, for several important reasons, the 
nature of t e terms and conditions of extending credit under the projects was to create or 
exacerbate problems for rural finance and appropriate financial intermediation. First, the 
funds wer made available by AI.D. to the GOB on very soft terms. These inexpensive 
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sources unqoubtedly allowed the government to substitute them for domestic savings and 
perpetuated a dependency on foreign assistance to finance agricultural loans. Second, the 
concessiona'.ry interest rates charged the final borrower, which were established by the GOB, 
distorted rural financial markets by: (a) leading to the misallocation of financial and real 
resources; ~b) contributing to political interferences in lending due to the implicit income 
transfers to borrowers; (c) causing banks to rely on non-price credit rationing mechanisms 
to allocate eredit, which raised both bank and borrower transaction costs; ( d) discouraging 
lending to small farmers because of these high bank and borrower transaction costs; and ( e) 
increasing the individual banks' dependency on rediscounts as a source of loanable funds 
for agriculture rather than domestic savings. Indeed, in this period there was no A.I.D. 
program otijective of mobilizing rural. 
A.l.D.'s policies were consistent with these of the GOB, the centerpiece of which was 
concessionary interest rates for agricultural loans. As would be expected, delinquency was 
a major pfoblem. Indeed, a considerable portion of the FRA-1 rediscount line was 
immobilized due to weak loan repayment. In addition, the Bolivian Agricultural Bank 
(BAB) hada very large portion of its total portfolio in the non-performing category, and this 
bank was aiso dependent on government subsidies or foreign financing to maintain its level 
of lending. I Most of FRA-1 loans went to large farmers, and not the targeted group of 
small- and 1medium-sized operators. 
1975-1978 i 
In t~e mid-1970's, the Mission's projects in rural finance changed to emphasize small-
farmers. During this period there were six new A.I.D. projects, two with BAB, one with 
integral cooperatives, and three new BCB rediscount lines. 
The
1 
flagship project was the Small-farmer Credit Program (PCP A) established by the 
Mission at the BAB under the Agricultural Sector I Project (511-T-053). Under this project, 
A.I.D. made a $4 million loan to the GOB, that also contributed $1 million in counterpart 
funds, to capitalize a $5 million rotating credit fund. The project also provided technical 
assistance, rvehicles and equipment to the BAB for implementing and operating the program. 
The program was originally limited to five departments. Because of the BAB's precarious 
financial cbndition, A.l.D. required that the PCPA be organized as a separate entity in the 
bank. Most lending was for investment projects with a short-term credit component. In 
1977, und~r the Agricultural Sector II Project (511-T-059), the PCPA was expanded to 
encompas~ another department. There was an additional A.l.D. grant of $3.5 million and 
GOB counterpart of $1.2 million. At the same time, A.l.D. made a grant for credit of $1.23 
million fm1 a Yacuiba Land Clearing component in the department of Tarija. 
I 
In 1976, the Mission undertook a second major project to reach small farmers, when 
it initiated Project 511-T-055, the Revolving Fund for Community Development (CROFOC). 
CROFOCi provided credit to the four newly-formed regional integral cooperatives in the 
departmettts of Cochabamba, Potosi, Santa Cruz and Tarija. CROFOC lent the funds to 
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cooperative~; which, in turn, onlent the funds to members. Funding for the credit 
component lo£ the project was a $5.7 million. The project was initially administered by the 
National Community Development Service. Later, the credit component was transferred 
to the PCP A and, ultimately, to PL-480. 
A third major project was the establishment, in 1974, of the Second Agricultural 
Refinancing Fund (FRA-2) as a BCB rediscount line, to be used exclusively for financing 
small farm~rs (Project 511-T052). The fund of $11 million was provided through a $8 
million loaq from Al.D. and $3 million in GOB counterpart funds. 
The I Agriculture and Artisanry Project (A and A) was another rediscount line 
established at the BCB. Funding consisted of a loan of $9 million, with $8 million in an 
A.l.D. loan and $1 million in GOB counterpart funds. This project was designed to promote 
relatively small-scale agribusiness and artisanry projects in rural areas that would benefit the 
low-incomelrural population. As part of the same program, the Technical Assistance Fund 
(FAT) was established at the BCB to provide credit for feasibility studies for potential A 
and A proj cts as well as training and promotional programs. The $400,000 project was 
funded by ~ loan of $200,000 from Al.D. and $200,000 in GOB counterpart funds. 
I 
The i other project was the $500,000 credit component (CRAC) of the 1974 
Agricultural Colonization Project (511-L-050) in Santa Cruz. This overall project assisted 
development of two colonization projects. CRAC was administered by the BAB, whereas 
the overall project was run by several GOB entities, headed by the National Colonization 
Institute. 
I 
Ana sis: The Mission's projects in this period reflect A.l.D.'s new interest in 
directing er dit to small farmers, which arose from the realization that few of the funds in 
their gener credit programs, such as FRA-1, reached this clientele. All new projects were 
designed to work exclusively with small farmers and had conditions to try to force credit to 
the target clientele. Each project targeted funds for end use, but most did not have major 
restrictions by type of product. Only one project, A and A, was targeted exclusively to 
specific investment objectives, e.g., agribusiness and artisanry. 
The¥ were no fundamental changes from the previous period, 1970-1979, with 
respect to t~e terms under which Bolivia received the funds and for which they were made 
available to small farmers, e.g., Bolivia received the money on soft terms and loans were 
made at concessionary rates established by the GOB. In the case of the PCP A, BAB 
received a grant to capitalize the project. Therefore, the inherent weaknesses in the system 
that are described above were carried forward. As before, there was no emphasis on 
deposit mobilization; indeed, only one project, CROFOC, had a savings component: forced 
savings in the form of required deposits by members of the regional cooperatives. 
The hrojects met with mixed success. The PCP A was well organized, disbursed funds 
on schedul¢ and had reasonable success in loan recovery. It was reported to be self-
1 
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supporting ~n the sense that its revenues covered costs. However, there was no financial 
cost assessed for its loanable funds, BAB having received them as a grant. Research showed 
that BAB's credit delivery system involved high costs for both the Bank and borrowers. The 
concessionary interest rate charged to borrowers allowed the bank to barely cover expenses 
and there was no opportunity for growth of loanable funds except from more donations. 
The CROFOC program was much less successful. A classic mistake was made when 
the funds f ere disbursed to the cooperatives and, in turn, to their members before the 
cooperatives had become solidly established. As a result, borrowers viewed credit as a grant 
and did no~ repay their loans and in successive years the program had to be scaled back. 
Later, the program was transferred to the PCP A, and in the 1980s, it was transferred to PL-
480. For similar reasons, CRAC experienced major delinquency problems. 
Both the PCPA and CROFOC programs utilized group loans as innovations in their 
credit deli.Jery systems as a means to try to reduce lender and borrower transaction costs. 
These met with mixed success; in many instances, the group members were not willing to 
meet their 
1
obligations to pay the delinquent loans of their fellow group members. 
Tuel new BCB rediscount lines experienced problems in utilizing the funds. The 
apparent reason was that the commercial banks were reluctant to lend to the targeted 
clients. The FRA-2 line moved slowly and the bulk of lending under it was done by the 
BAB. Eveh though larger interest rate spreads were later introduced to induce commercial 
bank use, tpere was little change. The cumbersome credit delivery systems discouraged use 
by banks. The number of projects developed for the A and A project were much fewer than 
originally anticipated. The FAT was not used much either. The performance of all of these 
projects illiustrates the problems commercial banks have in lending to low-income rural 
people. 
In this period, the real value of the amount of credit lent for agricultural purposes 
by the banfing system remained reasonably stable; in 1978, the real amount was only slightly 
higher than in 1974. However, by 1978 the relative participation of the commercial banks 
had risen to about one-half. In part, this reflected the decline in real amounts lent by BAB, 
which by this time was experiencing serious shortages of loanable funds due to its high level 
of non-performing loans in its regular programs. 
1979-1982 
This period was marked by political instability associated with redemocratization after 
fourteen ~ars of military rule. There were three inconclusive general elections in 1978, 
1979 and 1980. Between 1978 and 1980, there was a series of four interim civilian or 
military g~vernment. After the July 1980 elections, when it appeared that the populist 
Hernan Siles Zuazo would become president, General Garcia Meza led a successful military 
coup. A ~uccession of military governments unsuccessfully administered the country until 
October 1982, when they turned the government over to Siles Zuazo. The military had not 
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been able t1· stabilize the economy nor to provide effective leadership. This, in combination 
with their i volvement in the narcotics industry and rampant corruption, forced them back 
to the barr cks. This was a period of uncertainty for A.I.D .. The disruption of the return 
to democracy as well as Bolivia's growing drug industry caused the US to to pull back on 
its foreign assistance program. Indeed, on two occasions funding for new programs was cut 
off. There was only one new agricultural credit program established during this period. 
The ~ew program was the 1979 D.epartment Development Corporation Project ( 511-
T-064) whi¢h was to provide financing to the regional development corporations, which in 
turn wouldl onlend the funds for development projects which could include agriculture, agroindust~, and artisanry. A $13.5 million credit fund was established, including a $10 
million A.l.D. loan and $3.5 million in counterpart funds. It was administered by the PL-480 
Executive Secretariat. Because of all the problems in the nation, the program faced 
difficulties in getting off the ground and was suspended between 1982-1983. Later, in 1987, 
it was extended and reformulated under the Market Town Capital Formation Project. In 
1979, PL-4~0 also made a $3.94 million grant to the PCPA using Title III funds. 
I 
Ana sis: Political turmoil upset A.l.D. programs in this period. The only major 
project fina ced was the Departmental Development Corporation Project, the planning for 
which had lready been underway prior to the difficulties. The previously existing programs 
continued ut encountered problems. 
It was in this period that AI.D.'s relations with the BAB began to sour. In 1979, the 
BAB decided to incorporate the financially successful and semi-autonomous PCP A into the 
main oper ions of the Bank. Ostensibly, this action was taken to give the economically 
troubled B direct access to the PCP A's capital and reflows in order to make loans in its 
regular por folio, which had become paralyzed by delinquency. In fact, the BAB used the 
funds to co er administrative costs and salaries. This did not set well with A.l.D., and in 
1981 the ·ssion was successful in forcing the BAB to again separate the PCPA from the 
main bank. This lasted until 1983 when the PCP A was again incorporated in the Bank and 
PCP A funds were again used to meet the institution's payroll. With this action, A.I.D. broke 
its relations with the Bank. Subsequently, when A.I.D. funds were made available for 
agricultura1
1 
credit, BAB has been excluded. 
Len~ing from the A.I.D.-sponsored rediscount lines at the BCB also declined 
drastically. 1 A combination of a decline in reflows from outstanding loans, capital erosion 
due to inflation, and political turmoil contributed to the sharp decrease. This period 
marked the first intervention of the PL-480 Executive Secretariat in credit programs; an 
activity that would increase substantially in the next few years. 
1983-1985 
The regime of the Siles Zuazo government (October 1982 to August 1985) was 
marked by unsuccessful macro-economic policies. Results were considerable political 
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turmoil ~d hyperinflation. Both hyperinflation and natural disasters were to have 
important 'mpacts on agricultural credit. An additional factor was the United States' desire 
to curtail he production of the coca leaf. 
I 
Th widespread floods and droughts of 1983 caused a number of foreign donors to 
make em gency agricultural credit available to Bolivia. With the shortage of food, the 
sales or ants of wheat under PL-480 to Bolivia rose and this provided the Executive 
Secretaria of the PL-480 program considerably more funds. AI.D., lacking new centrally 
funded pr gram funds for agricultural credit, creatively began to work with the GOB and 
the Exe tive Secretariat to develop programs to use some of these new funds for 
agricultur credit, a pattern that would continue through the rest of the 1980s. Other 
factors in I.D.'s decision to work with PL-480 were that: (a) the Mission was not pleased 
with the CB's performance in managing the several rediscount funds that had been 
establishe in the 1970s, (b) it did not want to work with the BAB, and (c) it wanted to 
emphasize private institutions. 
Th ee agricultural credit projects were developed by the Mission in conjunction with 
PL-480 du · g the 1983-1985 period. The first, in 1984, was to lend support to a new idea 
for agricul al credit in remote rural communities. This program was proposed by FINCA 
Intematio al which had launched similar programs in several other countries. Under this 
program, L-480 made a $b2.8 million loan to FIN CA to establish a central revolving credit 
fund that ould be onlent to numerous small rural communities for purposes of establishing 
a local rev lving credit fund in each locale. The communities would then make loans from 
the fund t their members. When the loans were repaid, some of the proceeds would be 
used to ca italize the local community fund. Because of inflation the loans were indexed 
to product , mostly potatoes. Indeed, loans were to be repaid in kind and the community 
would sell the product to repay the local fund as well as FINCA 
Th second project was a 1984 pilot program for a Bank Trust Fund, again financed 
with PL-4 0 funds, to make credit available to small- and medium-sized farmers, artisans 
and agroin ustry through the commercial banks. This pilot program was formalized in 1986, 
and, there ore, will be discussed in the following section. 
I 
Th third project was a credit component of the 1983 Chapare Regional 
Developm nt Project (511-T-067) which was designed to create economic alternatives to 
coca prod ction. The credit component, using PL-480 funds, was to be used to finance 
altemativ economic activities. This project was, and continues to be, a major Mission 
activity an would be modified on numerous occasions over its life. By 1990 there was $17.5 
million co 'tted by the GOB to support credit. 
An I si : This period encompassed the beginning of numerous ad-hoc credit 
programs the PL-480 Executive Secretariat. The Secretariat allowed the Mission to get 
around th lack of centrally funded credit projects. Furthermore, these programs could be 
easily set p between the Secretariat, AI.D. and the GOB. As such, they could be used to 
39 
finance special credit programs by using PL-480 rediscounts or grants to credit institutions. 
This activity was a major shift away from the more complex centrally-funded BCB and BAB 
programs qf the previous decade. Furthermore, this new modus operandi fit well with the 
U.S. government's emphasis on helping private institutions. Indeed, the PL-480-A.I.D. 
connection was to expand greatly in the next period, as is discussed in the following section. 
The 
1 
FIN CA program attracted substantial attention because of its design to reach 
large numljers of small-farmer families with credit. The credit was designed to have low 
transaction costs as well as the feature of indexing loans to products, which was a means of 
preventing decapitalization of the fund by inflation, as was happening with most other credit 
programs. FINCA rapidly disbursed funds, serving 402 communities in 1984 and reaching 
24,289 fa~ies. However, the program was destined to fail because of structural weaknesses 
in its desi~n. The first problem was that, because of hyperinflation, the real value of 
FINCA's central revolving fund declined rapidly before disbursement, thus making the 
average size loan to each farmer only about $9.00. Second, a large number of the 
communiti4s obtained FIN CA funds but did not establish a community rotating fund. Third, 
there was np provision to capitalize the FINCA central revolving fund. Fourth, delinquency 
was high. Fifth, FINCA had a high-cost central administrative structure that need to be 
subsidized. Sixth, the marketing system that was necessary because of indexing the loans 
to productst did not function well. When A.I.D. recognized the weaknesses in the program, 
the Missiotj divested itself of its interest in the project. In the meantime, FINCA tried to 
correct its $tructural weaknesses and continues to operate in Bolivia on a much reduced 
scale. PL-480 maintained its support of the program on a small scale. 
The lChapare Project, a mainline activity in the Mission, has been fraught with 
frustrations mostly deriving from the inherent nature of trying to develop economic 
alternatives for the highly profitable coca crop. Therefore, the demand for credit for 
alternatives was not as high as envisioned. Another complicating factor was the credit 
delivery sys~em. At first, trust funds were established by the PL-480 executive secretary in 
two comm~rcial banks. When these institutions did not move the monies, in 1988 it was 
decided to try to elicit the help of the BAB and FENACRE. However, these institutions 
I 
were reluctant to participate. Therefore, it was decided that the PL-480 would directly 
administer the funds. To do this the Executive Secretariat rented the BAB offices in the 
Chapare atjd hired former BAB credit agents who had worked in the region to carry out the 
credit progtam. 
Another problem is that PL-480 is supposed to finance loans using reflows from 
several oth~r PL-480 administered programs, including the 1986 Emergency Agricultural 
Credit Program (CAE). In fact, the reflows are insufficient. Nevertheless, the GOB has the 
responsibilify to come up with the funds to meet the $17.5 million obligation. 
During this period, hyperinflation raged; the annual rates of price increases were 276, 
1,281, and 111,750 percent in 1983, 1984 and 1985, respectively. This situation created 
serious problems for the financial system. For example, the real value of the BAB's PCP A 
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portfolio drppped to essentially zero. Likewise, the real values of the FRA-1 and FRA-2 
BCB redis~ount lines dropped considerably. The flagship agricultural credit programs 
established by AI.D. in the 1970s were decapitalized by this experience. An important 
factor conttfibuting to the problem was that the GOB did not change the interest rate 
structure rapidly enough to compensate for the effects of inflation. Bank deposits declined, 
banks lent less and made only very short-term loans that they rolled over rapidly. This 
practice vir'1ally excluded agricultural lending. Banks shifted their assets to investments in 
real property. The stress on the banking system was tremendous. Several banks were on 
the verge of failure. However, the GOB was able to keep credit alive by printing money 
to put into lthe BCB rediscount lines for agricultural lending. Indeed, the real value of 
agricultural• credit rose 91 percent between 1983 and 1985, much of it channeled through 
the BAB. there were very significant income transfers to the borrowers of agricultural 
credit becatise of the sharp decline in the real value of their obligation over the life of the 
loan. Tuer~ was competition for the loans. Indeed, BCB employees who had responsibility 
for rediscounts soon found they could sell the rediscounts and corruption prevailed in that 
institution. IGiven the attractive income transfers as well as hyperinflationary conditions, it 
is doubtful that many of these funds targeted for agricultural purposes actually were used 
for that purpose. More likely, a considerable portion was used to purchase real estate or 
foreign excliange. 
I 
1986-1990 i 
Wheb the government of Victor Paz Estenssoro came to power in August 1985 and 
announced an economic plan to stabilize the economy, there was hope that the Bolivian 
situation woµId change. When it became clear by early 1986 that the government had both 
the will and1the ability to make the plan work (in 1986, 1987 and 1988, the annual rates of 
inflation fell to 276, 15 and 16 percent respectively) foreign donors, especially the World 
Bank (IBRb), actively worked with the GOB to diagnose structural and institutional 
problems in1 the economy and to propose changes. The financial sector was targeted for 
major chan~es; the difficulties of the preceding years had clearly demonstrated weaknesses. 
The BCB w~ reorganized, a superintendency of banks was established (the IBRD provided 
technical assistance), plans were made to deepen financial markets through a stock 
exchange, thle Banking Law was scheduled to be rewritten, and four commercial banks were 
closed. 
In t~ period, the Mission took interest in these activities and used remaining A and 
A funds to sponsor studies on informal credit markets and to develop a proposal for a 
project to strengthen financial markets. The proposal would strengthen these markets 
through: (a)i private-sector institution building, (b) policy-oriented research and seminars, 
(c) a wide-scale training program for bankers, (d) a deposit insurance fund, and (e) 
development of new capital market instruments. The proposal progressed slowly, but finally, 
in May 19~8, was funded in a reduced form as part of a broader Private Sector 
Strengthenillg Project (511-0598). Under this project, there are two specific components to 
strengthen the financial system, although none is directly related to rural finance. The two 
I 
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compone~nare the improvement of private-sector institutions, and financial sector policy 
research analysis in the private sector. Under the first component, there are four 
subcompon nts: (a) the establishment of a training program in the Institute for 
Developme. t of Businessmen (IDEA), (b) the expansion of services, including policy 
research, in the Bolivian Bankers' Association (ASOBAN), (c) the strengthening of the 
National F~deration of Credit Unions (FENACRE), and (d) the starting up of a security 
exchange. !l-ater the FENACRE component was transferred to the AI.D.-sponsored Micro 
and Small 'nterprise Project (PRODEM). 
Wi 1 respect to projects directly related. to rural finance, the Mission continued to 
work exclus vely with the PL-480 Executive Secretariat. Seven major new projects that had 
agricultural credit components were developed, all emphasizing private-sector financial 
institutions. However, only one of these projects, the Emergency Agricultural Credit (CAB) 
was exclusi ely directed to farm production; the others also financed activities such as 
agroindust or non-traditional exports. In most cases, Title I or Title III funds were used; 
only three rojects had central funding components. 
The ain project was the Bank Trust Funds program, which was developed in 1986 
after a 1984 pilot program was judged to be successful. In this project, PL-480 utilized Title 
I and III m nies to rediscount funds to private-sector banks for purposes of financing loans 
extended to small-and medium-sized farmers for the purposes of agriculture and livestock 
production d to enterprises for agroindustry or artisanry. In an attempt to ensure that the 
farmers we e served and that the loans did not go mostly to industry, at least 60 percent of 
the funds w re targeted for farm production. The program was operated as a set of small 
trust funds. nder this arrangement, each bank would submit an initial list of projects to be 
financed. nee the list was approved by the Executive Secretariat, the corresponding funds 
were place in the bank as a trust fund; the bank would hold them for five years as long as 
it continue to use the reflows for the targeted purposes. 
Ase ond major activity was the 511-0589 Private Agricultural Producers Associations 
Project (P 0) which was established in 1986. The main purpose of this project was to 
strengthen ese associations in order that they might provide better services to their 
members. e project had two credit components. The first was financed by a $5 million 
commitme of local currency contributed by the GOB. These funds were placed with the 
PL-480 Ex cutive Secretariat for rediscounting to the private-sector banks for extending 
credit to th associations for purposes of strengthening those organizations. The second was 
a commitm nt by PL-480 to rediscount loans made by banks to members of the associations 
for specifie production purposes. The current major thrust under P APO is to provide 
financing to members of the National Association of Oilseed Producers (ANAPO) to grow 
wheat in th Eastern lowlands as a substitute for imports of that cereal. 
A th" d major credit activity was the 511-071 Market Town Capital Formation Project 
(FOCAS). This project, which was initiated in 1987, was a continuation of the above-
described D partment Development Corporation Project (DDC) which was initiated in 1979. 
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Under the iFOCAS project there is a credit component of $38.5 million which is to be used 
to increase the level of productive private-sector investment in rural and semi-urban areas. 
The ExeCljttive Secretariat administers the funds and provides financing to the Credit 
Financial Units (UCFs) in the eight departmental development corporations. The UCFs 
then rediscount the funds to the private-sector banks for extending credit for the designated 
purposes. Most of the credit is directed to industry; little is used for farm production. The 
reflows to the UCFs from these loans are not returned to PL-480; they remain with the 
UCF as a grant. 
A fourth major activity was the 1988 Export Promotion Project (511-0585). This 
project ha.$ a $10.1 million credit component of which $8 million comes from an A.I.D. grant 
and the remainder from the GOB. These funds were used to set up a revolving credit fund 
to be used by the PL-480 Executive Secretariat to rediscount to private-sector banks for 
lending for pre-and-post-embarkation purposes in non-traditional exports. Agricultural 
products atre eligible, as are other classes of exports. 
A :ijfth major activity was the 1986 Emergency Agricultural Credit Project (CAE) 
financed bf a $10 million centrally-funded AI.D. grant under Project 511-0591. Under this 
special program the funds were placed with the Executive Secretariat to rediscount to 
private-sector financial institutions for credit extended to small- and medium-sized farmers 
during thel 1986-87 production cycle. As with most other programs, the funds were placed 
with the several banks and FENACRE in a trust fund, this time for a one-year period. 
When the reflows were returned to the PL-480 they were to be used for other trust fund 
programs, such as those with the banks and the Chapare Project. 
A sixth project was with FENACRE. Under this umbrella project, which was set up 
in 1986, the Executive Secretariat makes funds available to FENACRE from several 
different sources to finance different programs. As with the banks, the funds are typically 
placed in a trust in order that FENACRE can onlend them to its affiliates. This 
arrangement encompasses the PL-480's programs for Integral Cooperative Development 
Project (formerly CROFOC), a Small-Farmer Credit Program and the National Wheat 
Productio* Program. 
Finally, the seventh and very small-scale project, was the $420,000 Credit for Housing 
and Famil~ Needs Program in the National Savings and Loan Housing Bank (CACEN). 
Establishe~ in 1986, this program was to allow rural families in the Lake Titicaca region to 
reestablish themselves after serious floods. In this case, PL-480 used Title I funds to make 
a loan to <CACEN for 25 years, which was to be used by that institution to onlend for home 
constructi~n, family needs and agricultural production. 
By late 1989, the Mission had become disenchanted with many of its PL-480 credit 
programs. The fundamental problem was brought to light by an evaluation of the CAE 
Project which had shown that the funds had not been used for the intended purposes. 
Furthermore, the level of delinquency was high so that the expected reflows were not 
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available to provide the programmed funding for the Chapare Project. Similar results were 
experiencee in the Bank Trust Fund Program. These results were not satisfactory to A.I.D. 
nor to the PL-480. As a consequence, as they move into the 1990s, the Mission and the 
Executive ~ecretariat have agreed to substantially reduce the role of the PL-480 as a second-
story credit institution. 
Analysis: In August, 1985, as part of its stabilization package, the Paz Estenssoro 
government liberalized interest rates, allowing them to be mostly determined by market 
forces. This was an important improvement in the financial system. However, there was 
a weaknes*. It was believed that the market rates were artificially high, due to the high 
administrative costs of the generally inefficient banks. Therefore, as an incentive to 
stimulate Broduction, the Central Bank established a "development interest rate" which was 
to be usedl on loans made with its development-oriented rediscount lines. The rate was 
arbitrarily set at 13 percent, and it has remained at that level since that time. Consequently, 
this has been and still is the standard rate for virtually all formal financial market 
agricultural credit. It was adopted by the BAB and the PL-480. A.l.D. and other 
international assistance agencies accepted this rate for their programs. Given that this rate 
was, and continues to be, considerably below the market-determined rate for other bank 
loans, it is: certain the many persons would seek these loans to gain the implicit income 
transfers. 
1
This leads to considerable credit diversion, and, consequently, overstates the 
importance of the volume of lending for agricultural purposes. 
In this period, the Mission moved away from mostly providing rural credit for farmer 
productionj Indeed, the scope of its activity was expanded to include more financing for 
agroindustry, artisanry, producers associations, non-traditional exports, and alternatives for 
coca produFtion. As this occurred, the different credit projects became more focused and 
targeted. · 
The Mission continued to rely on the PL-480 Executive Secretariat as the second-
story institutional vehicle to provide credit. As mentioned above, given the lack of central 
funding, this was a way to use the more plentiful local currency for credit objectives. 
Moreover, lit was relatively easy to establish new projects within the PL-480 framework. 
Targeting was a central feature to direct credit to specific projects. In mid-1987, an 
evaluation 1of the PL-480 program reported that the Executive Secretariat managed 29 
different c~edit programs related to agriculture. Indeed, up to that time about one-half of 
the Executive Secretariat's total disbursements of $77 million, since it was founded in 1978, 
had gone for credit. There was no doubt the PL-480 Executive Secretariat had become an 
important source of credit in Bolivia. However, relatively speaking, it managed a much 
smaller volume of agricultural credit than did the BCB. 
I 
In tlliis period, the Mission lacked a master plan for rural finance. There was no 
project that dealt with mobilizing deposits nor was there a central thrust to rural credit, with 
the exceptibn of excluding the BAB and the BCB, or stated another way, relying exclusively 
on the private sector financial institutions. Thus, Mission credit programs were driven by 
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the numerous specific projects that had credit components rather than in the context of an 
overall finaijicial sector or agricultural credit strategy. All new projects were placed with the 
PL-480. Indeed, the Executive Secretariat provided a handy institutional vehicle to set up 
numerous programs relatively easily. Moreover, the PL-480 was attractive because it was 
able to disburse funds with little red tape and quickly. 
How~ver, the chickens later came home to roost when it was realized that many of 
the funds were not being used for the intended purposes and that there was extensive loan 
delinquency. These outcomes should not have been surprising. Not only was there the 
above-described problem with a concessionary interest rate, but also there were two 
significant structural weaknesses in using the PL-480 as a second-story institution. First, PL-
480 was not technically part of the financial system. In contrast to the BCB, the Executive 
Secretariat had no lever to hold over the heads of the banks to collect on their loans. The 
PL-480 held no funds for the banks. In contrast, the BCB would take funds from the 
commercial I banks' legal reserves if they did not repay the Central Bank their obligations on 
rediscounts.' Therefore, the banks could delay on repaying their obligations and the 
Executive Sfcretariat lacked the immediate wherewithal to collect. 
Second, there was the problem with targeting. Directed credit programs require close 
monitoring and control to ensure partially that the borrowed funds are used for the stated 
objective. The Executive Secretariat did not monitor closely the actual use of funds under 
the trust funds. Consequently, the banks and final borrowers compliance in using the funds 
for the targeted objectives was lacking. Often, the credit did not go for the intended 
objectives. 
These structural weaknesses created problems for A.I.D. and the Executive 
Secretariat JJecause they did not allow the credit programs to satisfactorily meet their 
intended objectives. However, it should be pointed out that this outcome was predictable. 
Indeed, it dnly reflects the inherent problems in excessive targeting and reliance on a 
second-stol)f institution that has little clout over its borrowers. 
! 
The CAB Project is a special case, that illustrates another aspect of problems that 
can arise in using foreign assistance for credit. These funds were made available hurriedly 
to Bolivia btcause, as the end of the fiscal year was approaching, there were unspent funds. 
Bolivia was asked to find a way to use them. The quickest way was to give a grant to the 
GOB for a one-shot credit program. Unfortunately, this type of program often leads to 
rapid disbursement without careful evaluation of loan applications. Moreover, borrowers 
may view the credit as a grant and not be inclined to repay. These characteristics, in 
combination with the concessionary interest rate, spell doom for repayment. 
FEN..f\CRE was the major beneficiary of the CAB program, financing thousands of 
very small loans. It should be pointed out that the PL-480 was the source of funds that kept 
FENACRE ~ive. Without the PL-480 rediscounts, the Federation would have had very few 
loanable funds. This dependency points out the financial weakness of this institution. 
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Over the late 1980s, the flow of agricultural credit from the banking system declined. 
In 1989, the real amount of funds disbursed declined to about 60 percent of the level in 
1985. The participation of BAB also declined as that Bank's access to BCB rediscounts was 
drastically reduced. It should be recalled, however, that 1985 was a peak year for 
agricultur~ credit because the Siles Zuazo government had turned on the printing presses 
to finance : large-sized BCB rediscount lines. 
The Strengthening Financial Markets (SFM) component of the Strengthening Private-
Sector Project was an important step for the Mission, albeit it took considerable time to 
launch thq project. Since the hyperinflation, it has become increasingly clear that the 
financial system needed restructuring. A.I.D. is taking the right step in trying to resolve the 
deficienci~s in financial intermediation instead of just pumping in more funds. The project, 
however, has a shortcoming because it does not deal directly with rural finance, although 
it would be expected that the rural financial institutions would benefit. 
Thcl importance that the Mission has assigned to the SFM Project is evidenced in 
their 1991r1992 Action Plan. The plan contains a specific component (one of six major 
components in the plan) to increase and broaden A.I.D.'s level of activity in strengthening 
financial markets beginning in the next fiscal year. At present, the Mission plans to work 
with the public entities (the BCB and the Superintendency of Banks) that control regulatory 
policy. To help in their planning for this additional effort, the Mission will undertake a 
financial s~ctor assessment in 1990. One component of the assessment will deal with rural 
financial markets. This component, if properly done, should help the Mission develop a 
sound strategy for strengthening those institutions that serve rural areas as well as the policy 
environment in which they operate. 
ASSISTANCE BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL DONORS 
Between 1966 and 1978, A.l.D. was the principal provider of foreign assistance for 
agricultural credit, accounting for nearly three-fifths of the total funds made available. Their 
relative importance was due to the Mission's big effort in financing the several BCB 
rediscount lines and the several small-farmer programs, especially the PCPA in the BAB. 
In the 1970s the World Bank had several projects. In 1975, it established a $12.5 
million ( alll figures in this section include loan, grant and counterpart funds) Agricultural and 
Livestock Development Fund (ALDP) in the BAB. Between 1976 and 1979 it sponsored 
three integrated rural development programs in the Altiplano: Ingavi, Ulla Ulla and 
Omasuyos-Los Andes. Each had a credit component; there was a total of $12.8 million 
committed. Likewise, the BAB administered these projects. 
Simultaneously, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was sponsoring four 
projects that were targeted for specific production in defined geographic regions. The total 
financing was $29.5 million. In 1969, they financed a Livestock Development Fund for 
rediscounts at the BCB. It was augmented in 1978; the total size was $13 million. In 1976, 
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the Pork Production and Development Project in Chuquisaca was developed with financing 
of a $1.9 million credit line that was run through the Chuquisaca Department Development 
Corporation. In 1979, the IDB established the Fruit-Dairy Development Project for 
Cochabamba in the amount of $5.4 million, and the Irrigation Development Project in the 
Bolivian Chaco for $17.8 million. The BAB administered both of these projects. 
The !World Bank and IDB programs were oriented to small-and medium-sized 
farmers. The funds were made available to Bolivia on soft terms and all utilized the 
prevailing crncessionary development interest rate for borrowers. 
During the 1978-1982 period no new major foreign assistance programs for 
agricultural 
1 
credit were established. It was only after the Siles Zuazo government came to 
power that ~sistance was renewed. In 1983 the IDB launched a large program with a $32 
million loan for the Livestock and Industry rediscount line with the BCB. This was to be 
used for finfncing small-farmer livestock and agricultural production as part of their Global 
Agriculture Program, Phase I. This line was the most important source of financing for 
agricultural i credit in the nation for both the BAB and the commercial banks in 1984 and 
has continu~d to be important since then. In 1987, the IDB extended this program with a 
follow-up loan of $100 million for the Global Agriculture Program, Phase II. 
I 
In 1990, the Inter-American Development Bank had plans for four new projects with 
rural credit ~omponents. In that same year, the Bank planned to initiate two programs: (a) 
the Global Agriculture Program, Phase III, which would place $51.2 million in a BCB 
rediscount line, and (b) the Chuquisaca Pork Production Program, Phase II, for $20 million. 
For 1992 they have programmed a Vegetable Sanitation Program for $10 million and a 
Livestock Sanitation Program for Meat Exports for $10 million.) 
Meanwhile, the World Bank did not have any new agriculture credit program. 
However, in 1989 it began the planning for the Lowlands Project for development in the 
Eastern lowlands. Current plans call for establishing a $30 million BCB rediscount line to 
extend loans for production purposes. Agricultural products, such as soybeans, are 
important activities in the plans for economic development in this region. 
In addition to the funds made available from the IDB and the World Bank, there are 
several smaller bilateral programs, mostly handled by the BAB. For a number of years the 
Bank has received annual grants from the Japanese, Dutch, and German governments to 
contribute to the Bank's capital. In addition, the BAB has obtained small loans from FIDA 
for credits iµ the departments of Chuquisaca and Potosi. As was the case with AI.D., the 
financing for the credit programs from these other international donors consisted of loans 
with soft t~rms or small grants. The borrowers' interest rates followed the policies 
established py the GOB. 
It is flear that foreign assistance has been a very important source for agricultural 
credit in Bolivia. In the 1970's, A.l.D. was the predominant lender. With the political 
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turmoil in the early 1980's, assistance for new programs from all major donors was virtually 
cut off. When the democratically-elected civilian governments came to power, beginning in 
1982, the flows began anew. Since 1983, the IDB has taken the leadership by providing 
large amounts of agricultural credit through its Global Agricultural Programs, Phases I-III 
which have placed large sums as rediscount lines with the BCB. In 1989, IDB rediscount 
lines accounted for almost two-thirds of the total BCB rediscounts for purposes of 
agricultural credit. It is noteworthy that none of these programs stress rural financial 
markets; rather they continue to deal with only one side of these markets, credit, to the 
neglect of deposit mobilization and viable financial intermediation. 
A c~mQUE OF A.I.D.'S RURAL FINANCE PROGRAMS IN BOLIVIA 
The Criteria 
I 
This ~ection addresses the question, how does A.I.D.'s rural finance efforts in Bolivia 
line up with policy criteria set forth in the 1988 A.I.D. Policy Paper, Financial Markets 
Development? The Paper charted a new course for the Agency's activities in financial 
markets. rrpe reader is referred to that document for detail. 
The Case of Bolivia 
The !Mission's agricultural credit programs in the 1970s fall into the category of 
projects that the Paper criticizes. Most projects were designed only as infusions of funds 
and did not have many provisions for building strong viable financial institutions nor 
developing financial markets. The desire to compartmentalize funds by project created an 
excessive number of BCB rediscount lines. The multiple programs for small-farmer credit 
diluted the Mission's attempts to serve this clientele and in the haste to disburse funds, 
insufficient time and effort were allocated to institution building. 
The interest rates charged to the final borrower were highly concessionary and 
corresponded to the "development rate" established by the government. In this period, the 
GOB had a fixed interest rate structure that was seldom modified. The difference between 
the effective commercial loan rate for banks and the development rate charged by the BAB 
ranged from 12 to 15 interest points over the period, i.e., about a 100 percent difference. 
There was discussion within the Mission on interest rate policy, but it was decided not to 
press the government on this issue; rather, emphasis was placed on making the spread on 
the BCB rediscount lines more attractive. It was clear that although the Mission had begun 
to understand the interest rate issue, it was not sufficiently convinced of its importance to 
strongly argue with the government for a change nor to use its foreign assistance program 
as a lever to force a change in the structure. 
During the 1979-1982 period the Mission was forced to place its assistance in a 
holding pattern. New credit programs were not forthcoming and attention was directed to 
working with projects already in place. There were plans to start a pilot deposit 
I 
I 
' 
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mobilization effort in the BAB but this was scuttled when the Mission broke relations with 
the BAB. AI.D. tried to foster policy dialogue with representatives of different financial 
institutions. In early 1982, the Mission sponsored a national rural financial markets seminar 
in which international experts were invited to present talks on interest rates, savings 
mobilizati~n, and transactions costs. Although, this perked interest, it did not have any 
immediate influence on policy and there was little Mission follow through on this initiative. 
Afth an elected government assumed power in late 1982, the Mission's activities 
again increased. However, there were no plans for new rural finance programs, with the 
exception .of the special case of the Chapare Project to finance substitutes for coca 
productionj. In this period, there was an effort to maintain the existing programs. However, 
there were problems. The relationships with the BAB continued to be sour and the PCP A 
was no lotjger a favorite Mission project. The BCB rediscount lines had problems, as did 
the CROFOC. 
The Mission, like almost everyone else, was quickly overwhelmed by hyperinflation. 
Most existing credit projects did not have the means to protect the real value of funds; a 
situation which was exacerbated by the government's dedollarization policy. The financial 
system, ac~ustomed to fixed interest rates, was not flexible enough to respond by rapidly 
adjusting foal rates. The Mission, for lack of a financial markets strategy, was not 
adequately prepared to deal with its own programs nor with the government. In rural 
finance, th~ only new program was the small-scale FINCA project, with which the Mission 
became enamored because it used PL-480 funds, was designed to reach numerous small 
farmers, and had an inflation-proof indexing feature. 
It was at the end of this period that the Mission, in recognition of the need to 
provide tqe government with informed research for macro-economic policy making, 
established the Unit for Analysis of Economic Policies (UDAPE) which provided 
informati01;1 and advice to key ministries. Furthermore, it was at this time that the Mission 
began to work with the PL-480 Executive Secretariat as a second-story credit institution. 
An import~nt factor in this initiative was the Mission's mandate to work with the private-
sector financial institutions rather than government entities, such as the BAB and the BCB. 
Indeed, the Mission strongly contemplated the possibilities of trying to establish 
another second-story bank to get around the difficulties of working with the BCB, which by 
now was url.controllable and rife with corruption; PL-480 was a candidate and served in this 
capacity, at least for the time being. 
i 
Begfnning in late 1985, the success of the Paz Estenssoro government's economic 
stabilization plan called Bolivia to the attention of the world. Consequently, in 1986 Bolivia 
suddenly had many offers of fresh foreign assistance. The World Bank took the primary 
role of helping the country diagnose the necessary structural and policy changes. It was 
clear from their analysis that the financial sector badly needed reforms, beginning with a 
reorganiza,ion of the Central Bank and the establishment of a Superintendency of Banks. 
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The World Bank worked with the GOB on these two institutions while A.l.D. did some 
research on informal credit markets and developed a proposal for a project for 
strengthening financial markets. This project took a long time to unfold and was not funded 
until 1988, and, only then in a watered-down form as a component of a project to strengthen 
the private sector. To its credit, this project provides for training bankers, strengthening the 
Bankers As$ociation (ASOBAN), and establishing a securities exchange. The slow and less 
ambitious rfsponse on the part of the AI.D. was undoubtedly influenced by the lack of a 
coherent firlancial market strategy within the Mission. 
The Mission had little influence with the monetary authorities; it was not working 
closely with 1 the BCB and the Superintendency of Banks was just getting started. It tried to 
work with the ASOBAN, but this relationship has not borne much fruit. The interest rate 
structure was partially liberalized and made subject to market forces. However, it was the 
GOB itself that made this decision as part of its 1985 stabilization package; the international 
donors had little to do with this action. Nevertheless, this policy change was a key to reform 
in the financial system. However, as described above, the concept of a special development 
interest rate was maintained, and, because it is considerably below the bank market-
determined rate, there continue to be distortions in the system. A.l.D. and other 
international donors have accepted this rate for their credit programs. 
The !Mission's rural finance activities were likewise the victims of the lack of a 
financial market strategy. All projects were credit oriented, most were relatively small scale, 
none had deposit mobilization components, and all continued to be tied to the PL-480 
Executive Secretariat. This system led to a plethora of targeted projects. Moreover, the 
projects were being run through an institution that was not even part of the formal financial 
system. 
As the Mission moves into the 1990s, there appears to be a commitment to expand 
its efforts to strengthen financial markets through the means of expanding its SFM Project. 
Furthermore, the Mission has made the decision to discontinue using the PL-480 Executive 
Secretariat as a source of loans for new projects and even reduce the scale of some of the 
existing projects now managed by that institution. 
! 
The11e is no Mission master plan for rural finance. There is some interest in the 
Mission in wanting to help small farmers through viable financial institutions, but how to 
do this has not been carefully thought out. It is clear that the Mission needs to develop a 
formalized coherent strategy for what it should be doing, or not be doing, in financial 
markets, in general, and rural finance, in specific. At this point, the only major foreign 
assistance program for rural finance is through the IDB. Unfortunately, that Bank's 
exclusively fredit-oriented programs continue to fall into the pattern that is criticized in the 
A.I.D. Policy Paper. 
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A.l.D. SPONSORED RURAL FINANCE PROJECTS IN 
GUATEMALA 
by 
Robert C. Vogel 
INTRODUCTION 
Most of the information in this case study was assembled while the author was a 
consultant working on rural finance problems in Guatemala with either the Inter-American 
Development Bank or the Agency for International Development. Details on specific rural 
finance projects were drawn from A.I.D. Mission files or from data banks in A.I.D. 
Washington. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In 1929 the Credito Hipotecario Nacional de Guatemala was formed to supply 
agricultura!l loans. An additional agricultural lending agency, the Instituto de Fomento de 
la Produccion was founded in 1948 and in 1953 the Banco Nacional Agrario (BNA) was 
established to provide still another source of loans in rural areas. AI.D.'s first efforts in 
rural finance in Guatemala began in 1955 in support of a colonization effort. Later, U.S. 
funds and !technicians were used to develop a supervised credit program in BNA (Rice, 
1973). Until 1962 most of A.l.D.'s rural finance efforts were attached to BNA. 
Subsequently, the supervised credit program was absorbed by a new bilateral servicio, 
SCICAS, ~hat reported to the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1963, the Inter-American 
Development Bank took over the primary funding of the supervised credit program. 
Apart from supervised credit, A.I.D. also provided substantial funding for loans to 
rubber faqners in 1959. In the 1960s AI.D. began to support two lines of cooperative 
development that involved on-lending to farmers. In 1964 A.I.D. support was given to credit 
unions and later A.l.D. also supported multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives that all on-
lent to farrhers. In the early 1970s A.I.D. provided substantial support to BANDESA, the 
successor to SCICAS. This again brought A.I.D. into the business of promoting supervised 
credit. From the early 1970s until now, A.I.D. has provided funding for rural finance 
through nine projects amounting to a total of about $80 million. A synopsis of eight of the 
most recent of these projects follows. 
51 
RECENT RURAL FINANCE PROJECTS 
Small Farmer Coffee Improvement15 
The main objective of the Small Farmer Coffee Improvement Project is to increase 
the incomes of small-scale coffee farmers through increasing their production, productivity 
and produc1 quality. This is to be achieved through a combination of improved technical 
assistance and access to credit from formal financial institutions (i.e., BANDESA and 
participating commercial banks). Lack of access to credit, especially longer-term credit, is 
identified as a key constraint that prevents small-scale farmers from undertaking investments 
that could increase their production, productivity and product quality and thereby achieve 
the objectives of the project. To capitalize the credit component of the project, USAID is 
to provide $300,000 in foreign exchange and the equivalent of $1,200,000 in local currency, 
while the Guatemalan Government is to contribute the equivalent of $9,250,000 from PL 
480 funds during the first five years of the project. 
Loans to farmers are to carry market rates of interest, initially 16 percent (the 
maximum rate permitted on commercial bank loans at the time the project was initiated) 
with provisions for adjustments to ensure market rates throughout the life of the project. 
However, there is no specification of how such adjustments are to be determined or 
implement~d, as, for example, under the current situation of no controls over interest rates, 
and whether such adjustments would apply to already outstanding loans--an important 
consideratic~n since loan terms are up to seven years with up to three years of grace on 
repayment of principal. Project funds are to provide loans to farmers adequate to finance 
the renovatjon of one manzana (1.6 acres) of old low-yielding coffee over a two year period 
followed by two years of production credit. In addition, the Guatemalan Government and 
the particip~ting commercial banks are to agree to continue to provide annual production 
credit to project beneficiaries after their fourth year of being financed under the project. 
To be elig~ble to participate in the project, a farmer must have no more than fifteen 
manzanas of land with at least two manzanas planted in coffee producing at relatively low 
yields, and, he must also have the capacity to absorb the loss of income during the 
renovation period and to meet the obligations imposed by the project loan.16 In addition, 
to participate a farmer must be a member of a coffee cooperative or of one of the groups 
formed by ANACAFE, although neither the cooperatives nor ANACAFE will be lenders 
under the project. 
15USAID/Guatemala, Small Farmer Coffee Improvement Project Paper, 1989. 
i 
16Credit under the project is also to be made available for nurseries to produce high-
yielding and disease-resistant seedlings and to construct or upgrade coffee processing 
facilities odented toward small farmers. 
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Project loans are to be provided through trust funds placed in participating banks, 
as this was judged the only way to circumvent legally-imposed collateral requirements and 
to reduce to acceptable levels the risks perceived by commercial banks in lending to small-
scale coffee farmers. Incentives for effective client selection, credit supervision and loan 
collection are to be maintained by the fact that participating banks will only receive income 
when interest is actually collected (although participating banks will still have far greater 
incentives to attempt to assure the collection of loans for which principal as well as interest 
is at risk). Interest earned on project loans (initially 16 percent) is to be divided as follows: 
Ministry of Finance, 0.5 percent; participating bank, 6.0 percent; ANACAFE, 5 percent; and 
creation of! reserves for problem loans, 4.5 percent. ANA CAFE is not only to take the 
lead in providing technical assistance to project beneficiaries but is also to play a major role 
in identifying borrowers, preparing loan documents, supervising credit use and collecting 
loans. The use of trust funds and the role of ANACAFE are together to overcome the two 
main barri~rs that have been identified as preventing banks from lending to small-scale 
farmers: high costs and high risks. Moveover, banks are said to be less reluctant to lend to 
coffee producers because of relatively secure markets and foreign exchange earnings, 
together with the existing involvement of some banks in coffee processing and marketing. 
Participati~ banks are thus supposed to learn through project lending that it can be less 
costly and risky to lend to small-scale coffee farmers than they had initially feared--in 
addition to their commitment to supply short-term production credit to project beneficiaries 
in later years. 
In thle design of the credit component of the project considerable attention has been 
paid to collflhoration between ANACAFE and the participating banks that is supposed to 
allow these 
1
banks to reduce costs and risks and thereby remove the main impediments to 
lending to Small-scale producers. However, shared responsibility for client selection and 
supervision 1has often led to serious loan recovery problems in credit projects. In addition 
to the general problem that when two entities are jointly in charge of an activity, no one is 
in fact in charge, the emphasis on timely credit delivery may make it difficult for 
participating banks to review applicants adequately or to deny loans to marginal applicants. 
Moreover, 
1
in spite of the emphasis in project design on enhancing credit delivery 
mechanisms and improving the operational efficiency of public and private lending 
programs, it is unclear what is to be done beyond the involvement of ANACAFE in the 
lending pro¢ess. This orientation is reflected in the focus of proposed project evaluation on 
the impact 9f the project on the farmer beneficiaries rather than on improvements in the 
efficiency of participating banks and their ability to sustain lending to small-scale producers. 
In addition,
1 
the reporting requirements under the project that are seen as necessary for 
adequate Il]lOnitoring and evaluation may impose significant administrative costs on 
participating banks. 
Although the project description focuses on the barriers that have inhibited bank 
lending to small-scale coffee producers, project design focuses primarily on channeling credit 
to intended 1 beneficiaries, so that the project ultimately to be implemented has become 
highly similq.r to the types of traditional directed credit projects that have been criticized in 
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AI.D.'s policy paper on Financial Markets Development and elsewhere. In spite of the 
efforts to ihduce participation in the project, it remains unclear that the capabilities and 
incentives for commercial banks to lend to small-scale producers will be permanently 
enhanced #ter project funds have been exhausted. Commercial banks may or may not find 
small-scale,coffee producers to be good clients depending on the success of the collaboration 
with ANACAFE which, as noted above, may face difficulties. One alternative would have 
been to foqus more directly on reducing lender costs and risks rather than shifting them to 
ANACAFij and trust funds. Another alternative would be to make greater use of informal 
sources of 1credit that already serve many small-scale coffee producers. Although these 
sources ard often seen to be high cost and exploitive of small farmers, it may be possible to 
enhance cdmpetition among them by increasing their access to credit--which may be less 
difficult than enhancing the access of small farmers to formal loans directly. Attention 
might be paid under the project to marketing and processing agents, in particular, as 
potential s~urces of credit for small-scale coffee producers. Moreover, inadequate coffee 
marketing Cfd processing arrangements have already been identified as barriers to increased 
producer i~comes, and lower producer incomes will undoubtedly have a negative impact on 
the recovecy- of loans made under the project. 
I 
Agribusiness Development17 
The !objectives of the Agribusiness Development Project are to increase rural family 
incomes antl exports of non-traditional crops through improved marketing opportunities to 
be achieved mainly by supporting agribusiness enterprises in rural areas. The project, which 
began in 1984, has three main components. The Non-Traditional Exporters Guild is to be 
supported fhrough a grant of US$1 million to strengthen its export and investment 
promotion •ctivities and to create a market information system. A grant of US$1.3 million 
has been provided for cooperative strengthening, especially in the areas of handling and 
marketing :fruits and vegetables. The largest component is the credit component which 
includes a gi-ant of US$0.6 million to the Central Bank of Guatemala for technical assistance 
and training to enhance the ability of participating financial institutions (including the 
Central Bank itself) to provide credit services, and a loan of US$9.5 million to the Central 
Bank, of which US$7.3 million is for on-lending by participating banks and finance 
companies, 1US$1.5 million is for on-lending by BANDESA to cooperatives, and US$0.7 
million is fo~ technical assistance in the development of rural agribusiness enterprises. Only 
limited profess has been made in improving credit analysis at the level of the participating 
financial intf,rmediaries and in facilitating credit operations at the level of the Central Bank, 
as little of 
1 
the training and technical assistance funds has been used. The following 
discussion qf the project and the evaluation of the project carried out in late 1987 focuses 
primarily on the reasons for the deficiencies in the credit component, as reflected in the 
slow disbur$ements, and the recommendations to overcome these deficiencies. 
17 Arthwt Young, Agribusiness Development Project: Mid-Term Evaluation, 1987 
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An ' evaluation of the project presents a variety of reasons for the slowness of 
disbursem~nts under the credit component of the project. Many potential borrowers are 
said to lack adequate collateral (for long term loans, banking law requires real estate valued 
at 200 percent of the amount of the loan), but this often appears to be an excuse rather than 
a reason ~ banks are able to find ways around this requirement when they are particularly 
interested !in making a loan. Eligibility criteria for access to A.l.D. loans funds at the 
Central Bank were also initially quite restrictive as, for example, agricultural processors 
seeking loans under the project had to buy more than half their crop inputs from small 
farmers. However, these criteria were later modified so that eligible borrowers had only to 
satisfy onel from among a number of criteria, such as generating foreign exchange, creating 
employmeht, processing non-traditional products, or transferring technology to benefit small 
farmers. In any case, the main reason for slow disbursement seems to have been a lack of 
attractiveness of the project's credit line relative to more easily available alternatives, 
together \\jith a lower demand for credit for export oriented agribusinesses activities than 
had originally been anticipated. On one hand, domestic liquidity was much less tight than 
when the project was designed, and a number competing credit lines became available from 
other donor agencies and foreign governments. On the other hand, credit demand seems 
to have bern overestimated because of a failure to analyze adequately the markets for non-
traditional! agricultural exports--which were small, not growing and subject to potentially 
strong competition from neighboring countries. 
In short, the credit component of the Agribusiness Development Project reflects many 
of the typipal features--and problems--of directed credit programs in general. There often 
tends to ~e an underlying assumption that cheap and abundant credit can overcome 
shortcomings in other markets, such as a lack of adequate demand for non-traditional 
exports (perhaps stemming from an overvalued exchange rate). Moreover, attempts to 
target cre~it to specific beneficiaries and activities lead to the kinds of problems with 
eligibility qriteria noted above, along with other restrictions such as limits on the proportion 
of working capital that can be financed relative to investments in plant and equipment and 
restrictions that borrowers not use project loans to refinance outstanding debts. In addition, 
a strong tendency arises for the Central Bank to take on roles in processing loan 
applicatio~s that delay and substantially increase the costs of lending under directed credit 
projects. ~n particular, insistence by the Central Bank on feasibility studies and other 
detailed information, which the Central Bank subsequently evaluates, reflects the Central 
Bank's view that it has important responsibilities in the allocation of project funds (and are 
not simply due to traditions of bureaucratic conservatism as the evaluation tends to 
emphasize~. On the other hand, however, borrowers and financial intermediaries not only 
complain of costs and delays but also express fears of submitting confidential information 
to the Central Bank and even suggest that excessive requirements may reflect an adversarial 
relationshf.. Duplication--both of effort and responsibility--is central not only to the costs 
and delays but also to the lack of trust among the various parties. Moreover, duplication 
and the re~ulting lack of clear responsibility can later cause serious loan recovery problems 
(something that has not yet arisen in this project) as each party tries to assign the 
responsibility for problem loans to one of the other parties. 
I 
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As the evaluation points out, A.I.D.'s efforts have led to greater flexibility in Central 
Bank operations, and efforts have also been made to enhance communication with financial 
intermediarjes and potential borrowers about the project and especially about improvements 
in the operation of the credit component. Nonetheless, too much emphasis on promoting 
the project's credit line, as opposed simply to increasing the availability of information, can 
also create subsequent problems for loan recovery as beneficiaries become more interested 
in the potential grant aspects of the loan rather than the loan itself. In addition, the 
evaluation's. recommendation to increase spreads for financial intermediaries, while 
compensatiJjlg for the high operating costs of the project's credit line relative to alternative 
sources of funds, does not deal with the basic reasons for these high costs, and especially for 
the duplication of effort and responsibility. In fact, the spread on project funds of 5.5 
percent is already higher than the spread on the Central Bank's regular rediscount lines and 
does not allow enough for the capitalization of the credit fund (4.5 percent) to prevent its 
erosion by inflation, nor enough for the Central Bank (1 percent) to cover its administrative 
expenses, as long as the rate of interest is maintained at only 14 percent for project 
beneficiaries. Moreover, other recommendations in the evaluation, such as creating trust 
funds or loan guarantee mechanisms to speed disbursement of the project's credit funds, not 
only fail to address the basic reasons for slow disbursement but also run the risk of adding 
to the distortions in Guatemala's rural financial markets rather than contributing to reform 
and liberalization. A recommendation that could instead have received greater emphasis 
is more rap~d use of grant funds for training and technical assistance to improve the credit 
operations df the Central Bank and participating intermediaries--after first investigating why 
these funds ,have been so slow to disburse. 
i 
BANDESA's role in the project's credit component is to provide loans for 
cooperatives to support processing and marketing activities, especially for non-traditional 
exports, in doordination with technical assistance being provided to cooperatives under the 
project. However, BANDESA's project lending was also very small at the time of the 
evaluation--just one loan from the project's credit line and two loans from competing sources 
to cooperatives receiving technical assistance under the project. BANDESA's limited 
participation in project lending is attributed in part, as in the case of private-sector financial 
institutions, to Central Bank delays, high administrative costs, low spreads on project funds 
relative to alternative sources, and a variety of eligibility requirements including the need 
for the borrower to be a legal entity, to provide guarantees in the form of land, to submit 
to joint and several liability and to provide at least 25 percent of project costs. In addition, 
maximum 1$an size is low for cooperatives, many cooperatives are delinquent on prior 
BANDESA' loans, and BANDESA is said to focus heavily on the political benefits of its 
lending--wh,ch are said to be few because of the small size and low visibility of the project's 
cooperative' credit component. BANDESA has also been criticized frequently for its 
excessive centralization and its lack of adequate field personnel. Although A.l.D. has made 
significant efforts to improve BANDESA's operations, especially its credit delivery system, 
BANDESA: still has numerous shortcomings, including high operating costs, severe loan 
recovery problems, lack of appropriate performance criteria and incentives for employees, 
unqualified jand unproductive personnel, and political intrusions into its internal affairs. 
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Until substantial progress in made in these areas, and especially in assuring BANDESA's 
independe~ce from inappropriate external interference, gains from support provided by 
donor agencies are likely to be limited and transitory.18 
Agricultural Production and Marketing19 
Tutt Agricultural Production and Marketing Project is a cooperative agreement with 
the Ametjcan Institute for Free Labor Development to strengthen the capacity of 
Guatemai's National Labor Union Confederation and its farm union affiliates to provide 
agricultur 1 services to members. The project is funded by grants of approximately 
US$320,0 0 and 03,100,000 for a three year period from mid 1987 through mid 1990. 
Among the project's several components is a credit component, funded by a grant of 
0875,000, to provide short-term loans to small-scale producers of corn and sesame. At the 
time of the evaluation at the end of 1988, approximately 800 farmers had received loans 
totaling about 0125,000, but in value terms only about 40 percent of these loans had been 
repaid on time. However, because the date of the evaluation was just after the due date for 
loan repaYbient, it was still too soon to know if loan repayment problems will plague this 
project a.S lhey have so many similar projects. Moreover, little information is provided in 
the evalua~ion about the terms and conditions of project loans, so that it is difficult to make 
any predi tions about the future course of loan recovery or other aspects of the credit 
componen of the project. 
Highlands Agricultural Development20 
Thd objective of the Highland Agricultural Development Project is to increase 
agricultur~l productivity, especially among the rural poor. The first phase of the project had 
a rural roimaintenance component and a natural resource component consisting in small-
scale irrig tion, soil conservation and reforestation. In the second phase a variety of 
technical d administrative services were added to support project beneficiaries on a more 
comprehe sive basis, with particular focus on credit, marketing, research and increased 
technical assistance. The project was initially to be funded with a loan from A.l.D. of 
18In 1 89, the project was amended to add US$ 1 million to grant funds for the 
cooperativ strengthening component of the project. In addition, because of continuing slow 
disbursem nt from BANDESA's credit line for lending to cooperatives, approximately US$ 
0.6 millio of these loan funds was transferred to the credit line for lending by banks and 
finance co pany which, subsequent to the evaluation of the project, had disbursed more 
rapidly. 
19Consultores Agroindustriales, Report on the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Agricultural 
Production and Marketing Project, 1989. 
! 
20 Asso}iates in Rural Development, Inc., Highlands Agricultural Development Project: 
Midterm J$valuation, 1987. 
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US$7.5 mllµon, a grant of US$1.5 million, and counterpart funds from the Guatemalan 
Government equivalent to approximately US$5.8 million, and this was subsequently 
increased tiirough a series of loan and grant amendments to the original project. With the 
initiation o~ the second stage in 1988, a major addition was made to the project of US$15 
million in A.I.D. grant funds, along with the equivalent of approximately US$ 12.8 million 
I 
in counterp'1't funds from the Guatemalan Government. The following discussion is based 
primarily o4 the evaluation of the project carried out late in 1987 and focuses on the credit 
aspects whi~h, consisting in credit for irrigation facilities, fall within the irrigation component 
of the proj ct. 
The nterest rate on loans to project beneficiaries was initially set at 6 percent but 
had been in eased gradually to 10 percent as of late 1987. However, even this rate is well 
below the r te on commercial bank agricultural loans, especially if the effective rate rather 
than the st ted rate is considered, as well as being below the rates that BANDESA, the 
project len er, charges on most of its other loans. In many recent years, moreover, the rate 
has been su stantially below the rate of inflation so that the fund for project lending is being 
decapitaliz d--even if loan repayment is 100 percent on time--through large implicit 
subsidies to the fortunate current recipients of project loans at the expense of potential 
future beneficiaries. Other terms of project loans are also generous, including terms up to 
fifteen year , grace periods up to two years on principal, possible similar grace periods on 
interest, an highly flexible guarantee requirements. The evaluation recommends that some 
of these te be tightened somewhat and, in particular, that interest rates on project loans 
be increase slightly and made flexible because of the need to compensate for inflation, 
especially o longer terms loans. However, even these interest rates would continue to be 
highly subsi ized (i.e., they would not cover the cost of securing funds at market rates of 
interest an on-lending them under the project) and could even be negative in real terms 
unless inter st rate flexibility is tied closely to inflation. 
The bedit component of the project is administered by BANDESA under a trust 
fund. Undbr the terms of the trust, BANDESA is compensated for its work by being 
allowed to ~etain the interest income collected on project loans. However, it must initially 
use its own funds for these loans and is then reimbursed with a lag of approximately six 
months. Th s presents problems for BAND BSA because its difficult liquidity position results 
in almost to al dependence on trust funds. Although BANDESA had about 060 million in 
savings dep sits, the evaluation does not recommend using these funds for agricultural loans 
because of he serious mis-matching of maturities and the risks of lending to small farmers. 
In any case BANDESA's liquidity shortfalls are primarily due to loan recovery problems 
which the e aluation attributes mainly to pressures to lend to the politically powerful, to 
weak coop ratives and federations and in areas disturbed by violence, rather than to 
shortcomin sin BANDESA's staff and operations. In fact, the evaluation largely praises 
BAND BSA s project lending efforts but suggests that they may be too costly to be covered 
by even the otal interest income from the project. Instead of suggesting increased efficiency 
in project le ding, the evaluation recommends additional commissions for BANDESA along 
with suppor for improved infrastructure (e.g., vehicles and computers) and greater attention 
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to deposit
1 
mobilization. However, such support is unlikely to accomplish much until 
BANDESA's high costs and serious loan recovery problems due to lack of independence in 
selecting borrowers are resolved, while deposit mobilization, though desirable in itself, may 
be dangerous if the funds mobilized are devoted to covering BANDESA's high costs or lent 
to questiotable borrowers. 
Dupng the first phase of the project (including amendments) approximately US$2.4 
million in IAI.D. funds was available for irrigation loans, but as of the end of 1987 only 
about US$0.4 had been disbursed. According to the evaluation, this shortfall is not due to 
any BANDESA's shortcomings but rather to the failure of DIGESA to develop and submit 
enough lop applications. It is DIGESA's responsibility to develop the loan applications 
including ~reparing feasibility studies, organizing participants into groups and forwarding 
lists of potential borrowers to BANDESA to check for existing loan delinquency. 
BANDES.A not only facilitates rapid loan approval by dividing large groups into smaller 
groups if qecessary to avoid the delays from having to send loan applications over a certain 
limit to the central office for approval but also substitutes family members with no negative 
credit rectd for applicants with delinquent loans. In reviewing loan applications, moreover, 
BANDES has not only stressed quick response but also approved all applications 
submitted , to it as of the date of the evaluation. Although efforts to speed the lending 
process are commendable, such easy approval of all loan applications may subsequently 
result in s~rious loan recovery problems, particularly given the record of similar programs 
where the I responsibility for lending is divided between two agencies. At the time of the 
· evaluation, little information was yet available on loan recovery rates because of generous 
grace peripds, but in one case where information was available (interest payments at 
BANDESJj\'s Quezaltenango agency) only about 50 percent of payments due had been 
collected. ' On the other hand, the evaluation mentions that some loans made by other 
agencies had been prepaid, reflecting the profitability of small scale irrigation together with 
some borr~wers' fears of debt. 
CommerciP,l Land Markets II21 
Th~ main objectives of the Commercial Land Markets II Project are to improve the 
welfare of Guatemala's rural poor and, at the same time, to increase overall agricultural 
output through better land utilization. These objectives are to be achieved through 
voluntary purchases of agricultural land by the Penny Foundation for resale in small parcels 
(2.8 hectaties) to farmers having little or no land and by providing these beneficiaries with 
infrastructure, technical assistance and production credit. The project also includes a 
substantial research component to enhance the performance and evaluation of the project 
and to id~ntify additional ways in which land transactions can be facilitated and their 
financing improved. The project is an extension of an earlier pilot project that involved a 
grant of $1 million to the Penny Foundation in 1984 for a similar program of land purchase 
I 
I 
21USAµ)/Guatemala, Commercial Land Markets II Project Paper, 1987. 
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and resale. Because of the apparent success of the pilot project, additional grants of $1 
million were made to the Penny Foundation in 1985 and 1986, and these grants have since 
been included as part of the Commercial Land Markets II Project. The following discussion 
focuses primarily on the financial aspects of the project, that is, the financing of land 
purchases and sales and the extension of production credit to beneficiaries, but it is also 
necessary t<I> discuss various aspects of land markets in Guatemala in order to understand 
more fully the potential that the Penny Foundation or alternative institutions or mechanisms 
may have t~ operate programs of this type on a sustainable basis. 
In Gluatemala, as elsewhere in Latin America, it is widely believed that large land 
holdings are often less efficiently used than smaller holdings. If this is in fact the case, then 
facilitating ~e transfer of land from large holdings to able farmers without adequate access 
to land ha.S the potential to increase productivity as well as helping the rural poor. 
However, p~t land reform efforts of the Guatemalan Government have engendered strong 
political resistance, as well as being at most marginally successful, so that efforts under the 
Commerci~ Land Markets II Project are focused on voluntary market transfers of land 
rather than' expropriations. The main barriers to such land transactions are said to be 
informatio~ and contracting, on one hand, and finance, on the other. Information about 
land markeb, especially potential offers to sell, is said to be limited by the large gap 
between rich and poor in rural Guatemala and by past conflicts over land. It is also said 
to be comp~x and costly to undertake and administer the subdivision and selling of a large 
farm in small parcels. Finally, there is said to be no commercial financing available for 
rural land ~urchases in Guatemala. Grants to the Penny Foundation have allowed it to 
overcome these barriers by undertaking the functions of buying large farms, reselling small 
parcels and [financing the purchase of these parcels. 
To tljle extent that the Penny Foundation has been successful in such endeavors, it 
may be due to its special expertise in these areas (land purchase, parcelization and 
financing) ~at is unavailable to other agents, thereby allowing the Penny Foundation to be 
profitable ~here others cannot be--or success may be due to access to grants from A.I.D. 
and other dpnors. Since expertise in land purchase, parcelization and financing should be 
common to ~uccessful land developers in any country, it is important to know more precisely 
what the barriers are in rural Guatemala that inhibit carrying out these functions and exactly 
how the Peijmy Foundation has been able to overcome these barriers: Prospects can then 
be more adequately assessed for the continuing viability of the Penny Foundation's program 
(without permanent dependance on donor grants) and for the transfer of this expertise to 
other institultions to create similar programs to expand outreach on a sustainable basis. An 
important ~pect of this is to separate the barriers in land purchase and parcelization from 
those in financing, since the imperfections implied are in different markets and hence in 
need of diff~rent remedies. The research component of the project appropriately focuses 
not only o* a thorough evaluation of the Penny Foundation's activities but also on 
identifying i~perfections in Guatemala's land and financial markets and then supporting 
institutions land mechanisms that can overcome these barriers and thus provide more 
adequate markets for rural land transactions and their financing. 
I 
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The ~mount of funding for the project is US$14 million, including the US$2 million 
in A.l.D. g$nts to the Penny Foundation that occurred in 1985 and 1986, US$8.5 million 
in new A.I.D. contributions, and US$3.5 million in counterpart contributions from the Penny 
Foundation (mainly for the payment of principal and interest on notes issued in land 
purchase tdmsactions and for the continuation of traditional Penny Foundation programs). 
These fund$ are divided into six main components: (1) land purchase and resale (US$5.005 
million); (l) farm management (US$0.822 million); (3) production credit (US$4.338 
million); (4) improvements in administration (US$ 2.018 million); (5) inflation and 
contingencies (US$1.067 million); and (6) studies (US$0.750 million). This breakdown of 
project funding shows clearly that land purchase and resale supported by production credit 
for beneficiaries is the main activity of the project, with subsidiary support for farm 
management, administration and research studies. The level of project funding was 
established based on the objective of making the land purchase and resale activity self 
supporting ~t a designated level of land purchases--which was later determined to be 1,350 
hectares Pef year. 
In an evaluation of the pilot project carried out in May, 1987, the Penny Foundation's 
procedures 
1
for reviewing farms and making purchase offers were criticized, but in addition 
the requiretnent of making purchases with at most 50 percent down and the remaining 
portion to ~e paid over five years at 9 percent interest may not always be optimal to secure 
the best price. In particular, the optimal financing offer will depend on the relative liquidity 
positions of the Penny Foundation and the other party to the transaction and the interest 
rate that e~ch would have to pay to obtain additional funds. The price to be paid by 
beneficiari~s for their 2.8 hectare parcels is based on the cost of the farm plus surveying and 
parceling costs. Payments are to be made over a ten year period, with a 10 percent down 
payment, but the Penny Foundation has been flexible with downpayments in order not to 
exclude participation by landless individuals. In addition, production credit is provided to 
beneficiari~s in the form of inputs (supplied by the Penny Foundation) and in cash (a 
subsistence 1wage for half the work done on the farm by the beneficiary). It is argued that 
the Penny Foundation must provide production credit not only because no other source of 
such credit, is available, but also because providing short-term credit helps the Penny 
Foundation!s cash flow situation by complementing its long-term loans for land purchase. 
Loans for bbth land purchase and production carry the same interest rate, 12 percent at the 
time the project was designed and expected to rise to 14 percent. 
A more appropriate justification for the Penny Foundation's role in lending to 
beneficiari~s is the Foundation's comparative advantage (i.e., economies of scope in 
information and loan collection arising from its relationships with beneficiaries) that allows 
it to lend profitably to beneficiaries while other potential lenders cannot. However, interest 
rates on lols to beneficiaries must be adequate to cover the Penny Foundation's costs--both 
the cost of funds and loan administration (including losses from repayment problems)--in 
order to a oid decapitalizing the Foundation while providing unwarranted subsidies to 
beneficiaries. The interest rates to be charged to beneficiaries are said to be competitive 
with prevailing market rates, but they are certainly not adequate to cover the Penny 
I 
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Foundation•s cost of funds and loan administration--if they were, the Foundation should be 
both able and eager to expand its lending activities. Moreover, these interest rates are well 
below thos<r available even to most large-scale producers and, for this reason as well, 
represent an. unwarranted subsidy to beneficiaries. If, for either social or economic reasons, 
beneficiarie~ are to receive subsidies, such subsidies can be more easily justified and more 
effectively delivered as technical assistance. In addition, the emphasis in the project 
document that these interest rates are positive in real terms, though currently correct, 
provides no guarantee that this will be true throughout the lives of the longer-term loans 
for land, as, there appears to be no mechanism in the project by which interest rates on 
outstanding I loans can subsequently be adjusted. 
The b,mount of the grant from A.I.D. to the Penny Foundation, was determined on 
the basis of the amount that would be required to make the Foundation's land purchase and 
resale openjttions sustainable at the designated level of 1,350 hectares each year. In the 
project dischssion, both the cash flow position and the solvency of the Foundation are 
mentioned ~s key constraints to be overcome in the selection of this level. However, as the 
foregoing discussion indicates, interest rates charged to beneficiaries are not adequate at any 
level of operations to achieve either solvency or a manageable cash flow position for either 
the Penny Foundation or other institutions that may later be asked to replicate these 
activities. If the crops to be planted by the beneficiaries in fact generate high rates of return 
that can co~er the full costs to the Foundation of providing credit to beneficiaries, as well 
as the initial costs of purchasing and dividing the land, then the sustainability of the project 
can be assured if adequate (market) prices and interest rates are charged (except that a 
continuing subsidy for technical assistance may be justified). If returns to beneficiaries are 
not adequat~ to cover these costs, then the project will never be viable without a perpetual 
subsidy, and other approaches to assisting these beneficiaries should be sought. Given that 
rates of retu;rn for beneficiaries are adequate, the key elements in the success of the project 
will, as indiCated initially, be the particular expertise that enables the Penny Foundation to 
buy large farms, resell them in small parcels and provide credit to the beneficiaries, all in 
efficient wah that can be identified and ultimately replicated by other institutions. 
Penny Foutjdation Proposal To Create a Finance Company22 
The J>enny Foundation has proposed to create a new finance company that would 
have the basic objective of providing credit to low-income producers who are involved in 
viable, sochj..lly-oriented programs and projects sponsored by the Penny Foundation and 
similar non-governmental organizations. In providing credit and other financial services to 
assist beneflciaries in the development of productive activities, highest priority would be 
given to the projects of the Penny Foundation, especially its Integrated Development 
Program (i.~., AI.D.'s land purchase and resale project). Moreover, profits earned by the 
22Penny Foundation, Perfil Sobre la Creacion de una Sociedad Financiera que de Apoyo 
a las Opera~ions de la Fundacion Del Centavo y otras ONGs, 1989. 
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finance c01;npany, and not reinvested, would be transferred to the Foundation to cover its 
general e~enses. In addition to making medium and long term loans, the finance company 
would pro ·de a wide range of financial services to its beneficiaries, including: capital 
investmen , short term loans based on central bank rediscounts; guarantees, advances and 
discount o erations; housing finance; and stock market operations, especially involving 
instrument issued by the Penny Foundation or by beneficiaries. In order to obtain funds 
to provide these services, the finance company would have the usual powers of a financial 
intermedi , including: issuing a wide range of instruments; obtaining foreign and domestic 
loans; ope ating trust funds; and accessing central bank rediscounts. In addition, the Penny 
Foundatio argues that the finance company would need a significant donation of capital 
to provide a high proportion of low-cost funds in order to make loans at interest rates 
competitiv with, or lower than, commercial bank rates and still operate viably. 
In s ite of the Penny Foundation's intention that the finance company should make 
loans that can be recovered (e.g., for productive activities in low risk areas) and should 
operate pr fitably, the chances that the proposed finance company would in fact be viable 
are slim. The record of efforts to create similar (i.e., socially oriented, yet profitable) 
finance co panies in other Latin American countries or elsewhere in the developing world 
is not pro ·sing. The few finance companies of this type that have continued to operate 
have eithe dropped their social objectives and become purely profit oriented or have 
continued to depend heavily on grants from governments or donor agencies for their 
survival. addition, the finance company proposed by the Penny Foundation has elements 
of potenti conflict that will likely hasten its demise (or its reorientation in unintended 
directions) An essential element in the successful regulation and supervision of financial 
intermedi ies in any country is strong and effective limits over the provision of loans and 
other servi es to related parties, that is, the owners and managers of a financial intermediary 
and indivi als and entities connected to them. Involvement in such lending inevitably leads 
to serious oan recovery problems as the financial intermediary is neither free to select 
clients wit the greatest likelihood of repaying loans nor to press recalcitrant borrowers 
strongly to repay. The prospects for the Penny Foundation's proposed finance company are 
even mor~ bleak because of almost certain conflicts between the Penny Foundation and 
other non overnmental organizations over priorities in the provision of loans and other 
financial s rvices, as well as between the beneficiaries and the institution in charge of each 
program oier who will in fact be responsible for allocating loans and subsequently collecting 
them. 
I 
The Penny Foundation's proposal is also problematic in that it depends on a large 
initial infu ion of capital to attempt to insure the future viability of the finance company and 
to allow le ding to beneficiaries at preferential rates of interest (rates equal or below those 
charged b commercial banks to their favored clients). To be viable in the long run, the 
finance co pany must charge rates of interest that cover the full cost of mobilizing funds 
from the blic at market rates of interest and then lending these funds (including costs 
from the f'ilure to recover loans on time). If the intended beneficiaries cannot afford to 
pay such r*es of interest, then other mechanisms and programs are needed to increase the 
! 
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profitability of their activities. Providing loans at below market rates of interest will instead 
encourage :rent seeking behavior by unintended recipients and, at best, create a privileged 
class amo~g the intended beneficiaries as the amount of the subsidy required limits the 
outreach of the program. Moreover, the Penny Foundation's suggestion of a large initial 
grant to ca italize the finance company with low cost funds also inverts the normal financial 
structure o an enterprise for which equity capital is the most costly source of funds because 
it incurs th greatest risks. The amount of subsidy implicit in a grant of capital to start a 
finance corhpany should be compared with the potential benefits from allocating equivalent 
resources tb increase the profitability of the activities to be carried out by the beneficiaries 
(e.g., through technical assistance and training, together with efforts to improve the policy 
environme~t ). 
I 
In ~ddition to the foregoing general analysis, the Penny Foundation's proposal to 
create a fi ance company should be viewed specifically in relation to the AI.D. sponsored 
land purch se and resale program. The Penny Foundation claims that it needs additional 
funds to e and this program to an acceptable size and believes that the newly created 
finance co pany could provide these funds from its mobilization of resources and its profits. 
Serious cas flow constraints have indeed emerged in the land purchase and resale program 
as more lo have been long term with the predominance of permanent crops on the farms 
being deve oped and especially as the program has been transformed into a more costly 
integrated development program with complementary infrastructure and services. In 
addition, ere may be some slippage in loan collection which may not be readily apparent 
because of the Penny Foundation's flexibility in rescheduling loans based on its view that 
the initiati n of new activities by beneficiaries with limited assets can be highly risky in the 
first stages However, as the preceding analysis suggests, the proposed finance company is 
unlikely ev r to have adequate profits to contribute funds to the Penny Foundation and, in 
order to obilize funds successfully from the public, will need to pay market rates of 
interest w ich will require rates of return on its loans and investments adequate to cover 
all its cost . A crucial issue is thus whether lending under the land purchase and resale 
program c be carried out profitably and, if so, whether more profitably by a newly created 
finance co pany or by the Penny Foundation directly. 
flow problems should not be insurmountable if lending is profitable and if the 
newly crea ed finance company is creditworthy and hence can borrow at favorable rates of 
interest to · ance its cash shortfall. However, continuing cash flow problems can be a sign 
of lack of rofitability rather than just poor matching of cash flows. One advantage of 
separating lending activities from the Penny Foundation and assigning them to a newly 
created fin ce company is that it may be easier to identify sources of lack of profitability 
(e.g., the Foundation's land transactions or the provision of infrastructure and 
compleme tary services) and to deal with them appropriately. On the other hand, because 
of econo es of scope in information and loan collection arising from the Foundation's 
relationshi s with beneficiaries, as noted earlier, it may be preferable to maintain lending 
activities thin the Foundation itself in spite of the potential advantages from specialization 
in the pro sion of financial services. Moreover, in spite of the Penny Foundation's apparent 
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lack of enthusiasm for loan collection responsibility, it may be more effective than a finance 
company th~t is likely to suffer from the problems involved in lending to related parties also 
noted above. In any case, for either the Penny Foundation or a finance company, significant 
term transformation cannot be avoided, and this will require adjustable interest rates on 
longer term loans and major efforts to enhance liquidity management techniques (as well 
as techniques to deal with foreign exchange risk if foreign credits are used). 
The foregoing discussion of the Commercial Land Markets II Project and the Penny 
Foundation'.s proposal to create a finance company suggests the need for further analysis of 
the options available to finance rural land transactions. While the creation of a new finance 
company (qr the transformation of an existing one) may be helpful to finance rural land 
transactionS and provide related financial services, the Penny Foundation's current proposal 
has serious 'hortcomings. Moreover, the in-depth analyses contemplated under Commercial 
Land Markets II Project, not only of the Penny Foundation's land purchase and resale 
program bu~ also of alternative mechanisms to finance rural land transactions, are likely to 
be crucial m reaching a judgement on what is workable. In particular, it will be important 
to know w•ether the Penny Foundation's cash flow problems are due in part to losses 
sustained iii certain activities and, if so, which activities (e.g., land transactions or lending) 
before app~opriate lessons can be learned from the Penny Foundation's experience to be 
transmitted to other non-governmental institutions. In addition, closer analysis of land 
transactio~ and their financing can pinpoint the imperfections that need to be addressed 
and can indicate which mechanisms and institutions are likely to have a comparative 
advantage ip implementing the necessary innovations that can make these activities viable. 
One potentially significant area for such innovation may be deposit mobilization, not only 
to contribu~e to land purchase operations and to the viability of financial institutions but 
also to proVide important deposit and liquidity services for program beneficiaries who 
traditionally have been thought too poor to save. 
Private Entbrprise Development23 
The bbjective of the Private Enterprise Development Project is to strengthen the role 
of the priv~te sector, especially small and medium scale enterprises, in the Guatemalan 
economy and in policy making through a wide range of activities including technical 
assistance, training and improved access to financial services. The budget for the project 
during its five year life from mid 1987 through mid 1992 is approximately US$27.5 million, 
including algrant of US$10 million from A.l.D., a local currency equivalent of US$10.9 in 
ESF funds from the Guatemalan Government, and a local currency equivalent of US$6.6 
in counte~art contributions from Guatemalan private sector institutions. The financial 
market development component of the project has two elements: a loan guarantee fund to 
encourage ~ending to small and medium scale enterprises; and support for financial market 
research, development, promotion and policy dialogue. The loan guarantee fund is 
23USA.Ib/Guatemala, Private Enterprise Development: Project Paper, 1987. 
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supported by the equivalent of US$5.5 million in ESF funds from the Guatemalan 
Government, the equivalent of US$5.5 million from participating Guatemalan financial 
institutions, the equivalent of US$50,000 in ESF funds for promotional purposes, and a 
A.I.D. grant of US$50,000 for technical assistance and staff training at participating banks. 
The financi~l market research, development, promotion and policy dialogue component is 
supported ~ya grant of US$500,000 from AI.D. and the equivalent of US$50,000 in ESF 
funds. Al~hough this project and its financial market components are not oriented 
specifically toward rural Guatemala, it is nonetheless worthwhile to analyze these 
components briefly for the lessons that they can provide for rural financial market activities. 
Small and medium scale enterprises have been identified as lacking access to credit 
because of a variety of financial market distortions, especially highly restrictive collateral 
requirements. A loan guarantee fund has thus been created to substitute for collateral, with 
initial partifipation by three banks. This fund guarantees 50 percent of the principal of 
qualifying l~ans (e.g., between 2,500 and 100,000 quetzales, with one year terms for working 
capital and up to five years for capital goods) to eligible small and medium scale enterprises. 
For the guarantee, a fee of .5 percent is charged on the outstanding principal of the loan, 
and there ~re also certain reporting requirements. However, the significant burden for 
participating banks is that claims can only be submitted after a loan is six months overdue 
and after cqllection procedures, including legal action, have been initiated. After approval, 
50 percent of the outstanding principal is reimbursed. In spite of A.l.D./Guatemala's efforts 
to avoid the problems that have plagued similar programs in other countries, use of the loan 
guarantee f{ind has been quite limited. Because of the long wait and the high costs of loan 
recovery ef(orts, incentives have not been adequate for banks to participate actively in the 
loan guarantee program. Moreover, collateral requirements may not be the main barrier 
to lending, as banks are reported to be willing to circumvent these requirements when they 
are eager t~ make loans. 
' 
' 
i 
The component of the Private Enterprise Development Project devoted to financial 
market research, development, promotion and policy dialogue appears to be a model of 
what might 
1
be accomplished in pinpointing distortions in rural financial markets and then 
addressing !these distortions through research and policy dialogue along with related 
technical as$istance and training. Moreover, the Guatemalan Financial Chamber, which has 
been designated as the counterpart institution for this component of the project, appears to 
have the support of the different private sector financial institutions that is necessary for the 
diagnosis of financial market distortions and for policy dialogue that could lead to the 
implementdtion of appropriate reforms. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that at least 
some financial market distortions are the result of non-competitive behavior by members 
of the Guatemalan Financial Chamber, while members of the Chamber may also benefit 
from certaib other distortions that stem from inappropriate financial market policies of the 
Guatemalab Government. Consequently, this component of the project may have a 
tendency toi lag or to fail to focus on some of the most significant distortions unless A.I.D. 
at times provides leadership to ensure that research and policy dialogue indeed address 
some of the more controversial issues in depth. On the other hand, the growing importance 
I 
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of non-regt11lated financial institutions and the competition they provide to the members of 
the Guatetnalan Financial Chamber may make the members particularly interested in 
research and policy dialogue leading to policy reforms that enhance the members' ability to 
compete oµ equal terms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Thel projects dealing with rural financial markets that have been developed and 
implemented by A.l.D./Guatemala during the 1980s are quite similar to those dating from 
the 1970s and before. The main characteristic of almost all of these projects is their 
predomina.P,t focus on the users of financial services (mainly credit) relative to the markets 
and institutions providing financial services. Moreover, in their focus on those individuals 
who are to:benefit from financial services, these projects almost always involve a variety of 
other form$ of support such as improved marketing services, enhanced technical assistance 
and somethites even access to more land or better rural infrastructure. The combination 
of these other elements with credit for beneficiaries on subsidized terms suggests that 
certain incentives exist in the design and implementation of projects that leads to this 
outcome. !It may be that difficulties in creating projects that can deal effectively with 
shortcominlgs in marketing, technical assistance, rural infrastructure and land distribution 
make it particularly attractive to introduce credit components that will, because of the 
subsidies i*volved, disburse relatively large amounts of money rapidly and thereby give at 
least an awearance of success in the short run. The failure to focus on research, policy 
dialogue, technical assistance and training that might enhance the viability of rural financial 
markets anp institutions represents missed opportunities to expand financial services in rural 
areas on a ~ustainable basis. In addition, the traditional approach that focuses on targeting 
attractively priced credit to specific beneficiaries tends to undermine the viability of rural 
financial markets and institutions, thereby reducing in the long run the quality and quantity 
of financi1 services available in rural areas. 
In Guatemalan, the projects involving rural financial markets have typically tried to 
channel cr'dit through credit unions and other types of cooperatives, through BANDESA 
(the Govepunent's agricultural development bank) and through commercial banks. 
BANDESA and the cooperatives and credit unions have, for the most part, been 
underminet by their participation in these projects, while the commercial banks have simply 
not partici ated to any significant extent. The response to these problems has been an 
increasing se of trust fund mechanisms, in the former cases trying to keep Al.D.'s funds 
separate ~°'thin basically insolvent institution, a.nd in the latter case trying to reduce the risks 
of lending to encourage participation (which has also been attempted through various 
guarantee echanisms ). The trust fund (or loan guarantee) approach has tended to 
exacerbate 1 the problems of lenders by increasing their operating costs and reducing 
incentives ~or effective loan recovery efforts. Another approach has been to recognize that 
the targete(i clients of these projects are relatively costly and risky to deal with, but instead 
of addressipg this by attempting to reduce costs and risks (as might be done by studying 
more closely the techniques used by informal lenders), spreads for lenders have been 
I 
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increased. Increased spreads might be appropriate, at least to some extent, if this were done 
by increasi:q.g interest rates to borrowers. However, interest rates to borrowers are said to 
be at or close to market rates (as has been defined by the maximum interest rate permitted 
on commercial banks loans) so that spreads have instead been increased by providing cheap 
funds to le:q.ders. This has not only discouraged deposit mobilization but has also ignored 
mechanism$ for the subsequent adjustment of interest rates when, as now, interest rates have 
been freed !from control. 
The main recommendation emerging from this study is that A.l.D. should completely 
reorient its lrural financial markets projects to focus directly on rural financial markets and 
institutions iand not on the beneficiaries of the services provided. This does not mean that 
there will be no beneficiaries but rather that the services provided will be provided by viable 
finance markets and institutions so that beneficiaries can benefit on a sustained basis and 
not merely !during the life of a project. Improving rural financial markets and institutions 
by insisting1 that they serve a particular set of clients in order to redistribute income or 
promote certain kinds of economic activity is like insisting that producers should produce 
only certain types of products that are deemed priority without regard to consumer demands 
or produce~ costs and that these products should be sold only to disadvantaged consumers. 
Financial niiarkets and institutions can only be viable--can only maintain adequate loan 
recovery and acceptable costs--if they are free to choose their clients. In some of its recent 
rural finance projects, A.l.D./Guatemala has recognized the importance of providing 
technical as~istance and training to strengthen certain institutions (e.g., BANDESA and rural 
credit unio~s and cooperatives) but these efforts must entail not only infusions of resources 
but also att~ntion to the basic incentive structures that determine institutional viability. In 
addition, A.I.D./Guatemala projects have recently begun to attempt to strengthen the 
private sector's involvement in policy dialogue. However, it must be recognized that private 
sector entities often have an interest in maintaining policies that promote cartels and 
monopolie~ in order to enhance their own profits, so that A.I.D./Guatemala may also wish 
to consider the support of public sector entities through training and technical assistance in 
its effort to enhance policy dialogue. 
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A.I.D. SPONSORED RURAL FINANCE PROJECTS IN 
HONDURAS 
by 
Thomas M. Dickey 
I INTRODUCTION 
I 
I 
Mosjt of the information presented herein was drawn from files of the Rural 
Developm~nt Office in A.I.D./Honduras and from conversations with A.I.D./Honduras staff 
during the Eriod February 4-15, 1990. Additional information came from AI.D./W files, 
interviews "th AI.D. staff in Washington, and various research publications. Several 
projects ad "nistered by offices other than Rural Development were also analyzed. For 
example,~ural Housing Project (a regional effort) was included because it provided loans 
to small f ers. The Small Business I & II Projects were also included because many small 
businesses a predominantly agricultural economy deal with agricultural products or will 
be run by p rsons also engaged in agricultural production, and because loanable funds from 
the Fores, Development Project are passed through the Central Bank discount lines used 
in the Sma 1 Business I and II Projects 
, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Prio~ to 1950 only a small amount of farm lending was done in Honduras by a couple 
of commer ial banks. In 1950 the Government formed the Banco Nacional de Fomento 
(BANAFO ) with the aim of providing agricultural loans. Very early the Food and 
Agricultur Organization (FAO) helped the Bank develop a supervised credit program that 
encountere substantial problems. In the mid-1960s AI.D. began two tracks in rural 
finance, o e aimed at small farmers through BANAFOM, and the other at developing 
funding, an strengthening lending by credit unions and cooperatives. Later, A.I.D. provided 
additional funding for loans for food production, livestock, grain storage facilities, 
agricultur cooperatives, and agro-industries. 
Sine the mid-1960s A.l.D. has funded two dozen projects in Honduras with 
substantial rural finance components. The total amount of U.S. loans or grants in dollars 
to these pr ~ects amounted to almost $300 million. In addition, substantial local currency 
that wasp tially controlled by the U.S. flowed into these programs. Most of the funds 
provided ~ r lending to groups and individuals were targeted for specific activities in 
accordance with the particular purposes of the different projects. Many of the projects were 
designed t promote rural development through the adoption of specific farming practices 
in the area of natural resource management, irrigations facilities, livestock production, and 
other agri ltural production activities. The rural cooperatives projects were designed to 
develop or anizations for agricultural production or for the provision of particular services 
(input sup ly and marketing, for example) for the small farmer members, but the finance 
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components were seen as necessary but secondary to the production or service objectives 
of the orgainizations. The credit union programs were designed to develop alternative 
financial i~titutions for the people who had less or no access to banks. The rural credit 
unions were generally less successful at mobilizing deposits than were the urban credit 
unions, bui they became a means for providing loans to farmers using funds from 
international donors. 
In a4dition to Al.D., the Inter-American Development Bank has also provided five 
loans since ~962 worth about $44 million for rural financing--mainly through BANAFOM--
and the World Bank provided a loan worth $45 million for agricultural credit in 1983. In 
total, foreigp donors have lent or granted Honduras about $400 million since the early 1960s 
for activitie~ related to rural finance. As a reference point, this is about twice as much as 
the total amount of agricultural loans made by the batiking system in Honduras in 1983 
(Graham aid others, 1985). In addition to the government sources of rural finance, there 
are also fo1!11" commercial banks in Honduras that do significant amounts of agricultural 
lending, pahly out of their own funds, but current interest rate (and other) regulations are 
causing ba.$G to rely heavily on the funds provided by donors through the Central Bank. 
Co~pared to many countries in Latin America, inflation has been moderate in 
Honduras during the latter part of the 1980s, generally running less than 5 percent per year 
until 1989, ~nd economic growth has about kept up with population increases. 
I 
Sev~ral important policies have had major impacts on the performance of rural 
financial markets in the country. An overvalued exchange rate effectively taxes agricultural 
exports, intbrest rate ceilings limit what can be paid on deposits and what can be charged 
on loans, ajnd hefty reserve requirements are strong disincentives for banks to mobilize 
deposits.24 · In addition, a substantial part of the funds moving through formal rural 
financial Itiarkets in the country are targeted and this elevates transaction costs in the 
system. VP"ious policies have also resulted in sharp changes in the amounts of credit 
available t9 the private sector. Between 1985 and 1986, for example, private sector lending 
declined by more than 20 percent, only to double in 1987, and then drop by 60 percent in 
1988. 
AioJg with several other A.I.D. missions in Latin America, the Mission in Honduras 
sponsored ~ series of studies during the early 1980s that shed considerable light on rural 
financial mFirkets in the country (Graham and others, 1985). Some of the earliest detailed 
work on hpw credit targeting affects transaction costs was done as part of this work. 
Deposit m~bilization, especially in credit unions, also received a good deal of research 
24In 1988 the Central Bank raised reserve requirements on most deposits to 35 percent. 
During the I latter part of the 1980s interest rate ceilings of 17 percent on commercial bank 
loans and 24 percent for loans by finance companies were in place. Credit unions are not 
subject to ~hese reserve requirements. 
I 
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attention. . Based on this research, the Mission encouraged the Honduran Government to 
liberalize ~terest rate policies and this was partially done in the early and mid-1980s. The 
Mission also followed through with deposit mobilization initiatives among credit unions. 
Some of the policy suggestions that came out of this research, however, fell by the wayside 
as the Mission began to move large amounts of funds, partly through targeted rural credit 
programs, to meet U.S. foreign policy objectives in the mid-1980s. 
I RECENT A.I.D. RURAL FINANCE PROJECTS 
In barly 1990 AID/Honduras had files on 14 recent or current projects, or 
combinatifns of projects, that had major rural finance components. These projects included: 
1. 522-0150 Agricultural Sector II, 
2. 522-0157 Rural Technologies, 
3. 522-0168 Natural Resources Management, 
4. 522-01171 Rural Housing, 
5. 522-0]76 Small Farmer Coffee, 
6. 522-0~5 Small Business I &, 
522-02 1 Small Business II, 
7. 522-0 07 Export Development and Services, 
8. 522-0209 Small Farmer Livestock, 
9. 522-0230 [ERP] &, 
522-0283 [ESF] Land Sales, 
10. 522-0246 Forestry Development, 
11. 522-oi51 Small Scale Livestock, 
12. 522-0~52 Small Farmer Organization Stren., 
13. 522-0i68 Irrigation Development, 
14. 522-0~92 Land Use and Productivity Enhan., 
FY 81-84 
FY 79-89 
FY 80-89 
FY 81-87 
FY 81-91 
FY 84-89 
FY 88-93 
FY 84-89 
FY 83-90 
FY 83-open 
FY 83-open 
FY 88-94 
FY 84-87 
FY 87-93 
FY 86-93 
FY 89-97 
1981-1984 
AID Rural Development 
BUDGET $US FX 
AID Grant, 
AID Loan! 
GOH 
TOTALS 
I 
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PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS 
522-0150 Agricultural Sector II 
L/C Total 
4,000 25 
21,000 
? 
25,000+ 
Since the project was completed in 1984, many project documents are no longer 
available ill. the Mission. This was a multi-purpose project with 18 components. A 
Cooperative Development component supported the development of four agricultural 
services cooperatives. Two of these were for grain producers (20 de Mayo and Maya 
Occidental) and two were export oriented, primarily in fresh vegetables (Fruta del Sol and 
CREHSUJi). At least one of the export crop coops pre-dated the project and joined it 
half-way through. 
I 
The, other components included: regionalization of the National Agricultural Bank 
(BANADESA), scholarships and other training, assistance to planning and information in 
various agepcies, marketing, horticultural research and extension, rural family consumption, 
and infrastructure. Apparently little or no loan money was provided with project funding. 
The primaity source of funds for the cooperatives appears to have been BANADESA at 8 
percent for on-lending at 16 percent. A 1985 evaluation reported serious financial problems 
in the export crop coops and minor financial problems in the grain coops. The export coops 
suffered significant losses in marketing in the 1984 /85 season. The four cooperatives are 
among the organizations receiving assistance in 522-0252 Small Farmer Organizational 
Strengthening Project. 
25Unless otherwise specified, the amounts given for each project are in thousands of 
dollars. 
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522-0157 Rural Technologies 
1979-1984~1988 
AID Rural Development 
BUDGET1$US 
AID Grant 
AID Loan 
GOH 
TOTALS 
FX 
2,810 
0 
227 
3,037 
L/C 
10,120 
0 
2,250 
12,370 
Total (Amendment 1) 
12,930 
0 
2,477 
15,407 
The purpose of the project was to develop and disseminate simple technologies or 
products designed to improve quality of life. The principal Institutions/ Agencies involved 
included: ~he Industrial Development Center (CDI), a project Unit (PTR) created in CDI, 
and the Adaptation Unit (UDA) in the Ministry of Natural Resources. In addition, non-
governmental and private voluntary organizations (NGOs/PVOs) were also used in 
promoting1 technologies. A new entity was created for the project (PTR) and activities were 
distributed in a complex set of relationships within existing governmental and private 
organizations. A later evaluation of the credit activities in the project recommended 
intensifyi~ links between credit and technology adoption, increasing financial 
intermediation and reducing PTR lending. 
Th~ principal components of the project included development and dissemination of 
appropriate technologies for small enterprise development; creating a fund to finance new 
pilot industry and expansion (grants or equity), feasibility studies, or expansion of existing 
industries~ and experimental credit to be used to test a variety of methods for delivery of 
loans. 
Thf sub-loans made under the project did not directly involve individuals working for 
PTR. Instead PTR became a lending institution indirectly through NGOs, cooperatives, and 
banks. Loans to small farmers under the project began in September of 1985. Interest rates 
on loans rhade under the project were set at 16 percent to final borrowers, banks received 
2 percent spreads and NGOs and cooperatives received 6 percent spreads on PTR funds. 
The loan recovery risks were born entirely by PTR. 
Current Status: (12/88 evaluation) 
I 
Total~ Credit (Cumulative): 
Total Disbursements $3,764.531 Compute outstandings at 
Principal ~epayments $ 633.506 $2,939.795. Thus, delinquency 
Total Arrears $ 375.314 as percent of O/S is 12.77 percent. 
Percent in Arrears 10.5 percent 
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522-0168 Natural Resources Management 
1980-1985-1989 
AID Rural jDevelopment 
I 
BUDGET$US 
AID Grant, 
AID Loan I 
GOH 1 
TOTALS 
FX 
3,900 
4,252 
8,152 
L/C 
0 
8,000 
5,000 
13,654 
Total (1986 Amendment 1) 
3,900 
12,252 
5,000 
21,752 
The !purposes of this project were to strengthen the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and to begi? action programs in selected watersheds to increase farm income and conserve 
natural resources. The institutions/agencies involved included a Natural Resource 
Management Project Office in the Ministry of Natural Resources (PMRN), the Honduran 
Corporatio' for Forestry Development (COHDEFOR), and the National Agricultural 
Developmept Bank (BANADESA). Principal components included a natural resource and 
land use policy and planning activity, natural resource data collection and analysis, and 
watershed management efforts. The Project also included $ 7 million for loans, but 
apparently only $100 thousand was used for this purpose The Project also included fertilizer 
grants for sfiialler farmers as incentives for adoption of specific practices. 
I 
The plan for the project included formation of 264 local community organizations 
through which credit would flow. Each of 15 (sub) Watershed Management Units would 
include a cf operatives expert and a cooperatives accountant. 
Ter.riis on the loans made under the project included: 8 percent, 18 year, 8 grace for 
agroforestry and fuelwood loans; and 8 percent, 15 year, 5 grace for reforestation; 12 
percent, 15.I year, 5 grace for range management and pasture. A draft 1982 Trust Fund 
contract be~een BANADESA and the Treasury Ministry specified 16 percent interest rates. 
A 1989 internal evaluation reported rates of 13 percent on loans for crop production and 
marketing, and 13 percent for livestock loans. Credit supervision was shared (in theory) 
between project agents and BANADESA The credit risks were born by the 
BANADESA/Project Trust Fund. In late 1989, 200 loans had been made under the project 
averaging $11,500 with default rates of 8 percent (LUPE Project Paper) or 24 percent (1989 
internal evaluation). 
The ~roject Paper did not clearly outline the credit/grant operations, but apparently 
the Project office provided oversight on the loan program and BANADESA is in charge of 
actual loan disbursements and recoveries. A portion of the Project Paper states subsidized 
loans "will be needed to maintain the farmer's current cash income and increase it gradually 
during the second through fifth year." It is later stated in the Project Paper that, "credit on 
the terms tp be provided through the Project is much less expensive than credit which is 
currently a~ailable in the area. This should facilitate risk-taking by small farmers for whom 
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the optimal use of scarce resources is crucial. Credit will provide cash income to poorer 
families, and offset the opportunity cost of labor investments required." 
522-0171 Rural Housing 
1981-1984-1987 
AID Engineering and ROCAP 
BUDGET SUS 
AID Grant 
AID Loan 
GOH 
TOTALS 
FX L/C Total (1984 Loan Agreement) 
200 
3,300 
1,530 
5,030 
The purpose of this project is to establish a system for the sustained improvement 
of housing conditions for the rural poor. The principal institution involved is the National 
Housing Institute (INV A). Principal project components include a grant to develop INV A's 
capacity tq provide technical and financial assistance to PVOs and loans to finance 
improvem$ts in rural housing. INV A is to make loans to PVOs at 5 percent which is equal 
to the passbook savings rate. Loans may be as large as $500 per family with 3 year term 
and installrhents not less than 15 percent of annual borrower cash income. Intermediaries 
included various Caritas entities, credit unions, and the credit union federation (F ACACH). 
All of the credit risk is born by INV A. 
Current St~tus: (Project Completion Report, 3 /89) 
Rec~ived by PVOs = $ 3,300 
Total Subloans = $ 5,036 
Loans recuperated = $ 3,292 
Delinquency varied widely, averaged 22 percent 
Observations: 
I 
The project completion report concludes that it is unlikely the goal of the INV A 
Rural Housing Division achieving self-sufficiency will be realized. There is also mention 
made of the need for the design process to be more sensitive to macro-economic factors, 
that imple¥1entation would be improved if A.I.D. monitored mor closely PVO financial 
controls, and if PVO accounting procedures met A.I.D. standards. 
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522-0176 Small Farmer Coffee 
1981-1991 
AID Rural Development 
BUDGET$US 
AID Grant 
AID Loani 
GOH 
TOTALS 1 
FX 
3,750 
1,500 
5,650 
L/C 
100 
14,500 
29,002 
43,602 
Total (1986 Amendment 2) 
4,250 
16,000 
29,002 
49,252 
The, primary purpose of this project was renovation or replacement of coffee plants 
in response to coffee rust. The principal institutions involved included the Honduran 
Institute Qf Coffee (IHCAFE), private banks, and the National Agricultural Bank 
(BANADESA). The principal components of the project included extension activities, loans 
to farmers, and coffee processing (beneficios ). 
The1 credit system involved supervised loans provided by IHCAFE agents who help 
borrowers prepare the applications and then went to the bank with the prospective borrower 
to help arrange the loan, and handle the first loan disbursement. The loan terms were as 
follows: 
Total Renovation : 7 years, 3 grace, 17 percent 
Partial Renovation: 5 years, 2 grace, 17 percent 
The batiks agreed to provide maintenance loans after 3 years at 13 percent from other 
Central Bank rediscount lines. The participating banks assume all credit risk. 
Interest rate allocation: 
Bank - Admin. costs 
- Reserve Bad Loans 
IHCAFE - Guarantee fund 
- Tech. Assistance 
Centra~ Bank - Admin. 
- AID loan costs 
I 
Original 
3.0 percent 
6.5 percent 
2.0 percent 
3.0 percent 
0.5 percent 
2.0 percent 
17 percent 
1986 
6.0 percent 
4.5 percent 
0.0 percent 
4.0 percent 
0.5 percent 
2.0 percent 
17 percent 
The current status of the project is that funds are now available for financing 
beneficios but it appears the loan saturation level has about been reached for this group. 
As a result, funds allocated for this purpose will not be completely used. The default rate 
on these loans is said to be low. Idle project funds in Central Bank are being used to pay 
for credit life insurance to replace the practice of some banks of charging separately for this. 
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Observations: The original Project Paper specified separation of extension and credit 
functions, ijut early evaluations concluded this not viable in a supervised program. Four 
additional banks began participating in 1989. 
522-0205 Small Business I & 
522-0241 Small Business II 
i 
1984-1987-1989 Small Business I 
I 
1988-1993 ! Small Business II 
AID Privat.e Sector Programs 
I 
BUDGET $US FX L/C Total Small Business I 
AID Grant 600 600 (1984 Project Paper) 
AID Loan 0 0 
GOH 6,900 6,900 
TOTALS 7,500 0 . 7,500 
BUDGET$US FX L/C Total Small Business II 
AID Grant 5,359 9,641 15,000 (1988 Project Paper) 
AID Loan 0 0 0 
GOH 0 16,025 16,025 
Priv. Sector 8,975 8,975 
TOTALS 5,359 34,641 40,000 
The objectives of these projects were to develop a source of financial and technical 
assistance for Honduras' small and medium-scale enterprises (SSEs) and to improve the 
policy and, regulatory environment in which SSEs operate. The principal institutions 
involved in the projects initially included the Financiera Industrial y Agropecuaria (FIA) 
which was formed by five commercial banks, and the National Association of 
Industriali~ts/Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Program (ANDI/PYME). Later, the 
Advisors f9r the Development of Honduras (ASEPADEH), the National Development 
Foundation (FUNADEH) and the Central Bank also began to participate via a fund for 
small- and, medium-sized industries (FONDEI/FOPEME). 
I 
ANDI/J>YME worked primarily with small entrepreneurs through NGOs, and PVOs. 
Grants wde provided to PVOs for staff. ANDI/PYME received income from interest paid 
on FIA loans. FIA developed its own technical assistance unit and was geared toward 
somewhat iarger scale enterprises. The differences between ANDI/PYME and FIA clients 
and intere&ts were resolved in Small Business II by providing ANDI/PYME with grant funds 
and FIA nbw receives the spread on its loans to support its technical assistance work. 
Grants 1 for loan funds and institutional support were also included for the already 
functioning ASEP ADEH and FUN AD EH in Small Business IL The project budget for both 
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organizations includes A.I.D. and private sector sources for the loans funds, including a half 
million dollars from the Inter-American Development Bank for FUNADEH. Funds for 
loans and establishment of a guaranty fund (apparently for the Central Bank FOPEME 
fund) are budgeted by the Honduran government, but are also supported by the private 
sector. 
Credit System: 
Small B!usiness I: FIA loans at 17 to 19 percent were discounted through a Central 
Bank-FONPEI fund at 8 to 10 percent. FONDEI kept 1 or 2 percent and gave 
ANDI/PYME 7 to 9 percent. 
I 
Small Business II: ASEP ADER and FUNADEH will lend from their own funds at 17 
percent, of !which 12 percent must be used to further capitalize the credit fund (thus leaving 
5 percent to support technical assistance). Production enterprises may borrow for 6 months 
to two years with monthly installments for a maximum of $12.500 ($25.000 for groups). 
Small merchants dealing with goods produced domestically by SSEs can borrow up to $5.000 
($25.000 for groups). 
Credit Risk: 
FOPEME - Participating financial institutions bear a minimum of 30 percent of the risk 
and the Guaranty Fund the remainder. 
ASEPADE and FUNADEH - (no information on access to guaranty fund) 
Observations: 
Loans for Forestry Development (522-0246) were added to FOPEME. 
522-0207 Export Development and Services 
1984-1989 
FIDE portjon under AID Private Sector Programs 
FEPROEXAAH portion under AID Rural Development 
I 
BUDGET1$US FX L/C Total (Original project) 
AID Grant 6,900 600 7,500 
AID Loan, 14,400 1,600 16,000 
I 
GOH 8,100 8,100 
TOTALS 21,300 10,300 31,600 
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The primary purpose of this project was to increase non-traditional exports. The 
principal iJ!1Stitutions involved were the Entrepreneurial Research and Development 
FoundatioDi (FIDE), the Honduran Federation of Agricultural Producers and Exporters 
(FEPROEXAAH), the Central Bank, and various private banks. 
I 
The principal components include FIDE to provide assistance in marketing and trade 
promotion, ' technical assistance in production, finance and administration to producer 
organizatiohs, develop two Industrial Park Management Companies, and help the Furniture 
and Wood :products producers, among other tasks. FEPROEXAAH is to assist individual 
agribusinesses and its member associations by channeling outside assistance, serve as contact 
point for qs importers and investors, help associations provide and monitor training and 
technical ~sistance to members, help negotiate freight rates, establish quality standards, 
provide malnagement assistance and business services, among other tasks. Banks were to 
provide do.lar loans for imports required by exporters (initially working capital only) and 
local curreiiicy loans for investment and working capital 
I 
Credit Syst~m: 
FIDE ruiid FEPROEXAAH to provide certificates of eligibility so that private banks can 
rediscount ~oans at the Central Bank . The ten thousand dollar lines of credit carry the 
following terms: Central Bank rediscount at 8 percent; final interest negotiated, generally 
12 to 14 percent, maximum 17 percent; and risks assumed by the commercial banks. 
I 
The,$24 thousand local currency lines of credit carried the following terms: split into 
Fund A (private bank risk) & Fund B (Trust Fund risk); Fund B limited to 60 percent of 
loan; Centj"al Bank rediscount at 8 percent Fund A, final rate less 3 percent spread for 
private barik on Fund B; terms for both dollar and local currency lines include investment 
capital to I 7 years with 2 grace and working capital up to 2 years. FIDE and 
FEPROEXAAH receive a 6 percent spread on local currency line and some amount on the 
dollar line.! The credit risks are born by private banks on dollar and fund A loans, and by 
the Trust Fund on Fund B loans. 
i 
b •I 0 servations: 
Thej interest rate spreads allowed FIDE/FEPROEXAAH expected eventually to 
make thes~ institutions self-sustaining. The Project Paper and the 1987 /1988 evaluations 
reflect confusion concerning which institution is assuming risk of default and how project 
design mu~t ensure that the risk-taker be solely responsible for evaluating the risks. They 
do not recognize that FIDE or FEPROEXAAH Certificates of Eligibility, prepared by their 
financial cfu.alysts and reviewed by their own Credit Committee, may not satisfy the 
risk-takers 
1
in the private banks (nor the Central Bank). 
522-0209 Small Farmer Livestock 
1983-1990 
AID Rural Development 
BUDGET$US 
AID Grant 
AID Loan 1 
GOH 
TOTALS 1 
FX 
3,000 
675 
3,675 
L/C 
9,325 
4,500 
13,825 
79 
Total 
3,000 
10,000 
4,500 
17,500 
The, purpose of this project is to increase the productivity of small farm livestock 
operations through development of a Livestock Fund to provide animals to joint production 
companies through producer organizations. The principal institution involved in the project 
is the FONDO GANADERO (Livestock Fund) a private, for profit corporation created 
under the project. 
The principal components of the project are joint (Fund/Producer) production 
companies 1where livestock belong to the FUND and any net earnings are split 40 percent 
to Fund, 160 percent to producers; technical services and training for producers; 
complemei;itary infrastructure credits; and input sales and production of mineral salts 
Credit Sys~em 
The FUND offers 'complementary credit' for farm infrastructure and is available to 
producers, iwith repayments made through deductions from sales of the borrowers. Interest 
rates as the same as those charged by the World Bank/ Central Bank agricultural credit 
project, fot terms of 1 to 10 years, possible 2 year grace. Beginning in late 1987 or early 
1988, the FUND began a new program of in-kind lending. The FUND provides the 
livestock at a specific value under a formal loan contract. Repayment terms and interest 
rates were: not specified in the document describing this lending. The Livestock FUND 
bears all of the credit risk. 
Current Status: 
At yeat end 1988 the FUND had approximately $8.5 million in assets and $9 million in 
liabilities, and was therefore technically bankrupt. The FUND was attempting to restructure 
its debt alld had made significant improvements in reducing its 1988 operating loss. 
ObservatiQns: 
Tub joint production companies constitute an alternative financial arrangement to 
direct lending for the purchase of livestock. However, it is not a credit system as such 
because the FUND becomes an equity partner in each company. 
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522-0230 [ERP] and -0283 [ESF] Land Sales 
1983-open 
AID Rural Development 
BUDGET $US FX L/C Total 
AID Grant Dollars provided under ERP 
AID Loan 1 and ESF, made available 
GOH 2,000 2,000 for this use by GOH 
TOTALS 2,000 2,000 
The. purpose of the project is to finance farm purchases by small farmers or 
cooperatives. The principal institutions involved in the project are private banks, the 
Central Ba:Ok, and the National Agrarian Institute (INA). Principal project components are 
loans for l~nd purchase with INA providing borrowers certificates that legitimize land as 
loan collateral. 
Credit System: 
Private 'banks can lend up to $ 25 thousand at up to 16 percent interest and up to 10 
years. Loans can be rediscounted in the Central Bank at 8 percent. The Central Bank 
reviews anp approves the individual loans, and then collects from the participating banks 
based on the due dates for each installment. All credit risks are born by the participating 
I banks. 
I 
Current Status: 
In late 1987 two banks had made 82 loans for a total of one million dollars. In the 
latter part 1 of 1989 the Fund had $1.5 million available for further lending. In 1985 some 
funds wen~ reprogrammed for other uses due to lack of demand, were subsequently replaced 
later in 1985 when one bank promoted the loans, and will probably be once again 
reprogram;med downward in 1990. 
Observations: 
I 
INA's certification process was extremely slow. Simple program seems to work 
reasonably well with only the financial market involved. 
1988-1994 ! 
AID Rural Development 
BUDGET$US 
AID Grant, 
AID Loan. 
GOH 1 
TOTALS I 
FX 
5,886 
5,994 
11,880 
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522-0246 Forestry Development 
L/C 
2,114 
6,006 
11,688 
19,808 
Total (1987 Project Paper) 
8,000 
12,000 
11,688 
31,688 
The 1purpose of the project is to improve management and sustainable productivity 
of commertial pine forestry and efficiency of industrial conversion and marketing of wood 
products. 11'be principal institutions involved are the Honduran Forestry Development 
Corporatio:µ (COHDEFOR); the Central Bank through its National Industrial Development 
Fund (FO:rllDEI); and the AID-Small Business II project's Fund for Small and Medium 
Scale Entetprises Private Banks (FOPEME). The principal components of the project are 
institutionaJ reorientation of COHDEFOR, forest management in selected areas, 
strengthenihg the private sector forest industry, and loans to meet needs of private loggers 
and sawmil operators to replace equipment 
I 
Credit System: 
i 
Maxim1J1ID loans of up to $200 thousand per borrower can be made under the program. 
A guarant(1e fund (initially funded by A.I.D.) was set up to guarantee up to 70 percent of 
loan at fee lof 3.5 percent (12 months or less) or 6 percent (more than 12 months). The fee 
can be charjged to the final borrower. Eligibility requirements for borrowers are a maximum 
$750 thous~d in non-fixed assets and annual production of 1 million to 10 million board 
feet of l~ber. 
I 
Observatioµs: 
Oriwnal Project Paper planned to channel funds through rediscount line in Central 
Bank usingj one private bank selected through an open bidding process. A November, 1989, 
Project Implementation Letter provided the initial funds and directed that they be operated 
through FOPEME. 
I 
MaJlly project beneficiaries are not already exporters and do not have ready access 
to dollars. :Thus, they don't want dollar loans that must be repaid in dollars. Arrangements 
are made l)etween the smaller sawmills and the larger (exporting) mills to buy equipment 
for the sm•ller mills, using their dollars, in order to get around foreign exchange rate and 
convertabif ty risks. 
1984-1987 
AID Rural Development 
BUDGET$US 
AID Grant 1 
AID Loan 1 
GOH 
TOTALS 1 
FX 
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522-0251 Small Scale Livestock 
L/C Total (source) 
1,469 
Dev. Assist. $875 Grant 
ESF $594 Grant 
The 1 objective of this project is to promote small scale livestock (swine) projects 
among women's groups. The organizations involved in the project are the Overseas 
Education Fund (OEF) and a commercial bank. The credit system operates through OEF 
staff who, working with women's groups, prepare a loan request to be presented to the bank. 
The Bank committed to lend up to twice the amount deposited by OEF as a guarantee fund. 
The project has been completed. 
I 
Observations: 
i 
Eviqence found of disbursements of$ 814 thousand. 
522-0252 Small Farmer Organization Strengthening 
I 
(1985) 1987-1993 
AID Rural
1 
Development 
BUDGET$US 
AID Grant 
AID Loan I 
GOH 
TOTALS 
FX L/C Total (Project Paper) 
7,500 
8,500 
19,804 
35,804 
Tuel main purpose of this projects is to establish a viable system for channeling 
productive resources (credit, inputs, technical assistance) to enhance small farmer 
productioni and productivity. The principal agencies involved in the projects are: the 
National pirectorate for Cooperative Development (DIFOCOOP); the Financial 
Development Fund (FDF) which was created as subsidiary of the Honduran Federation of 
Credit Unipns (FACACH); the Union of Cooperatives (UNIOCOOP) which is a Federation 
of agricultural service coops, some created under A.l.D.'s agricultural sector projects and 
coffee coops that had belonged to a federation of coffee cooperatives; the Honduran 
National Campesino Association (ANACH); and the Honduran Federation of Agrarian 
Reform Cpoperatives (FECORAH). The principal components of the projects include 
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technical assistance in organizational development, financial stabilization (through FDF, for 
restructurimg debt or capitalization of participating organizations), and long- and short-term 
credit. 
Credit System: 
I 
Direct loans are made by FDF to participating organizations. Reflows of funds then 
move to Central Bank for local currency lending. FDFs assume all credit risk. 
Observations: 
Short-term credit used for UNIOCOOP fertilizer sales took advantage of special 
situation aind realized windfall gains that helped reduce the equity deficit. Additional 
advantage seen in developing institutional capacity for long-term service business 
appropriate to UNIOCOOP. Loans to credit unions for special reserves increased power 
of CUs relative to F ACACH. 
1986-1993. 
AID RurJ Development 
i 
BUDGET $US 
AID Grant 
AID Loan 
GOH 
TOTALS 
FX 
3,040 
2,305 
8,730 
14,075 
522-0268 Irrigation Development 
L/C 
4,960 
12,195 
1,750 
18,905 
Total 
8,000 
14,500 
10,480 
32,980 
Amend #3 
18,500 Shifted $10,500 
4,000 from loan to 
10,480 grant 
32,980 
The purpose of this project is to improve farmer productivity and production through 
the installation of irrigation systems and the provision of related improved agricultural 
practices. ' The principal agencies involved in the project are the Hydraulic Resources 
Directorate (DRH), the Central Bank, and private banks. Principal components in the 
project in~lude design and construction of irrigation systems; promotion, extension and 
training; loans for investment and production; and institution strengthening. 
I 
Credit Sy~tem 
I 
Short-term production loans are allowed for a maximum of 36 months (normally 12). 
Irrigation !infrastructure loans can be made for 7 to 12 years with a 5 grace. Private banks 
may lend to farmers at a maximum rate of 17 percent and Central Bank Trust Fund 
rediscounts at 12 percent. 
Interest rate allocation: 
Central Bank - Admin. 
- A.I.D loan costs 
- Bad debt Reserve 
- Real value reserve 
total 
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Original 
0.5 percent 
2.0 percent 
4.5 percent 
5.0 percent 
12.0 percent 
Credit risk was divided with participating banks holding 70 percent, and the trust fund 
being responsible for 30 percent 
Current Status: 
There are seven banks participating in the program. In late 1989 there were 52 
applications submitted to banks for $6.2 million, 60 percent for infrastructure, 40 percent 
for production loans, 8 loans fully approved for $2 million (86 percent for infrastructure). 
' 
ObservatioJIS: 
The 1 credit system was approved in late 1988, 2 years after the project was approved. 
System was significantly changed from the use of federations, cooperatives, and local farmer 
organizations as intermediaries to the use of private banks. This change is said to have 
effectively changed the target population toward a set of farmers that are more creditworthy. 
It is estim~ted that about 20 percent of the borrowers may be new to formal financial 
markets. Private Banks are said to be requiring urban real estate or other more marketable 
assets as cpllateral, due in part to the lack of good land titles. Trust Fund allocates 4.5 
percent of interest to bad debt reserve even though it guarantees only 30 percent maximum 
of the loan. BANADESA did not meet conditions to be an intermediary bank. A.I.D. 
Private Sector Programs helped a lot in redesign of credit system. 
522-0292 Land Use and Productivity Enhancement [LUPE] 
1989-1997. 
AID Rural Development 
(Successor to 522-0168 Natural Resources Management) 
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BUDGET$US FX L/C Total (Project Paper) 
AID Grant 13,503 22,497 36,000 
AID Loan· 0 0 0 
GOH 14,000 14,000 
TOTALS 13,503 36,497 50,000 
i 
The purpose of the project was to improve hillside agricultural production and 
productivity on a sustainable basis, including the management and effective protection of 
Honduran 1natural resources. The principal institutions involved in the project are the 
Natural Resources Management Project unit within Ministry of Natural Resources (PMRN) 
and the National Agricultural Bank (BANADESA). 
The
1 
main components of the project are improved cropping systems, improved animal 
systems, post-harvest processing and storage, facilitated marketing, special incentives, and 
a credit program. For purposes of credit, the project added about one million dollars to an 
existing sll:b-loan account in the Natural Resource Management project handled by 
BANADESA The target population is categorized as marginal farmers (75 percent of 
I 
participants), small commercial farmers (21 percent), and small entrepreneurial farmers (4 
percent). 1 
Credit System: 
I 
Credit arrangements under this project are a continuation of the 522-0168 system: PMRN 
agents help prepare loan applications and go to BANADESA with farmer for initial 
disbursements and payments. The terms on the loans are the prevailing market rates based 
on Central Bank rediscount rates, and loans are made for up to 5 years. BANADESA's role 
appears to be little more than disbursement/ collection agent. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
I 
Sin~e the mid-1960s A.I.D. has played a major role in Honduras' rural financial 
markets, ~uch larger than other donors combined. A.I.D.'s funding of rural finance projects 
has also b¢en large compared to the overall size of formal rural lending in the country. This 
funding has come through a large number of projects, averaging about one per year over 
the past nyo decades. Most of these funds have been provided in conjunction with projects 
having other purposes than credit and have been specifically targeted for particular uses. 
These projects provided an easy method for A.I.D. to move relatively large amounts of 
money in~o the country and to also satisfy Congressional Mandates. 
A.l.D. played a positive role during the early 1980s in sponsoring research and policy 
dialogue that resulted in some liberalization of interest rates policies in the country. Also, 
the A.I.D, Mission has given some attention to deposit mobilization through its programs 
with credit unions and through setting discount rates on A.I.D. funds that were at least as 
i 
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high as rates paid on savings deposits. Even more importantly, A.I.D. has played an 
important role in discouraging the Government of Honduras from adopting policies that 
would have adversely affected rural financial markets, particularly through lower interest 
rates. 
While the formal rural financial market in Honduras is much larger now than it was 
when A.l.D. began working with it in the mid-1960s, it is still far from being an ideal system. 
It still services a relatively small portion of the country's population, still concentrates its 
I 
services a11fong the relatively well-to-do, still operates with high transaction costs, still 
involves too many political intrusions, and still does a poor job of intermediating between 
surplus and deficit units in the economy. Excessively high reserve requirements on deposits, 
interest rate controls, distorted exchange rates, large numbers of credit lines, and bad debt 
cause formal rural financial markets in Honduras to perform less efficiently and equitably 
than they njtlght. 
The. Mission has made significant positive changes in its approach to rural finance 
over the last several decades, including encouraging more liberal interest rate policies. Still, 
interest rates on loans to final borrowers in many A.I.D. funded projects are not at levels 
that would i allocate funds efficiently among competing uses and allow aggressive deposit 
mobilizatioµ. To its credit, A.I.D. has increasingly avoided setting up special units to handle 
its loanable funds and has, instead, used existing funding channels--even when this may 
result in reaching a class of borrowers who were slightly different from those outlined in 
project documents. A.I.D. has also been creative in encouraging more of the formal 
financial s~stem to lend for priority purposes through use of loan guaranties that cover a 
part of the jlending risk. While these are improvements, they are limited in their effect by 
the continued practice of targeting and by the current regulatory environment in which 
financial institutions operate. 
Thelsmall Farmer Organizational Strengthening Project is a significant effort aimed 
at improvitjg rural financial markets in the country. This project is encouraging institutions 
to adopt prudent financial management practices before allowing them to participate in the 
program. 
It will be difficult for A.I.D. to substantially improve the performance of this market 
without alt~ring the way it does business in the country. The overall performance of rural 
financial markets will not likely improve until A.I.D. places a higher priority on these 
markets and more directly addresses them, rather than largely using these markets to handle 
large amounts of money. A.I.D., for example, might consider doing more of its funding in 
large projects that focus on enhancing overall performance of rural finance markets. This 
might allow A.I.D. to encourage important policy changes that are necessary for better 
performance. In general, these large projects might be aimed at lowering transaction costs, 
expanding the total number of people having access to formal financial services, increasing 
the amounts of funds mobilized by formal financial markets, reducing loan delinquency, 
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enhancing the economic returns in agriculture, and making rural financial markets more 
sustainable~ 
At a more operational level, the Mission might improve the design of credit 
components in their projects by paying more attention to who assumes the equity risk of 
lending, and whether or not the spreads on loans are enough to cover the costs and risks of 
lending. When these issues are correctly evaluated, bureaucratic procedures can be reduced, 
loan delinquency will decline, and financial institutions will be more enthused about 
participatitjg in these programs. 
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APPENDIXB 
89 
WORLD BANK AND INTER-AMERICAN DEVEWPMENT BANK 
ACTIVITIES IN RURAL FINANCE IN IATIN AMERICA 
I 
World Ba1* 
Worud Bank projects are generally larger than those funded by A.l.D. and have also 
stressed agticultural lending more than have recent AI.D. projects. Over the period FY82-
88 a total q1f 125 Bank/IDA projects provided $6.6 billion for agricultural credit worldwide 
which amoiin.ted to about one-quarter of all the Bank's lending for agricultural purposes 
(Y aron). qf these projects, 42 were in Latin America including funds for agricultural credit 
amounting Jto $3.3 billion. About half of the $3.3 billion was in 10 specialized agricultural 
I 
credit proj¢ct, while the other half involved agricultural credit components in 32 projects. 
The credit :funds involved in these 42 projects amounted to about 40 percent of all World 
Bank lending for agricultural purposes during this period in the region. In terms of the 
volume of :funds, Mexico and Brazil absorbed a large portion of the Bank's funding for 
agricultural credit purposes during this period. On average, the Bank provided about $470 
million yearly in Latin America to fund agricultural credit activities from 1982 to 1988. 
Clearly, the Bank's efforts in agricultural credit have been sizeable in Latin America and 
concentrat~d. 
I 
De$ite the relative importance of agricultural credit in its portfolio the Bank has not 
issued an \lpdated policy statement to guide the formation of its agricultural credit projects. 
Only after :a good deal of internal infighting was the Bank able to publish in 1975 a policy 
statement on agricultural credit that was a compromise document showing how divided the 
Bank's staff was on agricultural credit policy. During the 1980s at least three attempts were 
made in the Bank to write a new agricultural credit policy statement but sharp differences 
in opinionlblocked the issuance of a consensus statement on this topic. At the same time, 
the World:Bank recently published in their 1989 World Development Report an overview 
of financi~l markets in developing countries that was largely in tune with the new views on 
finance. ~ome of the Bank's staff feel a new policy statement on rural finance will be 
forthcomittg in the next year or so. 
I 
I 
Patitly because of recent criticisms of concessionary interest rate policies and partly 
because of inflation pressures during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the World Bank has 
often negqtiated interest rate adjustments with their credit projects. In some cases this has 
lead to su~tained positive real rates of interest on loans made to farmers and to increases 
in the discpunt rates applied to funds from the World Bank that pass through Central Banks 
to ultimat~ lenders. In other cases adjustments in nominal interest rates negotiated by the 
World Bank have been overwhelmed by inflation so that negative real rates of interest 
persisted on agricultural loans funded by the World Bank. The Bank has given almost no 
attention to deposit mobilization in its rural finance projects. 
I 
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Recent internal evaluations of the Bank's agricultural credit projects have lead to five 
recommendations. The first is that the Bank should place more emphasis on developing 
viable fina1'-cial intermediaries to handle agricultural loans and move away from targeted 
lending. The second is that more emphasis should be placed on enhancing loan collection 
by intermediaries handling agricultural credit funded by the Bank. The third 
recommenGJation is to emphasize deposit mobilization. The fourth recommendation is to 
improve management information systems in financial intermediaries. And the fifth 
recommendation is to ensure the adequacy of spreads and rediscount margins for lenders 
handling World Bank funds. 
I 
SnnUar to other donors, the World Bank has difficulty systematically influencing, 
through negotiations associated with credit projects, important macro and financial market 
policies. I~ is also difficult for the Bank to insist on tough credit policy conditions because 
of the pre$sure to lend money. Traditionally, donors have channelled large amounts of 
money rel4tively easily into agricultural credit projects which have been little more than 
balance-of7payments support for the receiving countries. Requiring major policy adjustments 
along the lines suggested by the new views would clearly make it more difficult for donors, 
particularly the World Bank, to move these large amounts of money easily. 
I 
Inter-Ametlcan Development Bank 
j 
Agir,cultural credit projects have been an important part of IDB's lending activities, 
a substantial part of which has been with various government-owned agricultural 
developmqnt banks. Since 1961 the Bank has lent nearly $5 billion dollars for agricultural 
credit actiVities in virtually every Latin American country through 180 projects (IDB files). 
From the learly 1980s until now the Bank has made major adjustments in its policies on 
agricultur41 credit projects. In 1983 the Bank required that interest rates on loans made to 
farmers u'der IDB programs should carry positive real rates of interest (IDB, 1983). An 
IDB policy memorandum in early 1990 expanded the policy guidelines to include virtually 
all of the *ew views on rural finance laid out in AI.D.'s 1988 policy statement on financial 
markets. ;ne stimulus for policy change resulted from studies carried out by IDB in the 
early 1980s that reported on transaction costs in four IBD's agricultural lending programs. 
Out of these efforts came an ex-post evaluation of global agricultural credit operations 
issued in /February 1984 (Document GN-1493). These studies helped build high level 
support in the Bank for the policy changes that followed. 
I 
! 
Wlile the IDB has issued an excellent policy statement on agricultural credit projects, 
it has encountered difficulties similar to those faced by AI.D. and the World Bank in 
translating these new views into projects. IDB has steadily encouraged positive interest rates 
on loans Piade to farmers and has increasingly moved closer to making financial sector 
loans, smretimes in cooperation with World Bank efforts, in attempts to have more 
influence 1 on critical policies. IDB has also begun to pay much more attention to the 
strength of financial institutions and to their overall performance. It has been much less 
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effective in helping financial systems to be more aggressive in mobilizing deposits, although 
deposits mobilization is now an explicit objective of the IDB. Only recently has IDB began 
to expand its programs in rural finance to include non-farm rural enterprises. 
Occasionally, the most important contribution a donor agency can make to policy 
changes in I low income countries is to do nothing--or to not work at cross purposes with 
innovative activities sponsored by other donors. IDB, for example, was a silent, but very 
important partner in the highly successful deposit mobilization program sponsored by A.I.D. 
in the Dominican Republic. Initially, the A.I.D. sponsored program focused on helping the 
Agricultur~l Bank to mobilize deposits. This Bank had received a number of loans from 
IDB over the years to fund various types of agricultural credits and would have preferred 
to borrow further from IDB rather than to do the much more difficult job of mobilizing 
deposits. To its credit, IDB supported A.I.D.'s project by not lending to the Agricultural 
Bank during the critical formative years of the deposit mobilization project. This type of 
donor coordination is vital when critical policy issues such as deposit mobilization and 
interest ra~es are at stake. 
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